

Review of Alternative Models for the Delivery of Police Services

City of Richmond

perivale + taylor

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1.1 Complexity of Policing

The Context for Change

The basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder¹. While policing processes and activities associated with this mission have evolved over time and the manifestations of crime and disorder in society have changed, the basic mission of the public police in a democracy remains constant since Peel first presented the principles of policing, when establishing the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829. How this mission is made operational in terms of police functions and the form that it takes, is the foundation upon which this *Review* is built.

Regardless of the administrative model employed (contract with the RCMP, municipal service, contract with municipal police, or regional service), police perform six principal functions associated with the basic mission:

- Protection of life and property
- Crime prevention & detection
- Law enforcement
- Assistance to victims of crime
- Public order maintenance
- Emergency response.

While the principal functions of policing remain evident, it is also apparent that the business of policing is changing, internationally, nationally and provincially, with an attending impact on the local provision of police functions. Although the traditional reactive response to calls for service remains a core task of police, the operations, structure and management of police organizations across Canada are now expected to respond in a proactive way to more complex and diverse demands.

These demands are experienced in several areas:

- The budgets devoted to policing, and to protective services in general, are competing with other social policy initiatives such as health, education and civic infrastructure maintenance and development.
- Technological change facilitates alternatives to the traditional operational and administrative aspects of police work.
- The use of technology in crime
- Increasingly complex legislation makes the task of policing more administratively difficult.
- The public and governance authorities are demanding greater accountability by the police and more input to police priority setting.
- Employees of police organizations are demanding greater opportunity to participate in operational and administrative decisions that affect their work and safety.

¹ Sir Robert Peel, 1829

- The demographic make-up of the community is changing with an increasing representation of non-European members of the community and an increase in the average age of the population.
- The expanding suburban populations have resulted in regionalization or consolidation of police services.
- There is an almost universal trend in policing to move to a community-based police operation.
- Policing functions are becoming privatized with more prevention and enforcement responsibilities being assumed by non-public police organizations.
- Many jurisdictions are assessing the relative costs and benefits of a municipal policing service or a contracted service.

Adapting to Change

In response to these pressures, police agencies have examined their operations and management so that they can deliver service in a more effective, efficient, and economic manner. Hierarchies have been reduced², differential call response processes have been implemented, civilian staff are now used where the skills and abilities of a police officer are not required, there are fees for service and the contracting out of some work. More police organizations are establishing protocols and alliances with other agencies and with private policing and security organizations to ensure a broader community approach to safety and security. Municipalities and provinces are frequently under pressure to assess policing strategies to determine whether a contracted or partial contracted service or regionalized services will provide a more or less efficient service than their current arrangement.

The changed and changing nature of crime and social disorder and corresponding legislation has brought about a complex transformation in the strategies required to address such issues. Where crime was once seen as a clearly defined set of actions, the suppression of which were clearly the responsibility of a specialized body - the public police, these behaviours have now shifted into a more nebulous array of actions that are less clearly definable as crime and, perhaps more so, less clearly the responsibility of one agency. Other organizations such as private security, loss prevention officers, health and addiction treatment workers, and government inspectors are now assuming a greater and more formalized role in addressing community disorder.

Policing agencies face many demands and opportunities that seem inconsistent and even contradictory, such as community-based policing and hot-spot targeting, temporal deployment and staff wellness concerns. The ideal organization requires a culture of excellence and flexibility to prepare and deploy its resources in an effective, efficient, and economic manner. Policing is dynamic and, particularly over the past two decades, there have been many explorations into how the police can be more productive, community aware, and cognizant of employee needs.

² Reduction of supervisory and management levels has been one facet of police reform. Several departments have removed intermediate ranks such as "Staff Inspectors" and "Staff sergeants".

1.2 The Background to the Review

The perspective of the City of Richmond

The City of Richmond recognizes that the nature of policing with its long term commitment to resources requires a strategic approach. The civic administration and Council are also cognizant that the current Municipal Policing Agreement expires in 2012. In keeping with its obligation to practice due diligence, the City of Richmond has undertaken a review of the operations, administration, management, and governance of policing to:

- ensure the City has the best policing model available to meet Richmond's specific community needs;
- guarantee that the policing model provides cost effective policing services and local accountability; and
- ensure Richmond's policing service reflects the changing, more urbanized nature of the community and the region.

The *Review* is intended to provide a foundation for establishing a strategic approach to policing in the City of Richmond. Consequently, the *Review* provides a comprehensive, realistic, achievable, and practical treatment of a range of issues including, but not limited to:

- An examination of current and forecasted population and demographic circumstances.
- A review of existing police operations, service levels, accountability frameworks, and governance.
- A review of areas of comparison between the RCMP Richmond Detachment and municipal police forces.
- A qualitative and quantitative examination of community crime, social disorder, and policing trends and a determination of potential future demands on policing services.
- Infrastructure and capital costs.
- The provision of options and recommendations in support of strategic policing and public safety objectives, including recommendations regarding human resource requirements, infrastructure development, and funding required to accomplish the options and recommendations.

The City of Richmond is currently policed by the RCMP operating under an Agreement. The *Municipal Police Unit Agreement* between the City of Richmond and the Province, dated April 1st, 1992, provides the following mandate for the police:

ARTICLE 2.3

Those members who form part of any Municipal Police Unit shall

- (a) *perform the duties of peace officers; and*
- (b) *render such services as are necessary to*
 - i) *preserve the peace, protect life and property, prevent crime and offences against the laws of Canada and the Province, apprehend criminals, offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody; and*
 - ii) *execute all warrants and perform all duties and services in relation thereto that may, under the laws of Canada, the province or the Municipality, be executed and performed by peace officers.*

The *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act* provides the following mandate:

- 18. It is the duty of members who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner,*
- (a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody;*
 - (b) to execute all warrants, and perform all duties and services in relation thereto, that may, under this Act or the laws of Canada or the laws in force in any province, be lawfully executed and performed by peace officers;*
 - (c) to perform all duties that may be lawfully performed by peace officers in relation to the escort and conveyance of convicts and other persons in custody to or from any courts, places of punishment or confinement, asylums or other places; and*
 - (d) to perform such other duties and functions as are prescribed by the Governor in Council or the Commissioner.*

The Richmond Detachment is located in a building adjacent to City hall; the building previously housed the provincial court. The detachment has an established strength of 193³ sworn officers, one federal employee⁴, and 57 full time and 25 part time/auxiliary municipal employees. The detachment is led by an Officer in Charge (OIC), a superintendent, who reports to an Assistant Commissioner, Lower Mainland District. Two inspectors, one responsible for Operations, the other Operational Support, report to the Detachment OIC. The Detachment is responsible for the policing of the City of Richmond and, under separate contract between the City and airport, for the policing of Vancouver International Airport which is located within the City boundary⁵.

In addition to sworn police officers (and civilian support personnel), some of the attendant activities associated with principal policing functions are being undertaken by non-sworn security officers, community by-law officers, and other civic safety providers (Fire-Rescue, Emergency), city departments and external agencies (BC Ambulance, Coast Guard, and health services), as part of an integrated team response to the totality of community safety needs.

³ Current number supplied by RCMP. An additional 12 officers have been approved for 2007. It will be noted throughout the report that various numbers are used as the complement in the Detachment. These variations depend upon the various sources of the data. These are noted where relevant.

⁴ One crime analyst. Funding for a second analyst position has been approved by the City.

⁵ 27 airport police members in addition to the City detachment strength.

The Review objectives and outcomes

The goal of the project is to undertake the research necessary to prepare and present to the City of Richmond Council, a '*Review of Alternative Models for the Delivery of Police Services (Review)*.' The intention of the *Review* is to provide rigorous research, findings, and recommendations that will enable the Council to make informed decisions with respect to police service delivery in the City of Richmond and to provide parallel information for consideration by Council. The goal is not to recommend the engagement of a specific police organisation but to ensure that the decision makers are sufficiently apprised regarding all the relevant aspects of policing such that they can make an informed decision concerning service approaches. The *Review* will provide a foundation for policing strategies.

Activities to conduct the *Review* included:

- Comprehensive community and key stakeholder consultations and incorporation of relevant information into the *Review* process and final document.
- Analysis of current geographic demand for services of police functions and projecting the demand for these functions.
- Analysis of current police service performance measures, including a comprehensive examination of the relationship between police officer utilization and demand for police services.
- Benchmarking of comparable municipalities and comparison to the Richmond RCMP Detachment with respect to the functional demands for police service, police officer utilization to address these demands, and the relative expenditure levels by municipalities.
- Providing recommendation(s) respecting level(s) of police officer utilization based on current and projected geographic demand for policing service functions, identified criteria on which to determine appropriate workforce distribution, and an identification of potential technological applications that may impact police human resource acquisition/retention and/or deployment.

Additionally, within the framework of the *Review*, the research included:

- Analysis of the current utilization of police officers, other supporting public safety service agencies, infrastructure and asset management, to identify gaps, areas of duplication as well as opportunities that may arise to support and enhance the strategic objectives of the City of Richmond with respect to police service delivery.
- Provide a review of police governance issues impacting the City of Richmond and provide, as applicable, recommendations with respect to the issue of policing accountability.

1.3 Methodology

Principal elements of the data gathering and analysis

- 1 Literature research and document examination to facilitate 'Best practices' research.

Purpose:

- To identify and review previous studies and articles from policing, other public agencies and private industry, which highlight innovative ways of examining performance indicators and defining outcome effectiveness measures.
- To identify appropriate municipal or other police services to use as comparators with the demographics and crime and other relevant issues similar to those of Richmond.

- 2 Survey of other agencies and organisations

Purpose:

- To develop an appropriate set of comparisons with other municipal police agencies to provide "benchmark" data for assessing the options for policing in the City of Richmond.
- To help in the development of projections of future staffing/budgeting requirements as they may impact an alternative policing structure in Richmond.
- To develop detail of programs and processes that may enhance the policing strategies in City of Richmond.

- 3 Develop an in-depth understanding of the current policing model in Richmond through general overview interviews with key individuals representing the principle stakeholders.

Purpose:

- To obtain general information on the goals and objectives of the services; perceived strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, services' culture; expectations of the Council, City personnel, Detachment and Divisional managers, 'E' Division Integrated Policing Branch and the various communities within Richmond.
- To obtain suggestions for specific contacts with individuals who have more specialized knowledge in the areas under review.
- To identify salient events and issues that should be considered in conducting the *Review*.
- Interviews were conducted with one hundred representatives of various municipal, provincial and federal agencies, police agencies and with community agency representatives.

4 Conduct of an Environmental Scan.

Purpose:

- To ascertain trends that may impact future community safety and security needs or that may influence governance decisions.

5 Consultation with members of the public

Purpose:

- To provide an assessment of the changing responsibilities and organisational framework of the City of Richmond police services in view of the needs and expectations of the members of the community and specific community groups.
- To obtain ideas for strategic direction and service enhancements in light of the experience of levels of consultation, customer service, victim and witness support, and follow through on commitments.

Public consultation took three forms:

Focus groups - Focus groups were developed based upon lists of contact agencies provided by the RCMP Richmond Detachment and the City of Richmond. Also, other sources such as Yellow Pages and local newspapers and other periodicals were consulted to ensure an inclusive representation.

These agencies were divided into two categories: emergency/crisis services and general/ community support. To ensure that the focus groups were discussing on a similar level of police involvement and degree of intensity, the focus groups were conducted based upon this division. Discussion was based on six core issues which explored the “ideal” model for Richmond rather than focus on a review of current RCMP practices.

Open house – An open house for the public was arranged at City Hall. For five days and evenings, the public could attend a series of displays which explained, in some detail, the project mandate and invited input from attendees. An opinion form based on the six core discussion points could be completed on site and submitted or taken away and submitted later.

Web site – A project website was created as an attachment to the City of Richmond site. By clicking on an icon, the public was able to access a project description and complete an opinion form. Approximately 30 members of the public chose to submit an opinion.

6 Consultation with members of the police agencies

As an important phase of the *Review*, interviews were conducted with representatives of various policing organizations at municipal, provincial, and federal levels. The interviews were both structured and unstructured.

In addition, a combined focus group was conducted with representatives of three municipal police departments and three RCMP detachments. The discussion was based on the same six issues used in the public focus group but oriented towards a police perspective.

7 Accompanying General Duty RCMP Personnel.

Shift briefings were attended and field accompaniments were conducted to experience (in a very limited way) the work of General Duty personnel.

The goal of the report

It is recognized that this report will receive wide distribution. Given the importance of policing as a societal role and the cost of policing relative to other municipal services, a range of people will likely have call to peruse the results of the *Review*. In addition, in the course of the *Review*, representatives of several municipalities inquired regarding the *Review* process and expressed an interest in the potential impact of changes in service structure.

The elected representatives of the City are the principal contractual clients; the core objective of the *Review* and the resulting report is to provide insight into the options regarding the policing service for the City, allowing the elected representatives to make informed decisions regarding policing services. Consequently, the report is oriented so that the decision makers are provided a comprehensive understanding of the principal issues to consider in developing a policing service which meets the needs of Richmond. This is not to suggest that this requires the development of a new police agency. Rather, the report describes those attributes of any police service which will address the safety and security needs of the City. It is then a matter of negotiation or development to structure a police service that meets these needs.

The issues which are considered as findings evolved based upon the methodology outlined above. The prime focus during the *Review*, and in the subsequent report, is to address the specific needs of Richmond. This orientation is gleaned from the responses to interview questions, the demographic and workload data in Richmond, and the consultants' understanding of community safety and security issues and how best practices might be enhanced in the Richmond context.

This *Review* is not an audit of RCMP or the Richmond Detachment policies and practices. However, for two reasons the report specifically addresses the policies and practises which were current at the time of the *Review*.⁶

- The mandate of the *Review* requires comment on selected and specific issues with regards the Richmond Detachment.
- For many who work or live in the Richmond municipality, the current (RCMP), approach is their understanding of policing. From the elected representatives and City administration involved in the oversight of policing, to representatives of community

⁶ In the course of the *Review*, representatives of the RCMP mentioned that programs were under development or operational changes were anticipated. Although the consultants attempted to incorporate these anticipated changes and to keep the time between review and issue of the report to a minimum, inevitably, as policing is dynamic, changes may have occurred in the work of the Detachment.

groups, and to the members of the public who have been victims of a crime, the RCMP '*modus operandi*' is their frame of reference for policing. Any discussion of current practices must, therefore, be rooted in the RCMP approach. Likewise, the development and description of any proposed practices must be described against the backdrop of this knowledge.

The lay-out of the report

Following the general description of the methodology, above, the report is written with the intention of providing a cumulative knowledge of the policing requirements of the City.

The general description of policing is explained as a backdrop to the specific policing of Richmond. This provides a context for the examination of the policing of the city. Although there are many unique characteristics to the demographics, geography, and workload requirements of Richmond, policing in the municipality operates within a broader general safety and security environment. Many common denominators exist between policing generally and that in Richmond.

Then, there are descriptions of five principles: governance, evidence-based policing, human resources, administrative bridges, and finance. During the course of the *Review* these five issues emerged as most important from the perspective of interviewees and the *Review* analysis. They were five issues which were considered important as principles for policing in Richmond and were the issues which caused the most frustration in the current system of policing. At the same time, the ongoing review of best practices in other police agencies and other public service organisations demonstrated that, coincidentally, these five principles appeared to be the foundation for effective organisations. As the *Review* progressed, there developed a confluence of these streams of inquiry.

From these five ideals, flow other aspects of the policing approach. The following chapters explain the application of the administrative and operational aspects of the ideal agency.

The arrangement of each section

Each section within the chapters is, generally, arranged in the following way (Selected sections such as those which address 'finance' and the 'statistical analysis' are structured slightly differently owing to the complexity of the analysis and observations):

- An introduction regarding the concept or practice being described such as governance, crime analysis, or ranks/management levels, etc.

- How the concept or practice impacts policing.
- Where applicable, examples of 'best practices' are woven into narrative or bulleted. Examples of initiatives from other jurisdictions are included with literature sources; however, the report is not intended to be a comprehensive academic review of the relevant literature.
- Several police agencies were selected as "comparators". The goal was to examine agencies which have some similarities to Richmond in terms of workload or demographics or any other major characteristic. The goal was to learn from direct comparisons and to gauge the degree to which features such as policing costs, or workload or other factors may be the norm or an anomaly in Richmond.

Selection of true comparators proved to be very difficult. As those familiar with policing will recognise, although common denominators do exist across agencies, there are so many variables which impact the policing approach or the success of policing methods, that direct comparison is virtually impossible. The "comparators" were, therefore, used to provide examples of approaches which may work within the Richmond context and are mentioned as examples of "other ways of doing things".

An additional problem with the use of comparators, in fact with any research of 'best' or any other practices, is that many police agencies are so inundated with requests for information from other agencies that, in some cases, there is a difficulty in assigning resources necessary to research and prepare the data. This difficulty is entirely understandable when resources are limited and the focus on operational support must be maintained by the organization. Consequently, information from other agencies was sometimes limited by the availability of the data and the agencies ability to analyse and supply it to the Review. This having been noted, many police and government agencies provided invaluable assistance in the conduct of the Review.

