

RICHMOND CITIZENS PUBLIC SAFETY BULLETIN

**STOP CD161 ADOPTION
STOP BYLAW 7884 AMENDEMENT**

To Public Hearing
 Date: Feb 21/05
 Item #: 74
 Re: Bylaw 7884
 11000-11000 Nos
 12000 Steveston Hwy

PUBLIC MEETING MONDAY FEB 21ST @7 00 P M
CITY COUNCIL CHAMBERS

WITHOUT PREDJUDICE

RICHMOND CITY HALL IS SELLING AND REZONING IT'S OWN PROPERTY AT 12000 STEVESTON HWY REALLY, IT'S SELLING YOUR PROPERTY TO BE COMPLETELY REZONED FOR A PUB AND LIQUOR STORE AT ONE OF THE BUSIEST, MOST DANGEROUS INTERSECTIONS IN RICHMOND A HIGH COLLISION INTERSECTION 175M FROM THE BUSIEST FREEWAY AND TUNNEL IN THE PROVINCE

IS THIS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR JUST BAD JUDGEMENT??? YOU DECIDE

LIQUOR STORES, PUBS, FREEWAYS AND HIGHWAYS DO NOT MIX - IT'S A BAD IDEA!!!


WHOSE INTERESTS DOES CITY HALL HAVE IN MIND???

NOT YOURS AS SHOWN BY THEIR VOTING RECORD ON THIS ISSUE LAST WEEK **PUBLIC SAFETY SHOULD BE THE MAIN CONCERN!** WHEN FAMILIES TRAVEL THROUGH THIS INTERSECTION AND ON THE FREEWAY WE WANT TO KNOW WE'RE SAFE BYLAW 7884 IS DANGEROUS TO MY FAMILY!

YOU DO NOT PUB PUBS AND LIQUOR STORES IN BUSY HIGH IMPACT INTERSECTIONS NEXT TO FREEWAY'S AND RAMPS THIS IS URBAN PLANNING 101 MR. ERCEQ, MR. ALLEAU AND MRS LEE!!! TELL CITY HALL - NO WAY!!!

CONTACT YOUR COUNCILLORS @ 604-276-4000 AND THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT SUPERVISOR @ 604-660-8295 WE DIDN'T ELECT A COUNCIL TO MAKE POOR DECISIONS SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AND DISREGARD THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THE PUBLIC.

SPEAK OUT TO STOP THE ADOPTION OF BYLAW 7884 AMENDEMENT NOW!!



RICHMOND CITIZENS COALITION
RICHMOND_CITIZEN@YAHOO CA

1st Last time we looked zoning was not "For Sale"

734 5/39

STOP BYLAW 7884!

	INTL
✓	JRM
	DW
	KY
	AS
	DB
	WB

AMMENDMENT AND ADOPTION ON FEB 21ST @RICHMOND CITY HALL

TELL RICHMOND CITY COUNCIL – LISTEN UP

8060-20-7884

“BUILD THE PUBS, LIQUOR STORES, CABERETS AND XXX STORES IN YOUR OWN BACKYARDS . NOT OURS NO WAY!!!!”

- ***** NO MORE PUBS
- ***** NO MORE LIQUOR STORES
- ***** NO PORN STORES
- ***** NO CABERETS


Public Hse	
Date	Feb 21/05
Item #	14
Pe	7884
11000-11400 No 5	
12000 Sleevette Ho	

MAKE YOUR VOICE BE HEARD. ATTEND THE CITY COUNCIL MEETING ON MONDAY FEB. 21ST AT 7:00 P.M. AT RICHMOND CITY HALL – CITY COUNCIL CHAMBERS

* STOP BYLAW 7884 ADOPTION *

“PROTECT YOUR NEIGHBOUHOOD”

ADOPTION OF BYLAW 7884 WILL HURT RICHMOND PAID FOR BY RICHMOND CITIZEN COALITION RICHMOND_CITIZEN@YAHOO CA






Calgary Police Service

Liquor Stores & Crime


*A Study of Crime at Privatized Liquor Outlets
1993—2002*



Preeti Adhopia, M.A.

May 2003

Providing support to the Service
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SECTION
through analysis, planning and evaluation



Map 1
Location of Calgary
Liquor Stores
2003

Preeti Adhopia (April 2003)
 Research & Development Section
 Calgary Police Service

Table of Contents

Background	1
Growth of Liquor Stores Since 1993	1
Crime at Calgary Liquor Stores	3
Person Crime	4
Property Crime	7
Other Criminal Code	8
Spatial Crime Data	8
Summary	12
Discussion	14
References	17
Appendix	18

List of Tables, Figures and Maps

Figure 1 Number of Calgary Liquor Stores, 1993-2002	1
Map 1 Location of Calgary Liquor Stores, 2003*	2
Figure 2 <i>Criminal Code</i> Offences & Rate at Calgary Liquor Stores, 1993-2002	4
Table 1 <i>Criminal Code</i> Offences & Rate at Calgary Liquor Stores, 1993-2002	5
Figure 3 Person Crime Rate for Calgary and at Liquor Stores, 1993-2002	6
Figure 4 Commercial Robbery Venues, 2002	7
Map 2 Person Offences at Calgary Liquor Stores, 1998-2002*	9
Map 3 Property Offences at Calgary Liquor Stores, 1998-2002*	10
Table 2 Summary of Map 2	11
Table 3 Summary of Map 3	11
Map 4 Density of Calgary Liquor Stores*	13
Table 4 Distribution of Liquor Stores by Ward and Police District	18

*** See Appendix for Maps 1-4 by city ward boundaries.**

Background

In September 1993, the Alberta Government announced the privatization of Alberta Liquor Control Board (ALCB) outlets, ending more than 70 years of government controlled liquor retailing. September 2003 will mark ten years since the decision to deregulate. An examination of this decade is important in evaluating the impact of this decision. Since Alberta is the only province to fully privatize liquor sales, its experience is also significant to other provinces considering similar action.


It is certain that privatization has resulted in the proliferation of liquor stores and the availability of alcohol. While the impact of privatization on economics and alcohol consumption have been studied, the impact on crime and social disorder has been less obvious. A key step in evaluating the impact of privatization is to measure whether liquor stores themselves experienced any changes in crime.

The purpose of this report is to examine how privatization has influenced liquor stores' vulnerability to crime in Calgary.

Growth of Liquor Stores Since 1993

Given that government operated liquor retailing was initially established to regulate the availability of alcohol, it is natural that privatization might cause liquor stores to proliferate as the forces of supply and demand come to govern the market. Indeed, as seen in Figure 1, the number of liquor stores in Calgary grew by 620%, from 29 in 1993 to 209 in 2002¹. The current distribution of liquor stores across the city is depicted in Map 1.

While it may be argued that the expansion of liquor retailing was proportionate to Calgary's vigorous population growth, a glance at rates suggests an imbalance, in 1993 there were just over 3 liquor stores per 100,000 people, compared with 23 liquor retailers per 100,000 Calgarians by 2002. Certainly, diminished government control has supported growth in retail opportunities.



¹ These figures represent liquor stores selling spirits and do not include beer and wine outlets.

This expansion is not unusual, in the 1970s, Idaho, Maine, Washington and Virginia decided to permit private grocery stores to sell wine in competition with state-operated outlets. This resulted in an increase from 70 to 1,000 outlets in Idaho, from 65 to 1,400 outlets in Maine, and from 300 outlets to 4,000 in both Washington and Virginia.

In Calgary, privatization enhanced the availability of alcohol, not only by increasing the number of outlets in the city, but also by augmenting methods of payment for customers (credit and debit cards), and via longer hours of operation. Since the *Liquor Control Act* no longer governs the activities of retailers, owners are less restricted. Whereas in 1993 hours of operation were set at a maximum of 72 hours per week (10:00 am to 10:00 pm six days a week), today many liquor stores are open 112 hours each week (10:00 am until 2:00 am seven days a week).

After such a profound increase in the number of liquor stores with non-standardized operating procedures, new methods of payment (that might attract fraud), and a longer operating span, changes in how liquor stores experience crime requires exploration.

Crime at Calgary Liquor Stores

In 1993, the year that Alberta announced privatization, there were a total of 111 *Criminal Code* (CC) offences took place at Calgary liquor stores. Since then, there has been a general upward trend in the raw number of offences (See *Figure 2*). However, this trend does not take into account the increase in the actual number of stores. That is to say, one could expect more crime when there are more stores. When we examine the rate at which liquor stores experienced overall crime (number of offences divided by the number of stores each year), a different trend emerges. *Figure 2* shows the difference between the number and rate of offences.

Although there were only 29 liquor stores in 1993, they experienced 111 offences, rendering a rate of 3.83 reported crimes per store. This compares to 2.57 crimes per store in 2002, when there were 209 liquor outlets. Accordingly, in 2002, liquor stores actually experienced crime at a lower rate than ten years previous. The 1993 rate was actually the highest overall rate in the ten years under study.

Table 1 (page 5) is a more detailed presentation of the number and rate of offences by crime category. It is essential to break down the data in order to determine whether overall numbers are masking trends in specific crime categories.