- Conclusions concerning the issue are summarised at the close of each section. On occasion, such as the Finance section, conclusions are mentioned at the close of each sub-issue.
- Finally, one of the goals for the *Review* was to provide insight into the options for a policing service for Richmond. Consequently, each issue or proposed practice is briefly examined from the perspective of:
 - a (continuing or renegotiated) contract with the RCMP for policing
 - a municipal police force
 - contracting with another municipal police force
 - a regionalised police force

The options are described against each of the possible police services providing the best practice or ideal model. These summarised examinations are placed at the end of each section with the goal of providing the reader with an understanding of each concept immediately following the detailed explanation. It was concluded that this feature would allow a sense of continuity of understanding rather than separating the 'Options' discussion in a separate chapter; this would require the reader to make continual reference back to the detailed explanation of the practise.

The option of 'a hybrid of any of the options' was an option specifically mentioned in the terms of reference. During the course of the review it became apparent that a "hybrid" is difficult to define

succinctly and meaningfully or separately as a unique operational or administrative organization or structure. No police agency which exists in Canada today is mutually exclusive of other municipal, provincial or federal law enforcement service. This includes, of course, the Richmond Detachment. Each of the sections includes analyses of aspects of an agency which, in combined form is 'the ideal'. This is, in effect, the hybrid. Each organization described is, therefore, a hybrid. For this reason, the 'hybrid' option is not considered as a separate and distinct option however those elements which are considered relevant are discussed in the narrative.

Each section was laid out in this format to facilitate the following:

- Provide an understanding of, and what are perceived to be, the important elements of the 'ideal' model.
- Follow the logic of the discussion of the importance of the concept or practice.
- Understand the relevant best practices.
- Obtain an exposure to the practices in the comparator agencies.
- Comprehend the rationale for the conclusions.
- Determine how a particular practice would work (or not work) in each of the 'options'.

Project management

A representative of the City of Richmond, the Manager of Community Safety Policy & Programs, was the principal project contact. A member of the RCMP Richmond Detachment with the rank of Staff Sergeant was the principal RCMP contact.

Input and oversight was provided by two committees.

- The Internal Staff Committee was comprised of management level personnel representing City divisions with an interest in community safety and security.
- A senior Project Steering Committee was comprised of two municipal police chiefs, an Assistant Commissioner from the RCMP, and an experienced representative of private industry who, in a previous role, as a Chief Administrative Officer in major city, had management responsibility for policing at municipal level. In addition, two City Councillors, the General Manager, Law and Community Safety Division and the Manager of Community Safety Policy & Programs were also members of the Committee.

Acknowledgments

By its very nature, a review of this type requires very significant input from those who are involved in the safety and security of the community. Accordingly, during the course of the research many staff from the City, the Richmond Detachment, other divisions and functions within the RCMP,

other municipal police departments, the provincial government and federal government, and, of course, elected officials and representatives of the community groups who volunteered or were asked to contribute to the research. The OIC, Superintendent Ward Clapham, provided access, as requested, to RCMP personnel. The consulting team very much appreciate the assistance of the OIC and his colleagues.

All who participated provided valuable information or perspectives on the policing model for Richmond. The Review is very appreciative of the time, knowledge, expertise and experience that the interviewees shared. An essential agreement with those who provided valuable input was that confidentiality would be maintained and particular comments would not be attributed to specific individuals. A list of those who participated in the *Review* is noted in the appendix.

Two participants, Shawn Issel, Manager of Community Safety Policy & Programs, the project manager for the *Review*, and Staff Sergeant Ron Paysen, Client Services, Richmond Detachment, warrant special mention. They contributed an inordinate amount of time along with invaluable opinion, counsel, and orchestration of resources to ensure that there was adequate and timely data as a foundation for the findings of the *Review*.

The City of Richmond Context

2.1 The backdrop to Policing in British Columbia

2.1.1 The context

Policing in British Columbia (BC) is complex. The geography of the province presents major challenges to government in providing the required range of services that facilitate community safety and security. The province consists of major cosmopolitan centres, several international cargo and tourist ports and major airports. Two thirds of the population is concentrated in the lower 10% of the Province. The majority of the population is concentrated in three major centres in the south west corner of the province, Greater Vancouver, Greater Victoria and the Fraser Valley.

Demographically the province is diverse and in a state of rapid change. Parts of the province are undergoing dramatic increase in population whilst other areas are facing rapid declines in population. Urbanization is increasing with the 'young worker' category of 20-40 years increasingly moving to urban areas. The ethnic characteristics of the population are also undergoing significant change. In Canada⁷, 41% of the population is non-English speaking with Chinese, Punjabi and Italian being the dominant non-English languages. Where home spoken languages are considered, approximately 14% are Chinese speaking followed by Italian, German and Spanish. In BC, home languages, 26% are non-English⁸. Although BC has one of the lowest birthrates in the country, the population is increasing fuelled by immigration and inter-provincial migration. Since 2001, the population has increased by 5.3% to 4.1 million people. During the corresponding time, the population of Greater Vancouver has increased by 6.5% to 2.1 million.

The aging of the population has significant impact upon the characteristics of crime and social disorder incidents, the nature of the required policing programs and the funds available through taxation to pay for such services.

BC is organized into 55 Districts (including townships), 20 villages, 15 towns, and 43 cities, excluding the City of Vancouver which is the only city to hold an original charter. There is also a Native Indian Governance District of Sechelt and one Mountain Resort Municipality, Whistler, and one Island municipality, Bowen.

⁷ 2001 Census, Statistics Canada, most recent available. 2006 data is likely to demonstrate more of a shift to non-English.

⁸ See later comparison with City of Richmond. Chinese languages are noted as these are the dominant non-English languages in Richmond.

The ten largest urban areas in 2006 were as follows,

<i>City</i>	<i>Population</i>
Vancouver	578,041
Surrey	394,976
Burnaby	202,799
Richmond	174,461
North Vancouver	127,727
Abbotsford	123,804
Langley	117,332
Coquitlam	114,565
Saanich	108,265
Kelowna	106,707

2.1.2 Community Safety and Security

Note on Comparators

Throughout this chapter and many areas of the report, various local and national comparisons are made. It should be noted that the statistics are drawn from various sources (national, provincial, and local) and the most recent data are used. However, there are a number of variations in the figures provided from the various sources. The figures in the report remain as found in the sources; to amend a local, more recent, figure amongst provincial or national data, while leaving the other figures, would distort the comparison. Notwithstanding the variation, the figures provide an illustration of the broader picture of policing costs, ratios, case burdens, and crime rates, compared to populations.

The population-related figures, unless otherwise noted, are from the 2001 census. The 2006 census data are being released throughout 2007 and 2008.

The RCMP

The administration of justice within provincial and territorial borders, including enforcement of the criminal code, is the constitutional responsibility of the provincial and territorial governments.

The federal government, through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (formerly the Solicitor General) and Public Service Canada (PSC) provides provincial and municipal policing under contract to eight provinces⁹, three territories, and 192 municipalities. The policing contracts are between the federal and provincial governments with municipal policing agreements between the provincial and municipal governments. Twenty-percent of Canadians are policed by the RCMP in urban and rural areas. The RCMP also provides policing through

⁹ The provinces of Ontario and Quebec each have their own provincial police force.

tripartite agreements to certain Aboriginal communities. Nationally, contract policing accounts for \$1.6 billion of the RCMP expenditures and revenue from contract clients totals \$1.1 billion. The RCMP also polices three international airports¹⁰ at an annual cost of \$5m; costs of this policing are arranged at the local level. Contract services account for 60% of the RCMP's 18,500 officers and 47% of the uniformed personnel. The largest five municipal detachments of the RCMP are located in BC.

The *RCMP Act* specifies control and accountability limits with respect to the RCMP. The *Act* assigns the control and management of the force to the Commissioner under the direction of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Internal management, including administration and application of professional police procedures, remain under the control of the Minister. Complaints against RCMP officers are subject to the RCMP Public Complaints process which has the power to review complaints and make recommendations to the RCMP Commissioner.

RCMP contract services are organized into 14 divisions which are divided into districts which comprise groups of detachments. Richmond Detachment is accountable to the Lower Mainland District (LMD) which in turn is accountable to "E" Division¹¹. "E" Division of the RCMP is the provincial police service with over 130 detachments throughout British Columbia and forms part of the RCMP Pacific Region. The RCMP provides federal, provincial and municipal policing to British Columbia with over 5,900 regular members (police officers) and approximately 1,700 civilian members and public service employees, and approximately 1,200 municipal workers and 1,200 auxiliary constables who work with the RCMP. This makes "E" Division the largest in Canada, representing approximately one-third of the total RCMP force. The RCMP polices all but 12 municipalities in British Columbia, and has been the provincial police since 1950 when it absorbed and replaced the BC Provincial Police.

The senior officer of the LMD is an Assistant Commissioner. The area covered by the LMD includes the Lower Mainland, south to the US border, north to approximately Pemberton, and east to the Fraser Valley. This includes the five largest detachments in Canada.

¹⁰ Including the Vancouver International Airport in Richmond

¹¹ The accountability levels of the RCMP are structured however the exact accountability depends upon the nature of the issue.

Five largest RCMP detachments in BC.

<i>Detachment</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Establishment (authorized)</i>
Surrey	393,256	552
Burnaby	204,320	253
Coquitlam/Port Coquitlam	179,558	186
Richmond	173,429	191 ¹²
City of Langley/Langley Township	123,398	167

Source: British Columbia Municipal Police Forces Cost Report 2005, Police Services Division, August 2006.

The RCMP has been involved in contract policing since 1928 when the first provincial agreement was signed. Currently, each participating province and territory has a Provincial (or Territorial) Policing Agreement (PPSA or TPSA), with terms requiring the Province or Territory to pay 70 % and the federal government to pay 30% of the policing costs. Current PPSA and TPSA agreements were signed in 1992 and are in effect until 31 March 2012.

In most cases, municipalities with greater than 15,000 population that have chosen an RCMP service pay 90% of the policing costs while the federal government pays 10%¹³. Municipalities which have chosen an RCMP service and have less than 15,000 but more than 5,000 population pay 70% while the federal government pays 30%.

In BC, the funding for policing in municipalities with population under five thousand has recently been restructured to change the funding base yet allows the inclusion of revenue from traffic violation fines.

The province is responsible for policing. Consequently, the Provincial Police Services Agreement (PPSA) and the master Municipal Policing Agreement (MPA) are arranged, at first instance, between the federal government and the province and then devolved to a Municipal Police Unit Agreement (MPUA) between the provincial government and the municipality¹⁴. In BC, there are fifty eight municipalities which have signed a *Municipal Police Unit Agreement*, representing thirty municipalities with populations between 5,000 and 15,000 and twenty eight municipalities over 15,000 population¹⁵.

The PPSA also guides aboriginal policing, and in some instances a community tripartite agreement (CTA) prevails, between band councils, provinces and the federal government. There

¹² Police strength for Richmond does not include 24 positions for Vancouver Airport protective security. These positions are administered through Richmond RCMP detachment but the Vancouver Airport Authority reimburses 100% of the cost to the City of Richmond. Source: British Columbia Municipal Police Forces Cost Report 2005, Police Services Division, August 2006.

¹³ The Review identified one exception where for historical reasons the municipality pays 70% even though the population exceeds 15,000

¹⁴ Refer to Richmond agreement

¹⁵ Report of the RCMP Contract Discussions, UBCM, 2006.

are 105 tripartite agreements in place across Canada under which Provinces pay 48% of the cost of policing and the federal government pays 52%. There are still some aboriginal policing agreements in place which guide the Aboriginal Community Constable Policing Program (ACCP). The ACCP funds policing in five provinces and two territories with the host province paying 54% and the federal government paying 46%¹⁶.

There are cases within the Greater Vancouver Regional District of RCMP detachments serving more than one municipality, such as the North Vancouver RCMP Detachment services the City and the District of North Vancouver. Likewise, the Coquitlam Detachment of the RCMP services the municipalities of Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam. The West Shore Detachment (Vancouver Island) provides services to five municipalities and two First Nations.

The Report of the RCMP Contract Discussions, UBCM, 2006, made the following comments:

This national shared funding provides advantages to all parties¹⁷.

The federal government receives benefit from a national service which:

- *Creates a pool of trained officers to draw on in emergency situations or to deal with special events such as G8 summits.¹⁸*
- *Enables the RCMP to be a national police service with experience at rural, municipal, provincial and federal level.*
- *Provides the RCMP with a training ground for newly sworn officers to gain experience prior to participating in federal policing activities.*
- *Provides federal policing units with an ongoing source for local criminal intelligence¹⁹.*

The provinces and territories benefit from:

- *A standardized training program for peace officers serving in multiple jurisdictions.*
- *A close working relationship with the RCMP's federal police services.*
- *Recourse to a flexible response, with experts and additional personnel, to assist in the event of a major disaster, major investigation, or special event²⁰.*

The municipalities benefit from:

- *A trained and managed police services with minimal capital or set-up costs.²¹*
- *Recourse to a flexible response, with experts and additional personnel, to assist in the event of a major disaster, major investigation, or special event.²²*
- *Reduced operational policing cost²³.*

¹⁶ Information regarding agreements is taken from the report of the Auditor General, 2005 and the RCMP website.

¹⁷ Any negative impact of such a relationship will be addressed in the report of the Review.

¹⁸ Note: The Review was unable to identify any source recording and measuring when the 10% "federal option" has been or is exercised, and whether the resources utilized were greater or lesser than 10%. Interviews during the Review indicated that the withdrawal of detachment sources for federal events would likely be much less than 10%, especially considering the infrequency of such events.

¹⁹ Points 1-3 from Auditor General Report and confirmed through interviews. Point 4, gleaned from interviews.

²⁰ Auditor General Report 2005

²¹ Note: the current RCMP charge for Academy training is \$3500 per detachment member, or approximately \$600,000 per year. The Justice Institute of BC Police Academy charges fees to the municipal police recruits, but the municipal police departments pay the recruits' salaries and benefits for six months. Assuming an average career term with the municipal department of twenty years, a 200-person department would hire an average of 10 recruits per year at an approximate salary and benefits cost of \$270,000. See the Finance Chapter.)

²² Note: larger police organizations generally have greater economies of scale and the ability to redeploy resources to address disasters, major events, and major investigations. See appendix for the rationale for regionalizing the UK's already large regional forces into larger units. This advantage would apply to the Provincial Police, whether a contracted provincial police or a BC Provincial Police Force as existed prior to 1950.

As noted in the Report of the Auditor General²⁴, policing has changed significantly since the signing of the agreements in 1992:

- At that time, the RCMP and most police agencies were in the early stages of a community policing orientation. Begun in many jurisdictions earlier, this marked wholesale change in the philosophy and practice of policing from a reactive to a proactive approach.
- Legislative changes such as *The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* introduced different pressures upon police organizations and their personnel.
- Events, such as those of September 11, 2001, brought into sharp focus the necessity of law enforcement agencies to work together to ensure orchestrated activities within and across jurisdictions.
- The public and police employees demanded greater accountability from police managers with an increased emphasis upon planning and the monitoring of outcomes.
- The implementation of standards and their strict enforcement by more informed oversight authorities²⁵ brought about a renewal of a focus on quality within policing and, more particularly, in municipal services.

Given the imminent expiry of the current 1992 agreements, a process of consultation has begun between the various stakeholders. Preliminary work has been undertaken between the provincial Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities. The following guidelines have been introduced to guide the process of negotiation²⁶.

- *Continuation of the RCMP is beneficial to all.*²⁷
- *All aspects of agreements to be reviewed.*
- *Agreements will be clear and flexible.*
- *All parties to work together in good faith to approve agreements before 2012.*
- *RCMP to continue to provide a policing service until agreement is reached.*

The following three principal concerns with the delivery and financing of policing services under the RCMP contract were identified in a workshop of local government participants²⁸.

- *Financial costs (with thirty-two sub-concerns).*
- *Governance and Accountability (with twenty-six sub-concerns).*
- *Service Delivery and Staffing (with twenty-four sub-concerns).*

²³ British Columbia Municipal Police Forces Cost Report 2005, Police Services Division, August 2006..

²⁴ Auditor General Report 2005 1.11

²⁵ Excellent training programs and supporting documentation have been made available through, for example, the BC provincial Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General and the Ontario Association of Police Service Boards.

²⁶ Summary Report on RCMP Contract Discussions, UBCM, website.

²⁷ Note: The Review will highlight and compare areas where there may be disadvantages.

²⁸ Ibid.

Independent Municipal Police Services²⁹

Municipal Policing is founded on the delegation of authority under the Constitution. The *Constitution Act, 1867* outlines the devolution of powers and the jurisdictions of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.³⁰ Both Parliament and the provincial legislatures can enact statutes on any issues under their authority. They can also enact “subordinate legislation” on any issues under their authority in which they delegate the power to enact legislation to an individual or group. Such is the case with by-laws, ordinances, regulations and orders-in-council.