**Table 1
Criminal Code Offences and Rate* at Calgary Liquor Stores, 1993-2002**

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
	Rate	rate	rate	rate	rate	rate	rate	rate	rate	rate
Homicide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	1	15	16	21	25	21	53	23	32	49
Sex Crimes	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	2	1	0
Assault	5	2	2	12	5	17	17	17	18	19
MISC Person	0	0	1	4	0	0	6	1	3	7
TOTAL PERSON CRIME	6	17	20	37	30	38	79	43	54	75
Break & Enter	23	79	34	36	29	76	74	28	29	28
Theft	67	101	152	140	120	192	260	201	174	256
Auto Theft	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fraud	8	9	32	59	52	79	19	15	26	48
Other Property	4	4	11	19	17	28	27	24	23	28
TOTAL PROPERTY CRIME	102	194	229	254	218	375	380	268	252	360
TOTAL OTHER CC	3	2	26	17	4	17	62	46	108	103
TOTAL CRIMINAL CODE	111	213	275	308	252	430	521	357	414	538
# Liquor Stores	29	97	110	132	138	171	201	204	202	209

*Rate= offences per liquor store (calculated by dividing the number of offences by the number of stores in a year)

Source PIMS, January 2003


As per the Criminal Code, "assault" refers to not only the use of intentional force, but also to attempts, threatening gestures, and verbal threats

Note: The data in the above table is based on the offence as the unit of count, rather than the incident. Thus, an incident where a liquor store clerk was assaulted and robbed is counted in both the robbery and assault fields.

■ Government regulated stores had *standardized* security practices and operating procedures across all of their stores, whereas private owners' practices vary from store to store. A would-be robbery offender who may have dismissed all government shops because they had identical security, now has increased opportunity among any liquor stores where there are known variations in operations.


Since liquor stores are now subject to the same vulnerabilities as many other private retailers, an important question is how they fare compared to similar businesses. Gas stations and convenience stores are equally prolific and also operate into the early morning, if not 24 hours each day. In 2002, robberies at liquor stores represented only 15% of all commercial robberies that took place in Calgary. As shown in Figure 4, another 27% took place at gas stations, and 19% at convenience stores.

If we examine rates, however, the victimization gap is narrower. With 74 robberies occurring at the 318 Calgary gas stations, the robbery rate in 2002 (0.23) was only slightly higher than liquor stores (0.21 if we exclude the roll-job robberies). Thus, the victimization rate at liquor stores is comparable to gas stations and is not unique. Due to limitations in accessing data, it was not possible to calculate a robbery rate for *all* convenience stores. However, if we isolate the two major late-night convenience store chains, the robbery rate in 2002 was 0.26, again comparable to liquor stores. Rates for the three types of businesses discussed are high compared to retailers that do not open late at night. The robbery rate for pawnshops, for example, was only 0.03 in 2002, much lower than gas stations, liquor stores and convenience stores.



Property Crime

In terms of property crimes shown in Table 1, break-and-enters fluctuated over the past ten years. Most interesting is that the spikes in 1994, 1998 and 1999 correspond with



Map 2
Person Crimes at Calgary
Liquor Stores
1998 - 2002

Preeti Adhopia (April 2003)
 Research & Development Section
 Calgary Police Service

Map 2 demonstrates that many (130) liquor stores experienced some person crime over the past five years. However, there were only a few instances showing a liquor store location encountering more than three person offences in the five years. Table 2 below summarizes the map, showing that 115 stores experienced between one and three person crimes. This means that 68% of all person offences during this time took place at these 115 stores³. While these figures do not appear unusual, it is also clear from the remainder of the table that only 15 liquor stores attracted the remaining 32% of person crimes. In sum, 11% of victimized liquor stores attracted 32% of the person crimes.

**Table 2
Summary of Map 2**

Number of Person Offences	Map 2 Symbol	Number of Stores	% of total Offences
1-3		115	68%
4-6	■	12	21%
7-9	∴	1	6%
10-12	†	2	5%



A similar pattern emerges when property crimes in Map 3 are examined. Most stores (246) typically experienced ten or fewer property crimes - mainly theft - over the five-year period (green dots). These stores accounted for 61% of property crimes at liquor stores. Conversely, few locations had more than ten property crime incidents in five years. An average of less than 2 shoplifting cases at a store each year does not seem out of the ordinary. However, as seen in Table 3 below, only 33 stores accounted for the remaining 39% of all property crimes at liquor stores. In other words, 12% of victimized stores attracted 39% of the property crimes.