Under the *Constitution Act*, the federal government has exclusive power with regards to criminal law and procedures. The *Criminal Code* is the principal federal statute that defines criminal offences, establishes the nature and degree of punishment to be applied in case of a finding of guilt and establishes the procedures to be followed within the criminal justice process. Other federal statutes address other offences, for example, narcotics.

Also under the *Constitution Act*, the provincial governments are delegated the authority over the creation and maintenance of civil and criminal courts and the administration of justice. This includes the responsibility for public policing. As noted later in this report, the definition of ‘public policing’ is changing however, the provinces still maintain jurisdiction over the licensing of certain professions which are (now) becoming more involved in what was traditionally called ‘public policing’.

Under the Constitution, municipal governments are delegated their power by the provincial government. Local governments traditionally assume responsibility for the provision of services (and the by-laws or ordinances) which are more effectively (and sometimes more efficiently) dealt with at the local rather than provincial level. Local governments, through elected representatives and the support administrations, are responsible for making relevant policies, ensuring the policies are carried out and raising the revenue to support the local tasks that have been delegated to them. Consequently, it is under this authority that municipalities working within the provisions of the provincial *Police Act*, and the associated standards employ the necessary resources to provide a municipal police service.

3 (2) A municipality with a population of more than 5 000 persons must provide policing and law enforcement in accordance with this Act and the regulations by means of one of the following:

²⁹ Municipal police agencies (in BC and elsewhere) are titled ‘Department’, ‘Force’, ‘Service’, or ‘Bureau’. The choice is that of the municipality in conjunction with the agency and the governance authority. In this report, when referring to municipal police agencies, the term *department* is used, when referring to the RCMP, *detachment* is used. When the nature of the agency is irrelevant to the question or issue, the term *organisation* is used,

³⁰ Source for information in this section, *BC Police Board Handbook, 2005*, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, authored by M. LaLonde and Darryl Keane. As the text is clear and well explained, it is quoted almost verbatim.

- (a) establishing a municipal police department;*
 - (b) entering into an agreement with the minister under which policing and law enforcement in the municipality will be provided by the provincial police force;*
 - (c) with the approval of the minister, entering into an agreement with another municipality that has a municipal police department under which policing and law enforcement in the municipality will be provided by the municipal police department of that municipality.*
- (3) An agreement under subsection (2) (b) or (c) must contain terms that the Lieutenant Governor in Council approves.*

Specific governance models and cost differences and issues are discussed in detail in the respective chapters; however, the most significant difference between a contracted police service and establishing a municipal police department is the accompanying responsibility for administration and liability. The *Police Act, Section 23*, defines the role of oversight authority.

- *Employer of all civilian and sworn police department personnel.*
- *Sets policy, priorities, goals and objectives for the police.*
- *Prepares and oversees the department budget*
- *Authority for police policy and overseeing complaints investigation.*

Unlike the RCMP policed jurisdictions in which the RCMP assumes responsibility, municipalities which employ their own police force are liable for torts committed by any member of the police service. *Section 20(1a) Police Act* holds that a municipality is jointly and severally responsible for torts committed by any of its municipal constables, special constables or by-law enforcement officers when performing their responsibilities inside the municipality. However, all municipal, and special constables are considered to have jurisdiction throughout the province (*s.38 (1) Police Act*). The Solicitor General, on behalf of the province, is jointly and severally liable for torts committed by municipal constables and special municipal constables in the performance of their duties when acting in other than the municipality where they normally perform their duties. (*s. 11 (1) Police Act*).

The Council of the municipality may choose, on its own volition or on recommendation by the Police Board, to pay the costs incurred by an officer charged with an offence allegedly committed by him or her in performing his/her duties (*s.22(1) Police Act*). However, no action for damages lie against an officer for anything said, done or omitted by him/her in the performing his/her duties (*s. 21(2) Police Act*). This does not apply if the constable is guilty of dishonesty, gross negligence, malicious or willful misconduct, libel or slander.

All municipal officers are provided guidance regarding how to conduct themselves by virtue of swearing an oath of allegiance and office (*s.70 (1) Police Act*) and by adhering to a *Code of Professional Conduct Regulation*.

It is apparent that there are essential differences in the type and degree of oversight which is afforded oversight authorities in municipal versus RCMP jurisdictions. However, these are not mutually exclusive. There is, in fact, a range of possibilities regarding the application of the legislation. These options are described in the governance chapter, chapter 3. There are both advantages and disadvantages in the diverse range of forms of oversight. The nature of the oversight which is engaged in any jurisdiction is, essentially, a consequence of legislation and agreement but, more importantly, as noted later in this report, it is a consequence of the nature of the character of the arrangement that is forged at local level.

Currently, twelve municipalities have chosen to employ a municipal police force. The municipalities and the established strength of the services are noted below³¹.

<i>Policing jurisdiction</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Police strength</i>
Abbotsford	128,165	187
Central Saanich	16,821	21
Delta	102,661	151
Nelson City	9,797	17
New Westminster	57,480	107
Oak Bay	18,313	22
Port Moody	28,453	40
Saanich	110,386	147
Vancouver	584,701	1,174
Victoria & Esquimalt	94,525	215
West Vancouver	46,595	79
Total	1,197,902	2,160

As in all options for policing services, there are both advantages and disadvantages of a municipal police department form of service.³²

Advantages

- A department that is dovetailed to municipal planning and evaluation and budgeting.
- Policy influence over administrative matters such as selection and termination of personnel,
- Some cross use of municipal administrative services, equipment, supplies, lands, and services,
- Direct policy development, application and accountability through a Board or Commission
- Consistency of personnel.

Disadvantages

- Municipality is solely responsible for the staffing of all positions and functions.
- Salaries and benefits to be negotiated periodically with employee representatives.³³
- Liable for torts.
- No easy transfer of personnel who are inconsistent with the municipal environment.
- In smaller departments, the difficulty of maintaining a dynamic challenging work environment for personnel.

³¹ Data shown is the 2005 data that is currently available on the website of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General.

³² Advantages and Disadvantages are summarized and discussed in other sections of the report.

³³ Note: The salaries of the RCMP, Vancouver Police and Delta Police³³: RCMP: \$44,513; within 36 months salary will increase incrementally to \$72,125 annually. Vancouver: \$45,504, to \$70,006 after four years, and \$73,506 after ten years of service with development requirements fulfilled. Delta: \$43,364, to \$69,757 after four years, to \$80,221 after 20 years.

There are two other forms of policing which exist in BC, Designated Policing Units and First Nations Police Services.³⁴

Designated Policing Units³⁵

Designated Policing Units may be established by the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General under the authority of s.4.1 (2) of the *Police Act*. Designated Policing Units are a comparatively recent innovation under the *Police Act*. These are, in effect, the creation of public police forces for functions not easily accomplished by municipal or provincial police which are, generally, by their nature geographically based. Examples of Designated Police Units in urban settings include the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Police Service (GVTAPS) and the Organized Crime Agency of BC³⁶.

The extension of SkyTrain to Richmond and the Vancouver International Airport will add a new policing dimension to Richmond. While GVTAPS will provide first-level policing for the SkyTrain environment, it may be anticipated that additional policing demands and issues will be created by the increased human activity through SkyTrain stations³⁷. No report of anticipated police issues was made available to the *Review*.

First Nations Police Services³⁸ See Appendix 2.1 for details.

Regionalized Services

Unlike Ontario, which has several regionalized forces, BC has no regionalized forces; however, there are several regionalized functions. *Closing the Gap – Policing and the Community Report*³⁹ proposed the consideration of regionalized services, suggesting that regionalisation of services would reap the following benefits. In summary,

- *Cooperative Law Enforcement* – Since criminals do not respect boundaries, amalgamating police forces may facilitate greater cooperation rather than the fractured communication which may occur between many smaller police departments.
- *Capacity to deliver Specialized services* – Where police service demands high costs, such as Emergency Response Teams or forensic laboratories, regionalization allows a critical mass that justifies the large cost incurred for such services.

³⁴ This summary of the First Nations and the Designated Policing Units is sourced in the BC Handbook for Boards which provides a succinct account of policing alternatives.

³⁵ See Appendix 2,1 for details

³⁶ Now the CFSEU Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit

³⁷ See Chapter 3, Research, RCMP Research Chair, "The new Canada Line is the type of development the SFU lab will likely research.

³⁸ This summary of the First Nations and the Designated Policing Units is sourced in the BC Handbook for Boards which provides a succinct account of policing alternatives.

³⁹ Policing in British Columbia, Hon. W. Oppal, Commissioner, 1994

- *Law Enforcement Equity* – Over and above the normal discretion permitted police officers to enforce the law, proponents of regionalization suggest that regionalized forces ensure a more equitable enforcement of laws or complaint processes over wider geographical areas.
- *Personnel Development*. – Regionalized forces permit a larger pool from which specialized officers can be drawn and trained. Larger departments allow promotion within specialized functions and permit access to a pool of personnel for use in emergency situations without undue disruption of core police services.

Justice Oppal also listed disincentives to regionalization.

- *Loss of control* – Where services are regionalized there is an attendant loss of control for those who pay for the services. This would result in less say regarding how those resources are deployed.
- *Loss of resources* – There is a concern that with regionalization, local resources would be drawn to higher crime areas either on an ongoing basis where there is a long term justification for more dense concentration of personnel or on short term basis where an individual incident requires the attendance of a large number of officers.
- *Loss of police identity* – Communities which wish to retain a sense of identity for their service may lose this to a larger regionalized identity.
- *Loss of community based policing* – It is suggested that a move to a regionalized service would detract from the ability of local police to understand and develop programs or deployment to address local policing issues.
- *Police Opposition* – Some personnel fear that regionalization would result in a loss of jobs, moves to different jobs or location with which they are not familiar or different working conditions or command structures.

There have been several examinations of regionalized forces or regionalized services in BC.⁴⁰

- Task Force on Municipal Policing Costs in British Columbia. *Task Force on Municipal Policing Costs in British Columbia: Preliminary Report for Discussion Purposes*. Victoria, 1978. Co-ordinator: Patricia D. Ross.
- Policing the Greater Vancouver Regional District (1980)
- Police Service Regionalization in the North Okanagan (1983)
- Greater Victoria Regional Police Services: A Proposed Model presented by the Victoria Area Chiefs of Police; E. Avison, project coordinator. Victoria, BC. The Departments. (HV 8160 V53 G74 1985)
- Proposal/Discussion Paper on Regional Policing in the G.V.R.D. by Bob Leighton & Associates. (HV 7991 P763 1988)
- Policing British Columbia in the Year 2001: Report of the Regionalization Study Team. Victoria: Police Services Branch. (HV 7991 P643 1990)
- Structure of policing in the Capital regional District: Ministerial Briefing for the Honourable Colin Gableman, Attorney General, the Honourable Robin Blencoe, Minister of Municipal Affairs, Recreation and Housing. Police Services Branch. (HV 8160 V53 P287 1992)
- Regionalization of Policing Services in British Columbia: Quality and Equity Issues. Linda Graham. Victoria, BC. Policing in British Columbia Commission of Enquiry. (HV 7991 G723 1994)
- Policing for the Nineties and Beyond, N.B. Daniel, Abbotsford/Matsqui, (1994)

⁴⁰ The City of Surrey conducted a review of RCMP vs. municipal policing costs but the report did not consider a regionalized service.

- Regionalization in the Central Fraser Valley (1995)
- Redefining public policing in British Columbia. The opportunity to establish an integrated and publicly accountable model of policing, law enforcement, and private security (Vancouver Police Department, 2000)
- Central Saanich, Oak Bay, Saanich and Victoria Police Force Integration Planning Committee Final Report submitted to the Honourable Rich Coleman, Solicitor General and Minister of Public Safety. (2003)
- Lower Mainland (LMD) Integration Initiative (2004⁴¹)

Although regionalization or amalgamations of services are relatively rare, there have been two recent changes in the structure of policing in BC.

As a result of a vote of the two Councils in 1993, the City of Abbotsford and the City of Matsqui amalgamated. The decision was made that the new jurisdiction would be policed by a municipal police force. At the time, Abbotsford was policed by the RCMP under provisions of a municipal police contract while policing in Matsqui was provided by an independent municipal service, the Matsqui Police Service. In 2003, the Esquimalt Police Department was amalgamated into the Victoria Police Service. The *Review* is not aware of any audit or assessment of the amalgamations⁴².

It is also noted that while not a defined regionalized service, the RCMP has also undertaken a series of rationalizations of service to improve services, for example, the creation of the Lower Mainland District (LMD). The regionalization or integration of several RCMP services is being considered. These include Forensic Services⁴³, Collision Reconstruction and Analysis⁴⁴ and Police Dog Services⁴⁵. In addition, the University (University of British Columbia) Detachment is mentioned in the *Review* RFP 6. *Ascertain the Impact of External factors, d. "University Endowment Lands integration proposal"*⁴⁶. This issue is discussed later in Chapter 8.3 of this report.

Various initiatives have led to a rationalization of police services. These have generally been seen as positive moves which have benefited the majority of police officers, police organizations, oversight authorities, and the public. Examples include E-Comm, the Justice Institute of BC Police Academy, the Organized Crime Agency (now renamed the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit), integrated specialist teams, and PRIME BC.

⁴¹ LMD integrated earlier. Date refers to the report publication.

⁴² The year began with a newly amalgamated Esquimalt and Victoria Police department, which significantly improved services for both municipalities. City of Victoria Annual Report 2003.

⁴³ Report to Municipal Principal Policing Contacts and Chief Administrative Officers, 26 September 2006, Business Case, 25 April 2005;

⁴⁴ Business case, 21 September 2006;

⁴⁵ Report to Municipal Principal Policing Contacts and Chief Administrative Officers, 26 September 2006

⁴⁶ No RCMP report was made available to the *Review*

BC policing is an amalgam of various size agencies with diverse bases for their operation and governance. It is against this patchwork of agencies that any municipality must examine and decide upon the policing approach which best combines effectiveness and appropriateness of service along with the most efficient use of tax dollars. Under the *Police Act*, most changes in policing structures are subject to the approval of the Minister.

2.2 Richmond Policing: An Overview and Analysis

Premise

The demographic and workload data for the City of Richmond provide an important backdrop to the work of the police and, by extension, the nature of community safety and security.

Such data provide important insight to the characteristics of the community and an understanding of the special cultural and socio-economic needs to be addressed to facilitate safety and security and quality of life. Also, the data provide a quantitative perspective on the matters to which the police are called to attend, how the police choose to address community issues and they provide a foundation for initiatives such as police resource planning and deployment to match demands.

To accurately measure and quantify the workload (crimes and calls-for-service) it is essential to have suitable analysis processes and computer software to make sophisticated analyses.

The following section is based upon data drawn from various sources, each referenced, but primarily from Statistics Canada⁴⁷ and police workload data in raw format from PRIME Corp.⁴⁸ As the data, once analysed, are very detailed, a summary has been provided at the outset and at the end of each discussion section.

The analyses demonstrate that it is possible to analyse the data in an extremely detailed fashion and the various analyses are essential for planning geographic deployment. When coupled with temporal analysis (this Chapter) and Crime Analysis (Chapters 4 and 9) police managers are able to make strategic and tactical decisions regarding the deployment of resources.

Classifications such as *assist general public* and *assist other agency* – the most common incidents in all five zones - are not helpful in assessing workload and deployment of resources. Within the data there is information that would determine exactly what is contained within these categories; however this would require an even more detailed analysis. Further examination within these categories, or a more accurate categorisation of incidents, would help to determine effective deployment of resources. Many of the incidents are quite infrequent (even at several hundred a year are only one or two a day), and so it is difficult to use percentages effectively.

The most relevant issues identified by the analyses are:

- the difficulty in obtaining the data;
- the large proportion of “other” and “assist general public” incidents; and
- the inability of the Detachment to conduct analyses on its work.

⁴⁷ Statistics Canada 2001 census. The 2006 census data will be released throughout 2007 and 2008 and some relevant data are not available for this Review.

⁴⁸ The RCMP Richmond Detachment was unable to supply the required workload data. The reason offered was that the detachment was not equipped to download or analyze the operational data from PRIME.

2.2.1 Richmond in Context

Richmond is located in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) of British Columbia, Canada. The Cities of Burnaby and Vancouver are north of Richmond, while the City of New Westminster is to the east and the City of Delta is located to its immediate south. Richmond is home to the Vancouver International Airport and will play host to long-track speed-skating events in the 2010 Olympic Winter Games.

Figure 1: Greater Vancouver Regional District



Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Richmond%2C_British_Columbia_Location.png

Richmond's population in 2006 was approximately 174 000, making it the fourth largest city in the GVRD. Richmond's population, experiencing a growth of 6.2% between 2001 and 2006, appears to be growing substantially less rapidly than, for example, Surrey, which experienced a population change of 13.6% between the same years. Yet during this time period, Richmond exceeded the growth of Coquitlam, Burnaby and Delta (which witnessed declines in population between 2001 and 2006). Richmond's employment participation and unemployment rates are comparable to its neighbours, as is the proportion of the population

aged 15-44 (45%), and the proportion of the population (aged 15 years and over) that is single (31%) (see Table 1)⁴⁹.

Table 1: Richmond and GVRD Neighbours

	2006 Pop.	2001-2006 Pop + - (%)	% of Pop: Aged 15-44	% of Pop: Single	Labour Participation rate	UE rate	% of Pop. Foreign born ^a
Richmond	174,461	6.2	45%	31%	63.3	7.2	55%
Abbotsford	123,864	7.2	43%	27%	67.0	8.2	24%
Burnaby	202,799	4.6	47%	35%	62.5	8.3	48%
Coquitlam	114,565	1.5	46%	32%	67.2	7.0	37%
Delta	96,723	-2	41%	27%	69.1	5.4	27%
Surrey	394,976	13.6	44%	28%	67.0	7.4	33%
Vancouver	578,041	5.9	50%	43%	65.1	8.3	47%

^a The population foreign-born is calculated as a percent of both foreign-born and Canadian-born.

Richmond is ethnically diverse, as are many communities in the Lower Mainland; however, the population differs in many respects compared to its GVRD neighbours. For example, 55% of its population is foreign-born; in Vancouver, 47% are foreign-born; while Delta has a comparatively smaller proportion of foreign-born residents at 27%.

2006 was a record year for business licences with 12,280 applications up from 11,987 in 2005. Also development permits increased to a total value of \$658m over \$488m in the previous year. Dwelling units constructed totalled 1,416 in 2006 up from 1,042 in 2005. The previous high years were 1996 (1,463) and 1997 (1,589).⁵⁰

⁴⁹ All population statistics are drawn from the Statistics Canada 2001 Community Profiles Website (and 2006 Community Profiles where available):

http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/profiles/community/Search/SearchForm_Results.cfm?Lang=E.

⁵⁰ City of Richmond, Annual report, 2006.

Crime and Policing Comparators

Table 2: Richmond and its GVRD Neighbours: Crime and Policing Comparisons⁵¹

	<i>2005 Crime Rate per 100 000 pop*</i>	<i>Police Officers per 100 000 pop.</i>	<i>Population Per police officer</i>	<i>Per Capita Costs (\$) of policing</i>
Richmond	9,411	100.0	1002	\$133
Abbotsford	11,808	146.0	685	\$213
Burnaby	12,334	108.0	925	\$120
Coquitlam	9,988	98.0	1017	\$107
Delta	7,372	155.0	646	\$214
Surrey	12,673	123.0	814	\$133
Vancouver	11,719	223.0	449	\$301

* Crime rate: criminal Code offences (excluding traffic) per 100,000 population.

With regard to crime and policing comparisons with its GVRD neighbours (Table 2), Richmond's crime rate is one of the lowest in the GVRD, 9411 (per 100 000 population), with only Delta recording less crime in 2005, at a rate of 7372 (per 100 000). Delta, however, has a higher number of police officers per 100 000 population. Delta is only second to Vancouver in terms of police officers per 100 000. Richmond, on the other hand, has the second lowest rate of police officers to population (100 per 100 000 population). Only Coquitlam has a higher population per police officer (1017 persons per officer) than Richmond (1002 persons per officer).

Although ranking sixth of the seven GVRD locations with regard to crime rate, Richmond and Surrey tie for second in terms of the lowest per capita costs of policing, at \$133 per person, behind Coquitlam, which spends only \$107 per person on policing. Vancouver, on the other hand, spends \$301 per person on policing. These figures suggest that crimes, disorder, and calls-for-service are simply not as abundant in Richmond as in other locations in the region. It may also be significant that the cities with the four lowest per capita costs are suburban without the attendant "downtown" or city-centre policing issues which increase the policing workload⁵². It should be noted that statistics from national sources vary slightly from the provincial statistics and so caution should be exercised when making specific comparisons.

⁵¹ Police Resources in Canada (2006), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

⁵² Downtown policing issues: major public events; demonstrations; influx of daily workers and evening entertainment seekers; concentrations of major hotels and licensed establishments; and the majority of a region's office space.

Table 3: Richmond and its Provincial Comparators: Costs and Policing Comparisons⁵³

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Police officers</i>	<i>Population Per police officer</i>	<i>Cost per officer</i>	<i>Per Capita Costs (\$) of policing</i>
Richmond	173,429	191*	908	\$137,652	\$152
Abbotsford	128,165	187	685	\$136,473	\$199
Delta	102,661	151	680	\$139,345	\$205
Victoria	94,525	215	440	\$144,483	\$329

* Richmond 2005 staffing figure

Note: the differing figures reflect the national and provincial sources.

Key Points

- Richmond has witnessed a change in population over the past 5 years that places it at the higher end of the mid-range of positive growth in the GVRD.
- Like its neighbours, Richmond has a fairly young population, with 45% between the ages of 15-44, and 31% of the population being single.
- Despite its relatively youthful population, Richmond's labour participation rate is somewhat low compared to most of its neighbours (63.3%). Richmond's unemployment rate (7.2%) is in the middle of the range compared to its GVRD neighbours.
- Richmond has the highest proportion of foreign-born residents among its neighbours (55%).
- In 2005, Richmond's crime rate was low compared to its neighbours, with only Delta having a lower crime rate. Richmond is similarly low in terms of numbers of police officers per population, resulting in one of the highest population per officer measures within the GVRD. The costs of policing per capita in Richmond (\$133) are mid-range compared to its neighbours – considerably lower than Vancouver at \$301, but higher than Coquitlam at \$107.

⁵³ Police Services Division, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Dec 31 2005

2.2.2 Comparator Locations

In order to better place Richmond's characteristics in context, selected municipalities across Canada are considered that have similar characteristics on at least one or more dimensions (see Table 3 below). Duplicating the characteristics observed in Table 1 above, Table 4 compares Richmond with Halifax Regional (Nova Scotia), Regina (Saskatchewan), Abbotsford and Delta (GVRD), Victoria (British Columbia), Halton Regional (Ontario) and London (Ontario).

Table 4: Richmond Compared to Selected Canadian Municipalities and Regions

	2006 Pop.	2001-2006 Pop. (%)	% of Pop: Aged 15-44	% of Pop: Single	Partic. Rate	UE	% of Pop Foreign Born
Richmond	174461	6.2	45%	31%	63.3	7.2	55%
Halifax Regional	372649	3.8	47%	35%	67.8	7.2	7%
Regina	179246	.6	46%	35%	70.1	6.3	8%
Abbotsford	123864	7.2	43%	27%	67.0	8.2	24%
Delta	96723	-.2	41%	27%	69.1	5.4	27%
Victoria	78057	5.3	47%	42%	65.1	8.6	21%
Halton Regional	439526	17.1	43%	26%	72.1	4.0	22%
London	352395	4.7	45%	33%	66.8	7.0	21%

Table 4 provides population figures for each of the comparator locations. While Regina is perhaps the most comparable in terms of population size, the ethnic diversity of Regina is minuscule compared to the diversity observed in Richmond. While Richmond's population is 55% foreign born, Regina, on the other hand, is characterized by only 8% of its population foreign born. The population growth in Richmond is somewhat comparable to its immediate neighbours, with the exception of Delta, experiencing a 6% growth in population between 2001 and 2006. It is noted that Halton Region has experienced a 17.1% growth rate during the same period.

Table 4 also provides data regarding the proportions of the potentially crime-producing population. Crimes tend to be committed disproportionately by the younger population⁵⁴ – Richmond tends to be placed at about the middle of the range of proportions for the 15-44 age group at 45%. Halifax Regional and Victoria are somewhat higher at 47%, while Delta is lower

⁵⁴ The age-crime curve is a well-known phenomenon in the crime literature, and suggests that over time individuals' participation in crime decreases. For a recent discussion of this phenomenon see "The Age-Crime Debate: Assessing the Limits of Longitudinal Self-Report Data" by Janet Lauritsen in *Social Forces*, V. 77 (1): 127-154, Sept 1998.

with only 41% between the ages of 15-44 years. An examination of the unemployment rate indicates that Victoria's rate is one of the highest among these comparators at 8.6%, while Richmond's unemployment rate is 7.2. Despite having an 'average' proportion of 15-44 year olds (when compared with the other municipalities), Richmond has the lowest participation rate at 63.3%, compared with the other municipalities which tend to be closer to the 70.0% range (Victoria is the exception at 65.1).

Table 5: Richmond and National Comparators: Crime and Policing Comparisons

	2005 Crime Rate per 100 000 pop	Police Officers per 100 000 pop.	Population Per police officer	Per Capita Costs (\$) of policing
Richmond	9,411	100.0	1002	133
Halifax Regional	9,385	204.0	489	207
Regina	13,194	180.0	556	230
Abbotsford	11,808	146.0	685	213
Delta	7,372	155.0	646	214
Victoria	9,932	227.0	440	329
Halton Regional	3,588	120.0	832	174
London	7,473	141.0	708	186

Police Resources in Canada (2006), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

Note: the comparators include a wide variety of agencies: city police forces, regional, and amalgamated and therefore comparisons of personnel levels are difficult to assess.

Turning to indicators that specifically consider dimensions of crime and policing⁵⁵ (Table 5), it is noted that Regina leads the comparators with a crime rate of 13,194 (per 100 000 population), compared to Richmond at 9411 per 100 000. Halton Regional has a significantly lower crime rate than any of the other comparators at 3588 per 100 000. When considering police officers per 100 000 population, Victoria has the greatest number of officers, at 227 per 100 000, compared to Richmond, with less than half this number at 100 per 100 000 population. Richmond has the lowest number of officers per population of any of the comparators. Not surprisingly, this also translates to the largest population per police officer: 1002 persons per police officer in Richmond, compared to Victoria, with 440 persons per officer. The per capita costs of policing are led by Victoria, at a cost of \$329/person, compared to \$133/person in Richmond. Richmond's per capita costs are much lower than Halton Regional, for example, which spends \$174 per person on policing. Again, it may be significant that the two jurisdictions with the highest ratio of police officers, Victoria and Halifax, contain the "downtowns" of the regions.

⁵⁵ Some data for Richmond are repeated from page 4 to allow for non-BC comparisons.

Key Points

- Compared to selected municipal regions across Canada, Richmond's growth between 2001 and 2006 is relatively high, with only Halton Region higher at 17.1%.
- Both Halifax and Victoria have slightly larger proportions of 15-44 year olds, at 47%, than Richmond (45%).
- The national comparators suggest that Richmond's participation rate (63.3%) is the lowest among the comparators, while the unemployment rate is relatively high (7.2%) – with only its immediate neighbours, Abbotsford (8.2%) and Victoria (8.6%) having higher unemployment rates.
- Richmond clearly has the highest foreign-born proportion across the country.
- While Richmond's crime rate is low compared to its immediate neighbours, Abbotsford and Victoria, Richmond's crime rate is significantly greater than Halton Region, and significantly less than Regina's crime rate.
- Richmond has the least number of police officers per population, and again one of the highest population per officer measures across the comparators. None of the comparator locations was as low cost per capita as Richmond.

While the number of officers relative to the population impacts the per capita costs of policing, for example, other factors also influence costs and crime rates. These factors are examined next.

2.2.3 Costs of Policing and Crime Rate⁵⁶

The previously described analyses provide an examination of selected characteristics that describe Richmond and particular comparator locations. Descriptive data, however, do not facilitate predictions as there is no clear sense of how these characteristics fit together. For example, while it is known what the costs per capita of policing may be, it is useful to identify factors that might help us to predict what the costs per capita are *predicted* to be given the information that is known about other relevant factors. The next step of the analysis focuses on generating models with some of the variables considered above in order to predict per capita cost of policing and crime rate. Taken together, cost per capita and crime rate may provide a better sense of how Richmond performs on these dimensions while using data from other municipalities to provide meaningful contextual data.

What is more important, however, is the opportunity to assess demographic trends and from these develop predictions for policing costs and crime rates.

The policing data for this analysis are from the Statistics Canada publication, *Police Resources in Canada, 2006*⁵⁷, and for the demographic variables, data was retrieved from the Statistics Canada website⁵⁸. The census data is from the 2001 census, with the bulk of the more recent census data from 2006 having yet to be released⁵⁹. The dataset includes 45 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) with representation from each of the provinces that have cities (or conglomerates) with populations of over 100 000, including Richmond (see Appendix 2.1 for a list of locations). Cities with populations over 100 000 were selected based on the assumption that centres with smaller populations have much different policing issues than do centres with larger populations. Similarly, while some of the very large CMAs, such as Vancouver and Montreal, may have issues that differ from some of the smaller centres included in this analysis. Richmond's proximity to Vancouver suggests that the inclusion of very large cities in the sample is justifiable based upon Richmond's geographic proximity to Vancouver. Hence, "big city issues" are not out of the realm of possibility for Richmond. The initial examination of data included 450 (demographic and policing) variables.

⁵⁶ Appendix 2 includes a more detailed account of this discussion.

⁵⁷ Police Resources in Canada (2006), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

⁵⁸ <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/Profil01/CP01/Index.cfm?Lang=E>

⁵⁹ There are 2006 general population figures available on-line for some of the locations that were considered, but given the issue of time ordering that is implicit in the analysis, the earlier figures from the 2001 census are appropriate.

Given the relatively low number of cases and the high potential number of variables for inclusion in our models, the analysis is conducted in stages. The variables under examination are divided into seven categories, including:

Population Age
Ethnicity
Marital Status
Education
Earnings and Employment
Population Density and Geography
Policing

Predicting the Crime Rate and Costs of Policing

The next step of the analysis builds models that can be used to predict both the costs per capita of policing in Richmond, but also Richmond's crime rate.

From the final models generated⁶⁰, cost per capita and crime rate can now be predicted for Richmond. Table 16 summarizes these results. Richmond has an observed cost per capita of \$151 (without the 10% cost sharing). However, the equation derived from the above model indicates what cost per capita is predicted to be, taking into account all the variables in the above model. The predicted cost per capita for Richmond is \$162.90, a 7% difference to the observed cost of \$151.

The observed crime rate for Richmond is 9411 per 100 000 population. The formula generated from the model above, however, indicates that the crime rate is predicted to be 10153.9. The difference between the observed crime rate and the predicted crime rate is 8% when using the equation generated from Table 16.

Table 16: Predicted Per Capita Costs and Crime Rates

Per capita costs \$ (Observed)	Per Capita Cost (Predicted)	Difference (%)
\$151 ⁶¹	\$162.90	7%
Crime Rate per 100 000 (Observed)	Crime Rate per 100 000 (Predicted)	Difference (%)
9411	10153.9	8%

⁶⁰ See appendix.2

⁶¹ (\$151) source: Police Services Division 2005, August 2006. Note: the net cost with the 10% cost sharing is \$133.

Before concluding that Richmond is spending less per capita and has a crime rate less than could be expected, it is important to specify the limitations of this form of analysis in advance of drawing any firm conclusions.

Both the initial stages of the model and the more inclusive final model provide evidence that particular variables are relatively more important than others in the determination of cost per capita and crime rate. The above analysis may encourage thinking 'outside the box', as it is clearly evident that cost per capita and crime rates are impacted by factors that are outside the control of the police. However, these factors can be taken into account in municipal and police planning. This supports the concept and practice of a continuum of policing that incorporates a broader range of agencies to assist in preventing and controlling disorder and crime.⁶² This is outlined in Chapter 4.

Key Points

- Seven individual models were created to predict cost per capita and crime rate. These seven models featured: population age; ethnicity; marital status; education; earnings and employment; population density and geography; and policing variables.
- The "percent of the male population aged 15 and over" significantly impacts both cost per capita and crime rate: As the proportion of males in this age group increases, the costs per capita and crime rates increase.
- Ethnicity does not significantly impact either costs per capita or crime rates.
- The proportion of the population aged 15 years and older who are in common-law relationships significantly impact costs per capita and crime rate: as the proportion of common-law increases, costs per capita and crime rates decrease. As the proportions of separated and divorced individuals increase, so too does the cost per capita and crime rate.
- Certain categories of education work to lower costs per capita and crime rates.
- 'Earnings and Employment' have no effect on cost per capita, but median family income does influence crime rate: as median family income increases, crime rate decreases.
- Population density positively impacts both costs per capita and crime rates: as population density increases, costs per capita and crime rates also increase.
- Operating expenditures and clearance rates significantly impact costs per capita and crime rates, yet in opposite directions. As operating expenditures increase, costs per capita increase, but as operating expenditures increase, crime rates decrease. Similarly, as clearance rates increase, costs per capita increase, but crime rates decrease.

⁶² See also, *Safer Streets and Communities*, Nova Scotia Justice, 2007.

- The final combined models suggest that different factors predict both costs per capita and crime rates.
- The models suggest that Richmond is currently spending less per capita than could be expected (7% difference between the observed and predicted estimate of cost per capita), and has a lower crime rate than could be expected (8% difference between observed and expected values).

2.2.4 CAD Data Analysis

A comprehensive understanding of workload demands is crucial to the effective deployment of personnel, use of equipment such as vehicles and, by extension, the resource needs of the police agency. Such data also influence policy decisions such as the advisability of one-person vs. two person mobile units. Finally, workload data and the response of the police provide a foundation for implementing strategic approaches to addressing workload demands. For example, there should be an emphasis of resources on those calls which are high priority and endanger life. Other demands for service, such as minor thefts which occurred sometime ago and regarding which there is no physical evidence or suspects, may be dealt with by a method other than the dispatch of a mobile unit.