**Table 3
Summary of Map 3**

Number of Property Offences	Map 3 Symbol	Number of Stores	% of total Property Offences
1-10		246	61%
11-20	■	27	27%
21-30	∴	4	7%
31-40	†	2	5%



These figures suggest that only a few locations attract much of the overall crime that takes place at Calgary liquor stores. Furthermore, the maps indicate that many of these heavily victimized stores are clustered together. For both person and property crime, the downtown area, and the region northeast of downtown have the most

³ Since the map represents five years of data and there was a different number of stores each year, it was not possible to calculate a rate nor say definitively how many stores experienced no crime at all.



Map 4
Density of Calgary
Liquor Stores
2003

Preeti Adhopa (April 2003)
 Research & Development Section
 Calgary Police Service

stores do, nor influence a community in the same way. Liquor stores support late night activity and customer traffic. When they are clustered together, the effect is to concentrate night-time traffic and support conditions for loitering and violence. Indeed, Maxwell and Immergluck (1997) report such things as littering, loitering, harassment and intimidation of pedestrians and customers, public urination, drug dealing and prostitution as associated with a concentration of liquor retailers. This condition is magnified when bars and convenience stores open late are nearby, and interactions between people who have been drinking are increased.

The result is to further degrade a neighbourhood and discourage diverse types of retailing both by taking up commercial space and by being unattractive to other businesses. If this neighbourhood already experiences crime disproportionately, the cycle of decay is difficult to avert. Maxwell and Immergluck conclude that high concentrations of liquor stores in lower income and minority neighbourhoods undermines community development and social vitality by supporting this spiral of decline.

In Cook County, Illinois, it was determined that per capita density of liquor stores in lower-income zip codes was in fact more than twice the density in higher income zip codes (Maxwell & Immergluck, 1997). As the median income decreased, the density of liquor stores increased. These researchers suggest that liquor stores may also cluster in lower-income neighbourhoods because the community might lack political organization or power to influence retail zoning or resist proliferation of such outlets. Moreover, business operation may be more feasible for some owners in lower income areas, particularly since they tend to offer more retail space. This concentration may predispose such retailers to bad management practices due to heavy competition, as was suggested. For example, owners may reduce expenses by dispensing of security measures, poor lighting, fewer garbage repositories, or even feel pressure into selling to underage youth.

Many cities, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, have implemented liquor store zoning and concentration ordinances to assist disempowered communities in maintaining social vitality and to minimize their perceived risk of spill-over crime. Indeed, some researchers propose that,

Neighbourhoods with high crime rates will be unattractive to "legitimate" [sic] commercial enterprises, thereby creating a vacuum into which less desirable businesses, such as additional retail alcohol outlets, can step. Thus a "spiral of decline" is set in motion, in which physical disorder leads to high crime rates, and high crime rates lead to further physical disorder (Speer et al., 1998, p 313)

One study which analyzed the statistical relationship between assaults and the density of liquor stores, found that in 74 Los Angeles County cities, assaults are significantly associated with density of both off-sale and on-sale alcohol outlets (Scribner et al., 1995). Another study by Speer et al. (1998) presents a rigorous statistical analysis and also finds that,

References

- Adhopia, P. *Understanding Commercial Robbery* Calgary: Calgary Police Service, 2000
- Grover, P. *Preventing Problems Related to Alcohol Availability* Sacramento: Centre for Substance Abuse Prevention, 1999
- Holder, H D and Wagenaar, A C "Effects of the Elimination of a State Monopoly on Distilled Spirits' Retail Sales: A Time Series Analysis of Iowa" *British Journal of Addiction* 1990; 85, 1615-1625
- Laxer, G , Green, D , Harrison, T and Neu, D. *Out of Control: Paying the Price for Privatizing Alberta's Liquor Control Board* Alberta: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternative, 1994
- Maxwell, A & Immergluck, D. *Liquorlining: Liquor Store Concentration and Community Development in Lower-Income Cook County (IL) Neighbourhoods* Chicago: Woodstock Institute, 1997
- Scribner, R A , MacKinnon, D P and Dwyer, J H "The Risk of Assaultive Violence and Alcohol Availability in Los Angeles" *American Journal of Public Health* 1995, 85(3), 335-340
- Scribner, R A , Cohen, D A and Fisher, W "Evidence of a Structural Effect for Alcohol Outlet Density: A Multilevel Analysis" *Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research* 2000, 24(2), 188-195
- Speer P W , Gorman, D M , Labouvie, E W and Ontkusk, M J. "Violent crime and Alcohol Availability: Relationships in an Urban Community " *Journal of Public Health Policy* 1998,19(3), 303-318
- West, D S. *The Privatization of Liquor Retailing in Alberta* Alberta: Fraser Institute, 2003