As part of the GVRD, Richmond contracts with E-Comm, the Regional Emergency Communications Centre for Southwest British Columbia. As the E-Comm website explains,

*E-Comm dispatchers utilize Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems to ensure that call details are automatically transmitted from the call-taker to the dispatcher. The CAD systems allow the 9-1-1 call-taker to be on the line with the caller while at the same time the appropriate dispatcher is mobilizing units to help that person.*⁶³

The Vancouver Police Department explains the advantages of using the Prime/E-Comm system:

*PRIME-BC features one-time data entry, which means that call information is never keyed in more than once. A 9-1-1 call-taker enters initial information about the occurrence, followed by additional information from the police dispatcher, officers attending the incident, and finally the follow-up investigators. Data is transmitted wirelessly via a laptop computer that may be taken into a crime scene by the investigating police officer. Once the information is entered it is sent to police headquarters where it is checked for accuracy. It then becomes part of the police Records Management System (RMS).*⁶⁴

Richmond RCMP uses the Records Management System (RMS) initiated through E-Comm as part of its record keeping process. The data analyzed below, however, is downloaded directly from PRIME-BC, for the period June, 2006, to June, 2007.⁶⁵

⁶³ http://www.ecomm.bc.ca/corporate/publications/about_ecomm.pdf, retrieved July, 2007.

⁶⁴ <http://vancouver.ca/police/Support/comm/prime.htm>, retrieved July 2007.

⁶⁵ PRIME-BC purges their system regularly so that at any particular point in time, only one year's worth of data is available for analysis.

The analysis that follows provides a “snapshot of policing activity” in Richmond for the period June 2006 – June 2007. The key questions to be answered are:

- What types of incidents do police deal with, and how do they respond to these incidents?
- How do incidents vary across Richmond, and does the policing response also vary?

The first question provides an overview of the situation in Richmond, while the second question considers how incidents and responses vary on a “zone basis”. Richmond is divided into five zones, each of which is somewhat unique geographically and therefore present particular policing challenges and opportunities.

2.2.5 Incidents and Response Patterns in Richmond

2.2.5.1. Types of Incidents

In order to establish a picture of policing activity in Richmond, the range of incidents that come to the attention of Richmond RCMP is considered. “Cases” (or incidents) come to the attention of police through a variety of means, including, primarily, calls for service (via “telephone”), but also through cases that occur “on view” (police happen to be in close proximity when an incident occurs), “desk” (cases are reported in person to the police at, for example, the front desk at the detachment), or through “alarm” systems (directly notifying police).

Table 6 specifies how incidents came to the attention of Richmond Detachment for the period June 2006 to June 2007 – note that there are 44940 incidents. Over 76% of incidents come to the attention of police through telephone (nearly 24% via 911 calls, another 53% through direct calls to police), nearly 21% are reported in person, while about 2.5% come to the attention of police “on view”.

Table 6: How did the incident come to the attention of police?

<i>Incident brought to attention via:</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent</i>
911 System	10,636	23.7	23.7	23.7
Desk ⁶⁶ (D)	9,254	20.6	20.6	44.3
Telephone (T)	23,927	53.2	53.2	97.5
On view (V)	1,123	2.5	2.5	100.0
	44,940	100.0	100.0	

⁶⁶ Matters reported to the ‘Desk’ would usually be addressed by non-sworn staff member.

While there is clearly a wide-range of incidents that come to police attention, an initial (or front-end) classification system used by the CAD system divides incidents into nine categories.⁶⁷ Table 7 indicates that the vast majority of incidents are property-related, 90%; just over 7% are traffic-related incidents; while disturbances and person-related incidents are 1.6% and 1%, respectively.

Table 7: Case Classification

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent</i>
Disturbance (D)	722	1.6	1.6	1.6
Crime vs. Person (P)	447	1.0	1.0	2.6
Crime vs. Property (R)	40,482	90.1	90.1	92.7
Traffic Accident/Problem (T)	3,287	7.3	7.3	100.0
Total	44,938	100.0	100.0	
Missing	2	.0		
Total	44,940	100.0		

Note: The reason for using the initial case classification is a determination of the call from the responding officers' perspective.

The data found in Table 7 is clearly best considered “initial”, as classifications may change and become more specific once more information about an incident is gathered by the police.⁶⁸ For example, while 722 cases were considered “disturbances” initially, once more information was gathered, it was found that 79% (572) of these cases remained as disturbances (primarily noise or party-related), while 21% were reclassified as general assistance calls (9%), municipal bylaw issues (2.4%), or “annoying circumstances” (2.2%). Similarly, of those incidents broadly classified as person-related (consisting initially of assaults, domestic violence, and missing children incidents), final-case classifications broaden the scope of these initial determinations. Of these incidents, while 71% retain their initial classifications, nearly 17% become “general assistance” incidents, while the other 12% are coded in a variety of ways that lay further afield of their initial person-related classification. The category “property-related” appears nearly too inclusive to be of great use to the attending officer or for analysis by the detachment. Final case classifications within this category vary widely, with approximately 40% retaining a “property-related” classification. This category appears to be a catch-all category for incidents that come to the attention of police. Incidents as wide-ranging as ‘assaults’ to ‘warrants’ initially fall within this category.

⁶⁷ The nine categories include: A – Alarm, D – Disturbance, H – Assistance, L – Miscellaneous Service, M – Public Morals, P – Crime Vs Person, R – Crime Vs Property, S – Suspicious Circumstances, and T – Traffic Accident/Problem.

⁶⁸ It is important to note that there are at least three case/incident classifications found in the CAD data. The focus is on the initial case classification (consisting of the above 9 categories), but there is another ‘first-case classification’ that mirrors the ‘final-case classification’ referred to below.

The four (of nine) broad categories noted above in Table 9 clearly mask a lot of what is going on when it comes to specific types of incidents that police deal with. In contrast, final-case classifications present a wide variety of specific types of incidents that are dealt with by police – there are 181 codes for final case classifications. To provide a sense of what the incidents most frequently consist of, Table 8 lists the top ten most common final case classifications found from June 2006 to June 2007.

Table 8: Final-Case Classifications

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Abandoned 911 ⁶⁹	2,702	6.0
Assist General Public	4,519	10.0
Assist Other Agency	929	2.1
Drugs	936	2.1
Mischief	1,197	2.7
Motor Vehicle Incident	1,288	2.9
Property Lost	908	2.0
Suspicious Person	1,016	2.3
Theft	3,101	6.9
Theft from Vehicle	1,457	3.2
Total	18,053	40.2
Other	26,887	59.8
Total	44,940	100.0

Review note: the almost 60% of cases classified as 'other' create difficulties for an assessment, but more importantly, for resource deployment decisions. See Recommendations.

The types of incidents that Richmond RCMP deals with provide information regarding the nature of the activities that police attend to. Clearly, however, not all cases require similar levels of attention, and incidents are prioritized according to various criteria. Incidents that are 'in progress', for example, often received through 911 dispatch or noted 'on view', would be dealt with in a manner that differs substantially from incidents reported to the 'desk' of police about an incident that has only recently been discovered (for example, the realization that lawn furniture is missing after residents return from a two-week holiday would reasonably be treated with less priority). Similarly, incidents that clearly involve a greater potential for injury will be prioritized as more urgent than incidents without the same potential. The difficulty with considering case classifications alone is that level of priority is not always readily apparent. Table 9 examines the distribution of incidents by priority – priority 1 is the most urgent, with comparably decreasing

⁶⁹ E-Comm, Abandoned 911: call where contact is lost before information is obtained.

urgency through priorities 2, 3 and 4. The accurate determination of the true nature of a call is important with regards the appropriate use of resources and the safety of attending officers.

Table 9: Incident Priority Levels

Priority Level	Frequency	Percent
1	3,155	7.0
2	9,237	20.6
3	18,661	41.5
4	13,858	30.8
Total	44,911	99.9
Missing	29	.1
	44,940	100.0

The definition⁷⁰ of call priorities are as follows:

1. *Requires Urgent Attention, Life Threatening. (Dispatcher must dispatch member or notify NCO.)*
2. *Requires Immediate Attention, Serious, may not be life threatening. (Dispatcher must dispatch member or notify NCO.)*
3. *Routine Attention, no current threat to life or property.*
4. *Event must be documented, may or may not require police attendance.*

Table 9 indicates that the majority of the incidents to which police attend are priority 3 and 4 incidents, with only 7% of incidents designated as high priority (level 1), and nearly 21% designated as level 2 priority. In order to see how priority levels compare with initial incident classifications, Table 10 demonstrates that initial case classifications are related to priority level, as could be expected. 'Person-related' incidents, initially suspected to involve assaults (sexual and non-sexual), domestic violence and missing children, tend to be prioritized as level 1: over 81% of person-related incidents are treated as level 1 priority. Traffic-related incidents, on the other hand, are somewhat more spread out among the priority levels: 23% are high priority, while approximately 65% are priority levels 3 and 4. More than likely, the traffic-related incidents considered level 1 priority are those reported to involve injury. Similarly, it is noted that few of the property-related incidents are considered level 1 priority (5%). Very few 'disturbance' incidents are viewed as high priority (levels 1 and 2), with nearly 98% falling into priority levels 3 and 4.

⁷⁰ E-Comm

Table 10: Classification by Priority of Call

	<i>Priority Level</i>				Total
	1	2	3	4	
Disturbance	0 (.0%)	16 (2.2%)	698 (96.8%)	7 (1.0%)	721 (100.0%)
Person-Related	363 (81.2%)	40 (8.9%)	43 (9.6%)	1 (.2%)	447 (100.0%)
Property-Related	2,037 (5.0%)	8,778 (21.7%)	17,010 (42.0%)	12,632 (31.2%)	40,457 (100.0%)
Traffic-Related	755 (23.0%)	403 (12.3%)	910 (27.7%)	1,218 (37.1%)	3,286 (100.0%)
Total	3,155 (7.0%)	9,237 (20.6%)	18,661 (41.6%)	13,858 (30.9%)	44,911 (100.0%)

2.2.5.2. Time and Place

Theories behind the seasonality and temporality of crime essentially suggest that particular times of the year and times of the week may be more conducive to the commission of ‘untoward’ (not necessarily criminal) behaviour than other times. Keeping in mind that data was available from June 4, 2006, to June 4, 2007; the distribution of incidents is considered over the course of the year by level of priority. Figure 2 indicates that months that have the largest proportion of priority 1 calls are July, August and September.

Figure 2: Priority Incident Distribution by Month

Note that percentages are calculated within priorities, not within each month.





Figure 3 illustrates the percentage distribution of incidents by time of day and day of week. Time is considered on a 24-hour clock, with each number indicating a full hour (for example, 0 hours represents the time from midnight to 1 am). It is observed that Saturday and Sunday are comparatively busy between the hours of midnight and about 3 am, while both Friday and Saturday evenings are also particularly busy from about 9 pm onward (2100 hours). All days

appear relatively quiet between approximately 3-6 am. As discussed elsewhere in this report, an awareness of distribution of calls is important to shift planning.

Figure 3: Day of Week by Incident Distribution^a



^a Hours are on a 24-hour clock: '0' represents the time between midnight and 1 am; '1' represents the time between 1 and 2 am, etc. See Appendix 2.3 for full details.

Key Points

- The majority of incidents (over 76%) come to the attention of Richmond RCMP via telephone (including 911 calls); 21% are reported in person, while 2.5% come to police attention “on view”.
- Most incidents that come to the attention of police are initially classified as “crimes against property” (90%).
- The most frequent specific type of incident (10%) that comes to the attention of police is ‘assist general public’.⁷¹
- The majority of incidents are classified as Priority Level 3 (41.5%). About 51% of incidents are classified as priority levels 2 and 4, and 7% of incidents are classified as priority level 1.
- The majority of incidents initially classified as ‘person-related’ incidents are classified as priority level 1 (81%), compared to 5% of ‘property-related’ incidents coded priority 1, and 23% of traffic incidents coded as priority 1.
- Priority 1 incidents are more frequent in the months of July, August and September.
- The distribution of incidents is at a low from approximately 4 am to 6 am. Incidents most often peak from 10 am to 6 pm during weekdays. Early morning hours (midnight to approximately 2 am) on Saturdays and Sundays witness a larger volume of calls than other days of the week.

⁷¹ Note: see earlier comment on the usefulness of the ‘other’ category.

2.2.5.3 Responding to Incidents

Now that the types of incidents that Richmond RCMP respond to has been examined, the next part of the analysis turns to the nature and types of responses that these incidents entail.

First, response times – how long does it take for police to address particular incidents? Given that types of incidents vary widely, the analysis will consider level of priority and associated dispatch and response times. Next, the analysis examines the number of units (and police officers) dispatched given the variation in priority levels. While the analysis is not able to ‘track’ the outcomes of each incident through the criminal justice system, it is able to consider how cases are cleared and case status (founded or unfounded).

There are two measures of time that are considered in this analysis: the time the call is received to the time of dispatch; and the time of dispatch to the time officers arrive on-scene. Only certain cases were selected for inclusion here: those which came to the attention of police either via telephone or via 911. Incidents that are noted while police are “on view” or at “desk” do not have either a meaningful ‘received to dispatch’ time or ‘dispatch to on-scene’ time. As Table 11 indicates, response times vary according to the priority levels with which incidents are categorized: As priority level decreases (moving from level 1, highest priority, to level 4, lowest priority), response times decrease substantially. For example, incidents classified as level 1 (highest priority) have an average receipt-to-dispatch time of 2:56 (2 minutes, 56 seconds), and an average dispatch-to-scene time of 6:15 (six minutes, 15 seconds). On the other hand, incidents classified as level 2 or 3 have average dispatch-to-scene times of 9:33 and 15:14, respectively.

Table 11: Response Times – Receipt-to-dispatch and Dispatch-to-scene

Call Priority		Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time
1	Mean	0:02:56	0:06:15
	N	3009	2871
	Std. Deviation ⁷²	0:09:30	0:07:48
2	Mean	0:09:20	0:09:33
	N ⁷³	7358	6555
	Std. Deviation	0:29:15	0:27:43
3	Mean	0:29:31	0:15:14
	N	15130	13028
	Std. Deviation	1:34:37	0:52:12
4	Mean	0:42:56	0:19:16
	N	4660	3460
	Std. Deviation	1:53:54	1:12:32
Total	Mean	0:24:00	0:13:20
	N	30157	25914
	Std. Deviation	1:22:57	0:47:50

Another means by which to measure the police response is to consider the number of units dispatched. As can be seen in Table 12, the number of units dispatched again reflects the priority level of the incident. Nearly half (45.8%) of all priority level 1 incidents have 3 or more units dispatched, while only about 10% of level 4 calls have 3 or more units dispatched. This is often an issue that is discussed in terms of one person versus two person units. It is assumed that the

⁷² Standard deviation is the most common measure of statistical dispersion, measuring how widely spread the values in a data set are. If the data points are close to the mean, then the standard deviation is small. As well, if many data points are far from the mean, then the standard deviation is large. If all the data values are equal, then the standard deviation is zero.

⁷³ 'N' is number of cases.

number of cars equals the number of officers as the Detachment operates a one-officer car model other than training new officers.

Table 13: Priority level by number of units dispatched^a


			Units Dispatched				Total
			No Units	1 Unit	2 Units	3 or more	
Priority Level 1	Count		117	677	911	1442	3147
	% within priority		3.7%	21.5%	28.9%	45.8%	100.0%
	% within units dispatched		1.0%	3.9%	9.7%	23.1%	7.0%
2	Count		1810	2721	2561	2113	9205
	% within priority		19.7%	29.6%	27.8%	23.0%	100.0%
	% within units dispatched		15.4%	15.7%	27.3%	33.8%	20.6%
3	Count		2020	9357	4850	2343	18570
	% within priority		10.9%	50.4%	26.1%	12.6%	100.0%
	% within units dispatched		17.2%	54.0%	51.6%	37.5%	41.5%
4	Count		7825	4582	1070	356	13833
	% within priority		56.6%	33.1%	7.7%	2.6%	100.0%
	% within units dispatched		66.5%	26.4%	11.4%	5.7%	30.9%
Total	Count		11772	17337	9392	6254	44755
	% within priority		26.3%	38.7%	21.0%	14.0%	100.0%
	% within units dispatched		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

^a Note that all incidents were considered for inclusion in this table, regardless of how they came to the attention of police (via 911, desk, telephone or on-view).

Another measure of police response, though somewhat further removed, is how cases are cleared. Figure 4 depicts how cases are 'dealt with' or 'cleared' by police.⁷⁴ The means by which cases are cleared provides more detailed evidence as to what proportions of incidents that police deal with actually become 'recordable'. As can be seen from Table 12, nearly 72% of what police attend to result in a 'report submitted'. For just over 17%, 'no report' is submitted, while nearly 6% of incidents are 'cancelled': in both of these determinations, no further police action is taken.

⁷⁴ The clearance codes are as follows: A - Assist/Handled by outside agency; D - Duplicate call, G - Gone on arrival, L - Cancel, N - No report, R - Report submitted, U - Unfounded, W - Warning, X - Automatically.

Figure 4: Case Clearances



The manner in which incidents are cleared varies by the nature and priority of the incident under consideration. Priority 1 calls, for example, tend to have a far greater proportion of reports submitted than do level 4 priority incidents: the proportion of priority 1 incidents that have reports submitted is 94%, compared to 45% for level 4 incidents. Table 13 also indicates that for the incidents for which no report is submitted, 92% were determined to be level 4 priority incidents.

Table 13: Clearance code by priority level

Clearance Code		Priority Level				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Duplicate call	Count	16	77	74	12	179
	% within code	8.9%	43.0%	41.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	% within priority	.5%	.8%	.4%	.1%	.4%
Gone on arrival	Count	34	470	1167	275	1946
	% within code	1.7%	24.2%	60.0%	14.1%	100.0%
	% within priority	1.1%	5.1%	6.3%	2.0%	4.4%
Cancel	Count	89	1105	1141	191	2526
	% within code	3.5%	43.7%	45.2%	7.6%	100.0%
	% within priority	2.9%	12.0%	6.2%	1.4%	5.7%
No report	Count	19	108	580	7062	7769
	% within code	.2%	1.4%	7.5%	90.9%	100.0%
	% within priority	.6%	1.2%	3.1%	51.2%	17.4%
Report submitted	Count	2938	7325	15435	6235	31933
	% within code	9.2%	22.9%	48.3%	19.5%	100.0%
	% within priority	94.4%	79.7%	83.3%	45.2%	71.6%
Unfounded	Count	16	103	138	11	268
	% within code	6.0%	38.4%	51.5%	4.1%	100.0%
	% within priority	.5%	1.1%	.7%	.1%	.6%
Total	Count	3112	9188	18535	13786	44621
	% within code	7.0%	20.6%	41.5%	30.9%	100.0%
	% within priority	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Key Points

- Priority levels impact both 'receipt-to-dispatch' times and 'dispatch-to-scene' times. Incidents classified as level 1 (highest priority) have an average receipt-to-dispatch time of 2:56 (2 minutes, 56 seconds), compared to 9:20 for priority 2, and 29:31 for priority 3.
- The number of units dispatched reflects incident priority. Nearly half (45.8%) of all priority level 1 incidents have 3 or more units dispatched, while only about 10% of level 4 calls have 3 or more units dispatched.
- Nearly 72% of incidents police attend to result in a 'report submitted'; for 17% of incidents 'no report' is submitted while nearly 6% of incidents are 'cancelled' - for these latter determinations, no further police action is taken.
- The higher the priority, the more likely the incident is to be 'founded': the proportion of priority 1 incidents that have reports submitted is 94%, compared to 45% for level 4 incidents.

The above analysis has presented Richmond as though it is a singular unit with little geographic variation. As with many other municipalities, different regions of the city are characterized by different crime profiles which also impact on the nature of the responses to these incidents.

Now to the second question: How do incidents vary across Richmond, and how does the policing response also vary? An analysis of workload by zone was considered too detailed and esoteric for inclusion in the main report and is presented in Appendix 2.

Recommendations⁷⁵

- 2.A The City of Richmond and the policing agency should conduct on-going analyses of factors that can influence policing costs and crime rates.
- 2.B The City of Richmond should require the police agency to acquire access to the software necessary to process and analyse the available data such that the workload demands in the city are sufficiently understood to develop deployment models to meet demands and to analyse occurrences and trends to permit the development, implementation and evaluation of tactical and strategic community safety and security programs.
- 2.C The City of Richmond should require the police agency to analyse the available data and determine those calls that are more suitably subject to an alternative response other than attendance of mobile unit. Such calls could be redirected to a telephone response unit⁷⁶ and addressed in such a way that service to the public is maintained and details of incident data retained within the agency files for later case follow-up and trend analysis.
- 2D The City of Richmond should require the police agency to analyse the available data and determine those calls in which an agreement can be established with other emergency service providers, such as Fire and Rescue, such that when a service attends an incident and determines that assistance from another service is not required, that service is notified. Calls to incidents such as “traffic” may be suitable for such alternative response. Thus service personnel are released to attend other higher priority calls and emergency vehicles are not required to attend at speed through the city.
- 2.E Data regarding the call and workload in the City of Richmond should be provided to the Public Security Board⁷⁷ on a regular basis, in summarised hard copy format, along with reports of changes in rates, hot-spots or issues requiring special attention, and the plans that have been developed to address root causes of the disorders.

Model Options

PRIME is the legislated required record management system in BC. Such analysis, noted above, is available to all police organisations that purchase the required software. The implementation of the data warehousing phase of PRIME is scheduled for 2008. Failure to acquire and employ the software impedes effective resource deployment and evaluation.

2.2.6 Incidents and Response Patterns: Variation by Zone – see Appendix 2

2.2.7 Geographic Context – see Appendix 2

⁷⁵ These recommendations overlap with other Chapters of the Report. The issue of the analysis of workload is considered sufficiently important to be mentioned in each chapter where the issues arise.

⁷⁶ See best practices

⁷⁷ The oversight authority

2.3 Predicting crime rates and policing costs.

The above analysis provides an examination of selected characteristics that describe Richmond and particular comparator locations and provides an explanation of workload data and response approaches of the police. Descriptive data, however, do not facilitate predictions as there is no clear sense of how these characteristics fit together. For example, while it is known what the costs per capita of policing may be, it is useful to identify factors that might help us to predict what the costs per capita are *predicted* to be given the information that is known about other relevant factors. The next step of the analysis focuses on generating models with some of the variables considered above in order to predict per capita cost of policing and crime rate. Taken together, cost per capita and crime rate may provide a better sense of how Richmond performs on these dimensions while using data from other municipalities to provide meaningful contextual data.

The policing data for this analysis is from the Statistics Canada publication, *Police Resources in Canada, 2006*⁷⁸, and for the demographic variables, data was retrieved from the Statistics Canada website.⁷⁹ The census data is from the 2001 census, with the bulk of the more recent census data from 2006 having yet to be released.⁸⁰ The dataset includes 45 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) with representation from each of the provinces that have cities (or conglomerates) with populations of over 100 000, including Richmond (see Appendix 2.1 for a list of locations). Cities with populations over 100 000 were selected based on the assumption that centres with smaller populations have much different policing issues than do centres with larger populations. Similarly, while some of the very large CMAs, such as Vancouver and Montreal, may have issues that differ from some of the smaller centres included in this analysis, Richmond's proximity to Vancouver suggests that the inclusion of very large cities in the sample is justifiable based upon Richmond's geographic proximity to Vancouver. Hence, "big city issues" are not out of the realm of possibility for Richmond. The initial examination of data included 450 (demographic and policing) variables.

Given the relatively low number of cases and the high potential number of variables for inclusion in our models, the analysis is conducted in stages. The variables under examination are divided into seven categories, including:

- Population Age*
- Ethnicity*
- Marital Status*
- Education*
- Earnings and Employment*
- Population Density and Geography*
- Policing*

⁷⁸ Police Resources in Canada (2006), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

⁷⁹ <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/Profil01/CP01/Index.cfm?Lang=E>

⁸⁰ There are 2006 general population figures available on-line for some of the locations that were considered, but given the issue of time ordering that is implicit in the analysis, the earlier figures from the 2001 census are appropriate.

Once these factors had been determined through multivariate analysis, to provide an understanding of the likely impacts of these factors upon crime (and therefore workload), a further multivariate analysis was conducted and seven individual models were created to predict cost per capita and crime rate. These seven models featured: population age; ethnicity; marital status; education; earnings and employment; population density and geography; and policing variables.

In summary⁸¹

- The “percent of the male population aged 15 and over” significantly impacts both cost per capita and crime rate. So, as the proportion of males in this age group increases, the costs per capita and crime rates increase.
- Ethnicity does not significantly impact either costs per capita or crime rates.
- The proportion of the population aged 15 years and older who are in common-law relationships significantly impact costs per capita and crime rate. So, as the proportion of common-law increases, costs per capita and crime rates decrease. As the proportions of separated and divorced individuals increase, so too does the cost per capita and crime rate.
- Certain categories of education work to lower costs per capita and crime rates.
- ‘Earnings and Employment’ have no effect on cost per capita, but median family income does influence crime rate. Consequently, as median family income increases, crime rate decreases.
- Population density positively impacts both costs per capita and crime rates. As population density increases, costs per capita and crime rates also increase.
- Operating expenditures and clearance rates significantly impact costs per capita and crime rates, yet in opposite directions. As operating expenditures increase, costs per capita increase, but as operating expenditures increase, crime rates decrease. Similarly, as clearance rates increase, costs per capita increase, but crime rates decrease.
- The final combined models suggest that different factors predict both costs per capita and crime rates. The models were somewhat more successful (explained more variance) predicting crime rate than cost per capita.

⁸¹ See appendix 2 for detailed description.

The end result of the analyses suggests that Richmond is currently spending less per capita than could be expected (18% difference between the observed and predicted estimate of cost per capita), and has a lower crime rate than could be expected (8% difference between observed and expected values). To be able to predict the crime rate within 8% of that observed is important to police planners.

Recommendation

- 2.F The City of Richmond should require the police agency to implement an ongoing review of various demographic and workload data, as outlined above, to review the probable factors that impact the need for police resources. The analysis of such data will also provide some foundation for other urban planning such as housing density decisions.

Governance

Premise

Good governance is a crucial facet of effective and accountable policing of the community.

3.1 Introduction

Governance deals with *what* an organisation is to do and is, therefore, highly focused on planning, setting goals and objectives, and on the development of policies to guide the organisation and monitor its progress toward implementation of its plans. Provided that the governing body has confidently arranged for effective management of the organisation, the primary focus of governance should be on the long term - the organisation's mission, values, policies, goals, objectives and, for public sector institutions, its accountability under the terms of its implicit social contract.

Governance may be viewed as:

“the processes, structures and organisational traditions that determine how power is exercised, how stakeholders have their say, how decisions are taken and how decision-makers are held to account. Governing boards can enhance organisational performance by understanding and undertaking the governance role in a manner suitable for their particular organisation. They carry the public (or membership) trust and provide an accountability structure for management. The importance of governance grows with the level of public interest and investment in an organisation.”⁸²

In interviews conducted during the course of the *Review*, governance, and its constituent elements such as planning, budgeting, information exchange, and general oversight, was, more than any other issue, considered the major irritant for staff at all levels of the City of Richmond structure. Administrators felt restricted in their attempts to effectively facilitate community safety and security and to provide appropriate oversight of the associated budgets. City staff felt they had no access to either the police planning process or the information which might give them a sense of comfort regarding the policing of the City.

Community members also expressed concern that the police were detached from the community and that direct oversight of the police was important to what was termed the “connection between the police and the public”. Although community input recognized that the

⁸² Mel Gill, “Governance Models: What’s Right For Your Organization”

police are involved in various community activities, these lower level bridges did not compensate for an absence of governance at the municipal level.

Both City and community representatives mentioned the awareness of the police organisation going “beyond the City”. Both groups were acutely aware of the RCMP being subject to several masters with more dominant accountability occurring at the provincial and federal levels. At the local level, oversight was perceived as being minimal and somewhat weak and illusionary.

3.2 Governance models

Governance models represent an approach to the combination of elements, expertise, and approaches of oversight. Beyond attention to processes, policies, and structures there are considerable differences in the kinds of governance that exist; these unique forms of governing bodies drive specific considerations to the application of different models.

Indeed, each model focuses on an element of governance important for the effective functioning of a board. Many boards adopt a combination of models, in a blend appropriate to the unique features of their organisation and board composition. However, in and of themselves these models do not provide a comprehensive prescription for functioning of the Board. Neither is each model mutually exclusive. There is much more to good governance than simply adopting a particular model⁸³. There is no ‘one size fits all’ and Boards must establish a structure and accompanying processes that are supportive of effective oversight in a particular operational context. Given the unique role of police in society, the structures of police boards are also unique in the broader governance environment.

Nine governance models or board types have been identified in the corporate environment⁸⁴. They include operational, collective, management, constituent representational, traditional, results-based, policy governance, fundraising, and advisory.

⁸³ Doug Macnamara & Banff Executive Leadership Inc., “Models of Corporate/Board Governance”, [Leadership Acumen](#) 21, April/May 2005, 1

⁸⁴ Mel. D. Gill, [Governing for Results: A Director's Guide to Good Governance](#), Trafford Publishing, 2005

Figure 1 - Nine Governance Models (Gill, 2005)



One goal of good governance is to enable an organisation to do its work and fulfill its mandate. Simply put, good governance results in organisational effectiveness.

Much attention has been focused on good governance practices in the private sector in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. In the corporate world of business, the “bottom line” provides a helpful focal point, but even here there can be difficult questions of judgment as to what constitutes good governance. In public-purpose organisations, good governance is about more than getting the job done. Especially in non-profit organisations and government agencies, where community and organisational values typically play an important role in determining both organisational purpose and style of operation, process is as important as product. In this instance, good governance becomes more than only a means to organisational effectiveness; it becomes an end in itself.

Consequently, good governance in policing is about both achieving desired results and achieving them in the right way.

Since the “right way” is largely shaped by the cultural norms and values of the organisation and the society in which it operates, there can be no universal template for good governance. Each organisation must tailor its own definition of good governance to suit its needs and values⁸⁵.

Inherent in these definitions is the notion of *stewardship* or exercising prudent decision-making in a trust relationship. For police oversight bodies, this means balancing responsibilities to their staff and stakeholders with their responsibilities to the municipality from which their funds are derived. In policing, a core reason for police oversight is to ensure public value⁸⁶.

⁸⁵ “Governance Basics”, Institute on Governance, Learning Tools, <http://www.iog.ca>

⁸⁶ See ‘Public value’ later in this report.

3.3 Policy Governance

Garber⁸⁷ notes that *"in the Policy Board Model, the job of the board is:*

- *to establish the guiding principles and policies for the organisation;*
- *to delegate responsibility and authority to those who are responsible for enacting the principles and policies;*
- *monitor compliance with those guiding principles and policies; and*
- *to ensure that staff, and board alike, are held accountable for their performance."*

The genesis of the "new" model of governance, with the potential for salvation of non-profit police boards, originated with John Carver in 1990. The author of Boards That Make a Difference⁸⁸ was a proponent of carefully designed board governance policies and the clear separation of the Ends (results) and Means (activities) to achieve those ends. Carver is important to a discussion of police governance as his approach provided the foundation for further development of oversight in policing.

Carver viewed "corporate ends" as the intended results for various shareholder classes, along with their relative priority—that is, the outcomes for which the corporation exists⁸⁹.

Carver's emphasis is on policy governance, which *"contends that the most salient aspects of an organisation are the values it pursues and observes. The board, as the ultimately accountable body to 'shareholders', is foremost a guardian of values on behalf of some 'ownership' or stockholder-equivalents"*⁹⁰

Further, Carver is adamant that boards should establish formal value statements written as policies, defined as "the value or perspective that underlies action"⁹¹ and absent themselves from commenting on day-to-day operational activities or monthly reports on crime statistics or internal expenditures. Rather, to meet the criteria of effective governance, Carver suggests that a board must keep its focus on the 'big picture', asking those delegated to implement board policies if they are on track with respect to community safety initiatives or what they are planning in order to achieve priorities for prudent fiscal management. The necessity of the board to absent itself from operational activities fits with the need to separate politics from policing. However, as will be illustrated later, close oversight of matters such as budgeting, planning and the monitoring of progress against objectives using data such as aggregated statistical information are important elements of police governance. Consequently, although Carver's original model was fundamental in the development of police oversight, in the light of developments and greater clarity in police governance Carver now has somewhat less impact for policing.

⁸⁷ Garber, Nathan, *Governance Models: What's Right for Your Board*, 1997, London, Canada.

⁸⁸ Carver, J., *Boards that make a difference*, Jossey-Bass, 1990, 2nd ed.

⁸⁹ Carver, 1990: 6

⁹⁰ Carver, 1990: 7

⁹¹ Carver, 1991: 6

3.4 Governance in a police context

Governance is a crucial aspect of policing in a democratic society. The police are afforded extraordinary powers of search and seizure and in certain circumstances are expected to use coercive force⁹². The public, on the other hand, are morally obligated and, at times, legally required to abide by police commands that are normatively intended to facilitate public safety and security. Governance provides the pre- and post-circumstances monitoring of these activities.

In addition, the funding devoted to safety and security issues, (and invariably focused on policing), comprise a significant portion of municipal budgets. As we have seen, in the case of Richmond, this amounts to approximately \$26 million or approximately 19 per cent of the City's annual operating budget⁹³.

Police effectiveness in controlling crime and social disorder impacts the public's perception of safety in a community. Perceived effectiveness has a positive impact on residents and business owners alike who are able to go about their lives free of fear. This, in turn, affects a range of tangential matters such as community well being, real estate values, and the willingness of businesses, and their staff, to move to, and set up business in, an area. The converse may have a negative impact such as, raising community anxiety and adversely effecting property values,

Policing in British Columbia is governed by the *Police Act* and *Regulations*. The *Act* proscribes the various responsibilities and options available to municipalities to provide policing services.

3 (2) A municipality with a population of more than 5 000 persons must provide policing and law enforcement in accordance with this Act and the regulations by means of one of the following:
(a) establishing a municipal police department;
(b) entering into an agreement with the minister under which policing and law enforcement in the municipality will be provided by the provincial police force;
(c) with the approval of the minister, entering into an agreement with another municipality that has a municipal police department under which policing and law enforcement in the municipality will be provided by the municipal police department of that municipality.

In addition, the *Act* provides for a regional police force under Section 18:

(1) "Subject to the minister's approval, the councils of 2 or more municipalities may enter into an agreement providing for the amalgamation of their municipal police boards and municipal police departments".

⁹² Klockars, Karl B. *The Idea of Police*, Sage Publications, Inc 1985

⁹³ City of Richmond 2006 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Financial Activities.

The *Act* is silent as to whether this section, or any other section, would apply to a municipality moving from a contracted provincial police service. Given the wording of the *Act*, any jurisdiction with a contracted service is unable to “..enter into an agreement providing for the amalgamation of their municipal police boards and municipal police departments”. Should the City consider this option, negotiations with the Ministry would be necessary to establish the process.

The *Act* outlines the duties of municipalities providing policing services, details a municipal police board’s responsibilities, and sets out specific governance functions for the eleven municipal police boards in the province. The *Act*⁹⁴ also outlines the rights and obligations of governance authorities in areas policed by the provincial police.

Municipal police board

- 23 (1) Subject to the minister's approval, the council of a municipality required to provide policing and law enforcement under section 15 may provide policing and law enforcement by means of a municipal police department governed by a municipal police board consisting of*
- (a) the mayor of the council,*
 - (b) one person appointed by the council, and*
 - (c) not more than 5 persons appointed, after consultation with the director, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.*
- (2) Subject to the approval of the minister, the councils of 2 or more municipalities may enter into an agreement to establish a joint municipal police board under subsection (1).*
- (3) An agreement under subsection (2) must contain terms respecting the establishment of the municipal police board, membership on the municipal police board and division of expenditures.*

It is clear that the Ministers approval is required for any substantive changes to a policing arrangement. This position has been underscored in discussions with representatives of the Police Services in BC.

The *Municipal Policing Agreement*⁹⁵, outlines the following provincial / municipal governance model, providing local input and accountability within sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5:

ARTICLE 40 DIRECTION AND REPORTING

4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the Commanding Officer shall act under the direction of the Minister in aiding the administration of justice in the Province and in carrying into effect the laws in force therein.

⁹⁴ S. 31, 32, 33.

⁹⁵ April 1st 1992

4.2 *It is recognized that, pursuant to the Provincial Policing Service Agreement, the Commanding Officer shall implement the objectives, priorities and goals as determined by the Minister for policing the Province.*

4.3 *The Chief Executive Officer⁹⁶ may set objectives, priorities and goals for the Municipal Police Unit that are not inconsistent with those of the Minister for other components of the provincial police service.*

4.4 *The member in charge of a Municipal Police Unit shall, in enforcing the by-laws of the Municipality, act under the lawful direction of the Chief Executive Officer, or such other person as the Chief Executive Officer may, in writing, designate.*

4.5 *The member in charge of a Municipal Police Unit shall report as reasonably required either to the Chief Executive Officer or the designate of the CEO on the matter of law enforcement in the Municipality and on the implementation of the objectives, priorities, and goals for the Unit.*

The principle of checks and balances is one of the foundations of democratic governments⁹⁷. The establishment of police boards or commissions provides a civilian oversight function intended to be at arm's length and, ideally, independent of the day-to-day influences of politics. Over the years, legislative and ministerial initiatives have refined and clarified the mandates of police overseers and their police services. The clarity of responsibilities has been accompanied by an increased demand for professionalism, transparency, accountability, and community involvement.

As noted above in this section, police boards governing municipal, provincial, or federal services at the local level are creatures of statute. Their function, while representing the community that the police force serves, is to enunciate values and standards, then develop relevant policies, systems, rules, structures, and monitoring mechanisms within a workable strategic framework to sustain those values and standards.

The purpose of the framework is to ensure that the broader community and the members of the police organisation contribute to and understand the board's objectives. Priorities will be established and plans reviewed periodically to ensure they remain relevant to the community and the police force. The board will exercise its responsibilities so as to sustain the organisation's resources.

Police leaders implement the framework by making appropriate decisions and taking appropriate actions to deliver policing programs and services in an effective and accountable manner. They provide understandable, accurate reports on progress towards achievement of board objectives.

⁹⁶ Mayor. Municipal Police Agreement, Article 1.1 b) April 1 1992

⁹⁷ Vanagunas, in Melchor C. De Guzman, Integrity, Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Impact: Do All These Matter in the Civilian Review of the Police? 1974,11

Municipal police boards exist because of provincial legislation. They are the product of provincial policy decisions to separate police operations from local level politics, while ensuring a mechanism for citizen input into policing priorities at the community level.

The separation of policing operations from politics – municipal, provincial or national – is a good thing, we would all agree, for obvious reasons of integrity of investigations, unbiased enforcement of the law, transparent human resources practices, and many others.

And the optics around this separation are as important as the practical reality. The perception of separation between politics and policing is a keystone in a solid relationship with the community, which must be based on citizen confidence in police and their integrity.⁹⁸

Municipal police boards, by their legislative mandate, membership, and role within a community, are hybrid creatures.

While there are some elements of a traditional or control-oriented board such as rules of order, the establishment of committees or working groups (labour relations, chief of police selection, budget), the primary work of police boards involves representing constituents or stakeholders (police, community, local government, justice system), with a focus on results (through setting priorities, monitoring activities) and policy development to define goals and limitations. The effectiveness of a police board depends on its ability to establish rules and implement appropriate checks and balances, while maintaining equilibrium among board members as well as among competing priorities and interests.

The Canadian Association of Police Boards suggests that most police services boards in Canada are responsible for:

- determining adequate personnel levels;
- budgeting for the needs of the police service;
- monitoring the budget;
- reviewing the performance of the service;
- hiring the Chief of Police;
- labour relations;
- discipline; and
- policy development.⁹⁹

The Canadian Association of Police Boards has reported:

Board governance is essentially an invisible function. Its practitioners leave daily operations to a chief executive officer who often becomes the public personification of the organisation. It is only when problems surface and the organisation is in crisis that

⁹⁸ "Police Governance: What's the Best Model?", Chief Edgar MacLeod, President, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 2004, page 3

⁹⁹ Canadian Association of Police Boards, "Board Composition and Duties" www.capb.ca/about/composition.shtml. Since the publication, there have been some changes to board duties in some jurisdictions. For example, the boards in Calgary and Edmonton are both included in priority setting and the Calgary board has no involvement in the selection of a fire chief. The table, see appendix 3, is included to demonstrate the range of board responsibilities across the country.

the governing entity, and questions about its role and effectiveness, is thrust into the spotlight. It is only then that the true importance of an effective board emerges¹⁰⁰.

It is this tight focus on the fundamentals of governance in the context of authorities, policies, and accountability that lend ongoing support to adapting elements of Carver's approach to fit the local police board's context. Although Carver's policy governance principles form a foundation for police oversight, as noted above¹⁰¹, most police boards in Canada have expanded from Carver's narrow interpretation¹⁰². The boards have engaged in examining governance in other jurisdictions and have adapted the basic concepts to the unique complexities of policing governance.

Freiwirth¹⁰³ noted that

"many of us who work with boards and focus on board effectiveness and development have come to realize that the problem largely rests with the traditional governance models, or the hybrids thereof, that many nonprofits now use. The field needs an immediate infusion of new ideas, new approaches and new board models".

According to Freiwirth, this requires,

- *A focus on Performance vs. Purpose:* The governing work of the board needs to be meaningful to the organisation's mission and work.
- *Boards must connect with the communities they serve:* Boards must remain focused on the constituents rather than solely on the oversight of internal organisational issues. Therefore, boards must maintain a focus on the organisation's mission.
- *Expand the traditional definition of "governance" to build true accountability:* Boards can not be truly accountable to the community unless active engagement is part of their basic responsibilities as a board.
- *Community-driven Governance:* Community-driven governance models ensure opportunities for constituents and community members to be actively engaged in key decision-making by, for example, identifying current community needs, setting future directions for the organisation, and problem solving around issues affecting the community. Boards can move from "input" to "inclusion."

While legislation directs membership and mandate, how a police board designs its policy and operating structures is a reflection of the vision of the members, the applicability of elements of various board governance models, the community served and the organisational maturity of the police force to be governed.

Best practices research indicates that exemplary governance models are a consequence of multiple factors. In BC and other provinces there is generally more structure and structured latitude for independent municipal oversight authorities than those with responsibility for

¹⁰⁰ Canadian Association of Police Boards. Putting the Tools in Place: The Final Report on Phase 1 of 'Pursuit of Excellence.' November, 1994.

¹⁰¹ Page 4, of this section.

¹⁰² Wendy Fedec, Executive Director of the Ottawa Police Services Board and former Executive Director of the Canadian Association of Police Boards (CAPB)

¹⁰³ *Transforming the Work of the Board by Moving Toward Community-Driven Governance - Part II* in *Nonprofit Boards and Governance Review e-Newsletter*, February 16, 2006 - Judy Freiwirth, page 1

contracted services, whether RCMP or OPP (Ontario Provincial Police). There is structure and structured latitude in that the breadth of oversight functions is broader and, consequently, the latitude for the municipal board to apply governance (or not to) is also broader. Interviews indicate that the absence of full powers of oversight and a clear definition of the processes that can be used with contracted services is a source of frustration for representatives of contracted jurisdictions.

Success in police governance stems from factors as diverse as the established and documented structure of the oversight body and the direction taken by the Board and provided to the police agency through the policies and practices of the Board or Committee. But also, equally important appears to be the personality and attitude of the primary players.

As noted, above legislation and support for board development by provincial ministries and oversight associations have given rise to effective boards in jurisdictions such as New Brunswick, Ontario, and BC. The Province of Nova Scotia has recently introduced training for police boards and police advisory committees. Even relatively smaller agencies, such as the municipal force of Saint John, New Brunswick, have developed effective policies and practices along with positive and balanced relationships with senior officers. Codiac Police Authority, also in New Brunswick, was called to address a somewhat fractured transition from three municipal agencies to a regionalized contracted policing service. With the gradual development of committees, formalized processes and other 'rules of engagement' along with a commitment of police and community representatives, effective oversight is evolving. Other police agencies in Ontario, for example, have also evolved with the guidance and counsel of the Police Services of the Ministry and the Association of Police Services Boards which provide support through template policies, practice, and training and senior officer selection processes. Interviewees noted that the support provided by the Police Services Branch of the Ministry in BC is particularly effective.

Information obtained during the review indicates that the eleven major police departments use the services of a full time board secretary.

In many of the cases reviewed, effectiveness of governance was based upon a combination of the formal processes and rules of engagement along with the commitment and willingness of the individuals that started and facilitated the development of effective oversight. It is apparent that the desire on the part of the principal participants to develop effective governance appears to override the need for formal processes. However, the development of

formal processes and rules of engagement must soon follow the evolution of a working relationship.

The governance model established by the City of Surrey, BC, the Police Committee, a Standing Committee of Council, was deemed by interviewees – police and city staff - as being a successful model. Interviews with those who are primary participants demonstrated that the focused, committed, and consensus driven approach was a catalyst for change. This productive liaison brought about the Crime Reduction Model which is discussed in another section of this report. The governance model operates largely outside of the policing agreements. In order to incorporate Fire Services, By-law Enforcement, and other safety issues, the Committee was recently renamed the Public Safety Committee^{104, 105}.

An interesting example of oversight can be found in Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) where a Board of Police Commissioners, a combination of Councillors and appointed representatives, provides oversight for both the Halifax Regional Police (HRP, a municipal force) and the RCMP Halifax Detachment. The majority of the urban areas are policed by the HRP and the rural areas by the RCMP. Specialist teams are comprised of both municipal and RCMP officers operating throughout HRM and there are uniformed officers of both services operating in the general duty or patrol function in both areas. Both services report to the Commission monthly in a similar manner through a joint report. However, there were perceived and actual differences in the degree of control that could be exerted over each service. RCMP staff reported that in addition to workload reports they provided the Commission with complete information on such things as overtime costs. Members of the Commission and Council receive daily electronic dispatches regarding a summary of significant policing events that had occurred in the RCMP policed area. This illustrates the variety and flexibility of means to maintain effective communication and positive relationships between the police and local oversight.

However, just as a system of governance can be introduced and maintained based upon informal arrangements outside of agreements, such a process can quickly disintegrate when the principal players are changed; hence, the need for formalization of processes.

The *Review* was advised that the Surrey model was originally based upon the Community Safety Committee of the City of Richmond. Interviews suggest that the respective committees have taken different tacks due to the perspectives and goals of those involved in the governance models. Surrey, for example, has introduced periodic formal meetings with hard

¹⁰⁴ Mayor's Report, July 9th 2007

¹⁰⁵ The Terms of Reference of the Committee are detailed in the Appendix 4.

copy reports of progress against objectives. The Richmond model, on the other hand, has the OIC reporting informally to the Mayor and to the Committee, with no formal meetings with the person appointed as the Principal Police Contact.¹⁰⁶ Also, although the police representative meets with the Community Safety Committee these meetings do not provide a formal vehicle for input to police strategies nor to receive feedback from the police regarding the outcomes of police programs or operational and workload data. In the course of the review it was found there was limited scope of input of the City to policing strategies and the absence of formal reports from the OIC.

The following provides examples of different approaches in a number of jurisdictions:

Burnaby*Community Policing Committee*

- Councillors and community representatives

Halifax Regional Municipality*Halifax Regional Police and Halifax RCMP Detachment
Police Commission*

- Councillors and community representatives

Township of Langley*Community Safety Commission*

- Councillor chair, 16 members, broad representation

City & District of North Vancouver -*Joint Police Liaison Committee*

- 2 mayors
- 2 CAOs
- 2 Councillors

City of Port Coquitlam*Protective Services Committee*

- Chair and Deputy Chair, Councillors

Town of View Royal*Committee of the Whole*

- Mayor and Council
- West Shore RCMP Detachment
- Serving five municipalities and two First Nations

City of Richmond*Community Safety Committee**Police Services, Fire-Rescue, Emergency and Environmental Programs and Community
Bylaws*

- Chair and Vice Chair Councillors
- Three councillors

¹⁰⁶ 'Principal Police Contact', is the position, subject to an MOU, noted as the contact between the OIC and the client municipality. Terms of Reference, RCMP Lower Mainland District and mayors Working Group, Staff Working Group and Task Force Group, 26.01.2007

With regard the City of Richmond, the *Community Charter* prescribes the requirements for municipal committees.

Division 4 — Committees, Commissions and Other Bodies
Standing committees of council to be appointed to a select committee.

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- (1) *The mayor must establish standing committees for matters the mayor considers would be better dealt with by committee and must appoint persons to those committees.*
- (2) *At least half of the members of a standing committee must be council members.*
- (3) *Subject to subsection (2), persons who are not council members may be appointed to a standing committee.*

Select committees of council

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- (1) *A council may establish and appoint a select committee to consider or inquire into any matter and to report its findings and opinion to the council.*
- (2) *At least one member of a select committee must be a council member.*
- (3) *Subject to subsection (2), persons who are not council members may*

Where Public Security Boards (read police boards or commissions) have oversight responsibility for more than one police agency, such as a regionalised service, the issue of proportional representation arises. From best practices research, a number of approaches appear to have been tried to ensure equitable representation of partners in governance. The most simple, in some respects, is representation based upon population.

This is a simple solution based upon census data but presumes that the populations of each sub-jurisdiction contribute (or make demands upon) the policing system to an equal extent. As we have noted in the section regarding the predictability of crime, this is not an accurate assumption. Factors such as population density impact crime rates and workload. Jurisdictions such as Codiac and other RCMP based areas have used the internal RCMP system, SARPLE¹⁰⁷, to determine the division of issues such as funding and by extension representation. SARPLE, which is based upon workload and mileage, is being phased out by the RCMP to be replaced by a broader formula, the details of which have not yet been adopted by the RCMP.

A more specific form of representation based upon resource use is tied to percentage of calls for service.

Proportional representation in governance is important as it provides a voice for the community and provides input to facilitate the development of policing strategies which are

¹⁰⁷ SARPLE is the process previously used by the RCMP to determine resource needs for a detachment.

attuned to the idiosyncratic needs of specific communities. In addition, of course, the magnitude of representation impacts the amount of power of direction regarding public funds.

As previously described, a municipal police board has greater authority and oversight over a municipal police department than a municipal council has over a contracted policing model. The police board also has the advantage of non-elected community representation.

The *Municipal Policing Agreement* provides a structure within which the City's oversight and input can be enhanced. The recommendations of the *Review* describe how some advantages of the municipal police board model can be included in the oversight of the contracted model through the proposed *Public Security Committee* which would replace the current *Community Safety Committee*.

Recommendations

- 3.A The City of Richmond should, through the UBCM and other appropriate vehicles, lobby for greater municipal input into the Provincial Policing Services Agreement and the Municipal Policing Unit Agreement.
- the Agreements should provide greater accountability and clarity regarding governance and the reporting relationship between the Detachment and the Municipality; and
 - see Finance recommendations for greater financial accountability.
- 3.B The City of Richmond should develop and implement a formal governance structure with accompanying policies and procedures that ensures effective and comprehensive oversight of policing in the municipality.
- 3.C The City of Richmond should establish oversight of community safety in the following ways:
- Establish a representative *Public Security Committee*¹⁰⁸ of persons with skills, expertise and interest in police governance, to replace the existing community safety committee
 - The Committee should be a *Standing Committee of Council*, comprised of the Mayor, councillors, and non-elected representatives of the community appointed by Council. Councillors will comprise the majority of members.
 - The prime objectives of the *Public Security Committee* are to liaise with the senior officer to set and provide input to implementation of the objectives, goals, and priorities¹⁰⁹ of the police agency and to receive reports of progress from the senior officer of the agency.
 - Arrange for training of committee members through Police Services, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
 - Arrange for training of committee members in Fire Rescue, Emergency Programs and Bylaws

¹⁰⁸ The term "public security committee" is used as a more generic term than "board" or "commission" and to differentiate the new governance organization from the existing Community Safety Committee. This places the concept and discussion outside the bounds of the Act or Agreements. The term Public Security Board is used in the 2006 report of the Law Commission – In Search of Security. The resultant name of the oversight body would be determined by Council.

¹⁰⁹ Articles 4.3 and 4.5 of the Municipal Policing Agreement, April 1 1992

- Develop a mandate and structure for the committee, including working committees, if required.
- Coordinate the mandate and activities to complement those of the Joint Operations Team and the senior management team – TAG team.
- Conduct a series of public meetings to establish community priorities for safety and security.
- In consultation with the senior officer of the police agency¹¹⁰, discuss and reach consensus on a process for the development of a strategic plan for policing.
- In consultation with the senior officer of the police agency discuss and reach consensus on the reporting schedule, a reporting structure, and the report elements to ensure full and open discussion of issues related to community safety and security. Each facet of the plan should, where necessary, dovetail with each facet of other municipal departments participating in the safety and security group.
- Meetings would continue to be conducted in accordance with Richmond's processes and procedures for Standing Committees.

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

Although the current agreements and the *RCMP Act* limit the degree of involvement of municipalities in the oversight of, and administration of, the RCMP, precedent suggests that a representative committee can be established within the current terms of both. The legislation and agreement prevent involvement in selected aspects of operations and internal administration; however, the City of Richmond has significant latitude to seek greater structure and formality to the planning and reporting processes along with broader input regarding the community perspective on safety and security matters. Also, under the current arrangement if the OIC fails to comply with a reasonable request of the CEO (the mayor) or the principal policing contact then the officer to whom the OIC reports should be notified and, the *Review* was informed, appropriate action will be taken.

Under this option, the Richmond *Public Security Committee* may be comprised of the Mayor and Council, or a combination of Mayor, Council, and other appropriate community appointees. Under this model, the senior officer of the police agency and other working committees would report to the *Public Security Committee* on a formal and regular basis, and also the senior officer would report to the *Principal Policing Contact* on day to day professional contact.

An independent municipal police force

The *Police Act* gives a wide range of opportunities for active involvement in the governance of policing. Those limitations that do exist, such as very limited involvement in operational issues, are rational and desirable to ensure that the delineation of politics and policing does not

¹¹⁰ Senior officer of the police agency in this context refers to the individual who is in command of the agency or detachment, in other words the person assuming the position of chief of police

became blurred. The Police Board, having responsibility for the police department, could function as a *Public Security Committee*. Under current legislation, the *Act* prescribes membership of the Board with the majority of positions being assigned to provincial appointees and, consequently, the City would have limitations upon its representation. *Police Acts* in some other jurisdictions give the majority positions to municipal representatives.

Contracting with another municipal police force

It is presumed that a contracted municipal model would not automatically provide the City of Richmond with representation on the board of the contracting police service. However, in order for this model to be acceptable to the City, it can be envisaged that the negotiations leading to such an arrangement would provide an opportunity for the City to establish reasonable input into the governance of the Richmond component of the police department, especially local *objectives, goals, and priorities*, forms of service delivery, and staffing levels. In addition, protocols determining regular reporting to the City could be established. This reporting may contain elements which provide a comprehensive understanding of outcomes in strategic plans, performance against budgets and priorities, and information data such as complaints against police.

In addition, the Richmond *Public Security Committee* could function as described under the first option.

The overriding issues in any of these forms of governance structure are the nature of the governance structure, the degree of involvement in (or detachment from) oversight, and the amount of representation afforded the representatives of the jurisdiction in a shared policing service arrangement such as contracted municipal service or (below) a regionalized service.

A regional police force

A regional model comprising the Richmond policing service and one or more municipal police departments under the *Act* would require an agreement containing terms respecting the establishment of a joint board and membership on the joint board.¹¹¹ It can be envisaged that the negotiations leading to such an agreement would provide appropriate City representation on the police board (see above).

In addition, the *Richmond Public Security Committee* could function as described under the first option.

¹¹¹ *Police Act Section 18*

4.1 The Ideal

Premise

The ideal model is the organization comprised of those structural, resource, policy and process elements that will optimally serve the policing needs of the City of Richmond. With the ideal organisational principles established, the practical application can then be considered.

An essential element of the requirements of the *Review* is to outline an “ideal” policing model for the City of Richmond. There are several factors which differentiate the police from other public and, particularly, private sector organisations:

- The unique role of police in society as enforcers of the law on behalf of the public.
- The special legal basis of the police powers.
- The impact of police effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) upon the well-being of the community.
- The unique funding of police services versus other public institutions.
- The structured police hierarchy.
- The virtual monopoly of police over many aspects of community safety and security.
- The dynamic nature of the environment in which police organisations operate.

It was apparent during the course of the *Review* that the police environment and the internal management and dynamics of police organisations, in general, are far from static. The RCMP, for example, is in a state of evolution. At the same time, the operational environment for policing remains dynamic as the perception of the threat and relative importance of offences change, laws and evidentiary requirements become more complex, and demographic trends are shifting as are definitions of public versus private space.¹¹²

The internal systems of police organisations are also undergoing significant change. Personnel are more educated, and increased civilianization and specialization means that sworn and civilian personnel combine talents to create a highly skilled organisation. More sophisticated recruiting and selection tools mean that staff are more appropriately selected based upon the competencies required to the job for which staff are recruited or promoted.

Interviews, research, and focus groups conducted in the course of the *Review* indicated that it was impossible for the police to focus on one objective such as the

¹¹² Malls, gated communities, housing estates and transit systems are all subject to debate regarding their degree of public vs. private space and by which organization they should be policed.

high profit margin or the share value of the private sector - the ideal agency (and its constituent elements) could only be expected to define and maintain an optimum balance between many, sometimes competing, interests and objectives. The optimum skills of the executive, the manager, the supervisor, and line staff lay, primarily, in their ability to understand the policing environment and to orchestrate activities to attend to the most important matters in the community. Likewise, the role of the oversight authority was seen as to facilitate this process, apply due diligence, and to ensure that plans are brought to fruition within budget and in compliance with community needs.

Consequently, the “ideal” model described below has considered the context in which the police are likely to operate. It takes into account what can be reasonably expected in a dynamic policing environment, operating ethically within current legislation, within a competitive budget environment and against an ever-changing backdrop. Much of the discussion is speculative in that police organisations can, if not define, then strongly influence inputs and outputs by introducing strategies or programs which help to engineer and then redefine the work and role of the police. The following are examples which may affect inputs and outputs. These were mentioned in the course of the *Review* as existing in a variety of police agencies.

- Implementing a program which requires the public to phone in reports of a theft or break and enter will become a disincentive to victims and reduce the reported incidents, and the ‘perception’ of the crime rate.
- Introducing a Road Side check program will increase the number of reported incidents of impaired driving.
- Improving representation of minority groups with commensurate language skills into a police agency will increase the number of reported incidents from a particular ethnic community.
- Targeted drug-trafficking investigations will increase the “crime rate” of drug related offences.
- Improved investigations and reporting of violence-in-relationships crimes will increase the number of assault statistics.

The ideal model is first described in terms of the general concepts that are seen as desirable. These were described by an interviewee as “the principle¹¹³ backdrop for policing” - these are the touchstones for the agency.

Then, these principles are moved to a practical foundation for operating. Strategies and programs are described that provide a range of approaches for implementation in the Richmond policing service.

¹¹³ Discussion with the interviewee suggested that either principle or principal could be used in this context.

In describing these programs in the report they are often placed in a point counter point to current programs or approaches of the Richmond Detachment. This approach has been adopted for the following reasons.

- The Terms of the *Review*, as outlined above in 1.2, require an assessment of approaches and programs that are used within the detachment.
- For many of those who were interviewed, participated in focus groups, or provided an opinion through other forms of input, the RCMP and, more particularly the Richmond Detachment, is the frame of reference for policing. It is the personnel of the Detachment who have attended calls for service, or participated in community groups, or about whom the public have read or viewed in the local media. Therefore, any new initiative must be described from the Richmond perspective. Where possible, best practices from other agencies are also explained.

Consequently, the predominant use of the Richmond Detachment, and more broadly the RCMP's approach to policing are intended as a critique and not a criticism.

It has been noted above that policing is dynamic. However, the emergence of this almost constant state of change is relatively recent given the long traditional approach of policing since 1829 when the Metropolitan Police was introduced in London, England. Until the early 1970s police, almost universally, addressed crime and disorder issues in a reactive way. Essentially, after an incident occurred the police addressed that single event; little thought was given to the event in a broader community context. The 1970s however, heralded a significant change in the way that policing was viewed, studied, managed, and applied.

In 1972, by attempting to inject a more scientific, rational and analytical approach to policing, the *Kansas City Patrol Experiment*¹¹⁴ caused a profound reassessment of the manner in which police should conduct the task of policing. The Kansas City Experiment attempted to understand the impact of structured versus random deployment and other formal policing approaches upon the overall rate of community disorder. Since that time a great deal of research has been conducted into the effectiveness of various policing strategies. These innovations include 'Signs of Crime'¹¹⁵, drawing on the logic of "broken windows", an early intervention strategy to prevent conditions from deteriorating to the point where crime flourishes; Community Based Policing¹¹⁶, referring to the recognition that the police must act to encourage the public to share responsibility for public safety, specifically by consulting with them, adapting their operations to local conditions, mobilizing volunteer resources; and

¹¹⁴ See Appendix 4

¹¹⁵ Wilson and Kelling 1982

¹¹⁶ Bayley 1994, Goldstein 1990, Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 1988, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990.

'problem oriented policing'¹¹⁷, developing police programs that ameliorate or eliminate conditions that generate problems of insecurity and disorder that police are repeatedly called upon to prevent. Bayley has suggested that it is these initiatives that have generated real changes in policing¹¹⁸.

The *Review* has examined a variety of concepts and recommendations, cognizant that positive results are more likely from successful local initiatives than ones that must be imported from different cultures and environments.

Recommendation

- 4.A The Richmond policing model should incorporate best practices central to the culture and function of an effective and efficient community oriented organisation. As will be examined later, the essential strategies should include, a community orientation, the analysis of data to allow the more rational deployment of personnel, and a proactive approach to the resolution of crime and disorder.

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

The *Review* identified varying levels of implementation of best practices in policing organisations demonstrating that a contracted service, subject to appropriate City – Detachment discussions and governance processes, can incorporate ideal strategies. These can be adopted at local level even within the context of a national organisation.

An independent municipal police force

The municipal model perhaps provides the most immediate connection with, and sensitivity to, the community and the opportunity to customize police service directly to the community's needs.

¹¹⁷ Goldstein 1979, 1990

¹¹⁸ Bayley, David H. Distinguished Professor, State University of New York at Albany, 2006

Contracting with another municipal police force

It may also be envisioned that the degree of sensitivity and responsiveness to local conditions can be established during negotiations leading to a contracted service.

A regional police force

There is no reason that a regional model cannot be as sensitive to local conditions as the municipal model; however, in practice, the greater the separation between the city management and the leadership of the police service, the more difficult it becomes to customize service. It may be envisioned that the degree of sensitivity and responsiveness to local conditions can be established during negotiations leading to a regionalised service.

4.2 Continuum of Safety & Security Services

Premise

An important element in the continuum of policing is the understanding of “policing” as more than purely a public police function. A broad application of the task of community safety and security facilitates better use of community resources and will provide greater support to the goal of public safety and the associated perception of safety.

In many urban areas we are witnessing not simply two-tiered policing but a continuum of agencies that are responsible for policing¹¹⁹.

Policing agencies are evolving from the uniformed sworn officer response, through non-sworn staff providing some support services such as call taking and telephone report writing, to, currently, a continuum of policing services where a spectrum of sworn and un-sworn personnel contribute to a broader view and application of community safety and security strategies. This strategic change in the provision of services has been prompted by innovators seeking to be more cost effective, the increased complexity of legislation and evidence gathering¹²⁰, the blurring of lines between public and private space, private security delivering first level policing services, and the large number of community services and organisations involved in the public safety area.

Research shows that options include service delivery through sworn patrol officers; police officer telephone investigation; telephone report taking; internet reporting; by-law enforcement; non-sworn specialists such as scenes-of-crime staff; private security personnel under contract to police agencies; non-sworn police community service officers; citizens' crime patrol; victim services; business improvement association street security patrols; private security in stores, hotels, malls, and a variety of public spaces; and volunteers working in a variety of support functions.

As the concept is evolving, this *continuum of policing* is usually unorganized and, when cooperation exists, it is based on individuals who take the initiative with contacts in other safety or security related organisations. There is generally no formal

¹¹⁹ In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada, Law Commission of Canada, 2006

¹²⁰ For example, DNA Act; ViClass; disclosure legislation; Bill C-109, Surveillance techniques; case law requiring extended process such as R v. Feeney, R v. Bridges

mandate, leadership, support, or funding to create a logical, effective continuum of service; although, as noted below, a movement of coordinated continuums is arising.

The City of Richmond established the Division of Law and Community Safety, the Community Safety Committee (2001), and the Joint Operations Team. Likewise, the City of Surrey, for example, has implemented a broadly orchestrated Crime Reduction Program which incorporates multi-agency involvement.

Public Leadership of the Continuum

The Law Commission of Canada makes the following recommendation:

Public Security Boards or analogous institutions should have the ability to allocate their budget to providers of policing, whether public or private, according to their demonstrated capacity and suitability for contributing to the best overall policing of communities¹²¹.

The ability to allocate budgets to providers of policing, whether public or private, is key to the ability to effectively deploy the continuum of policing. Local examples exist within the police community. For example:

- police departments contract with a private security company to provide jail guards as required¹²²;
- a large police department deploys a traffic authority, a unit of part-time reserve constables, for traffic direction and control¹²³;
- many police agencies employ staff to lead or coordinate various volunteer functions such as citizens' crime patrol and victim services; and
- the Corps of Commissionaires provides security for a number of police facilities in British Columbia¹²⁴.

Examples of the Policing Continuum

The *Review* examined a number of local, national, and international examples of the continuum. The following examples are relevant to the Richmond environment.

¹²¹ Law Commission of Canada, *Search for security – The future of policing in Canada*, 2006, 135

¹²² West Vancouver PD, Victoria PD

¹²³ Vancouver PD

¹²⁴ OCA, RCMP

Richmond's Joint Operation Team

The City of Richmond conducts bi-weekly meetings of the *Joint Operations Team*, comprising representatives from the police, Bylaws, Fire Department, Engineering, and Business Licensing, and other City departments as required such as Law, Planning, Building, Parks and Recreation as well as external resources as required. The function of the team is to address issues and problems through the various functions supporting one another's initiatives. City staff report that the model is successful and includes effective debriefings of the cross-function responses. The concept demonstrates how the coordination of a variety of resources can more effectively address community problems, including safety and security.

Municipal Crime Reduction Strategy

In 2006, the City of Surrey announced a *Crime Reduction Strategy, Improving the Quality of Life for the Citizens of Surrey, A Problem Solving Approach*, modeled on similar initiatives in the United Kingdom. The concept goes beyond the policing continuum and creates a larger community safety continuum within which the policing component plays an important role. Recommendations include¹²⁵:

- *establishing Community Safety Officers;*
- *real-time crime analysis and analysis by academic researchers;*
- *public education;*
- *crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED);*
- *closed circuit television (CCTV);*
- *social and physical support;*
- *early childhood development interventions;*
- *youth intervention programs; and*
- *other interventions.*

Neighbourhood Policing Teams

The Wiltshire Police in the United Kingdom has begun the implementation of an orchestrated approach to the identification and resolution of community issues along with other local authority departments and agencies. Under a national program introduced by the Home Office, the central government coordinator of police activities and budgeting, the Wiltshire Police have established a series of Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). The size of each "neighbourhood" is defined by the identifiable culture of an area along with the assessed volume and severity of

¹²⁵ City of Surrey, website

incidents which occur within the area. Neighbourhoods with a higher number of incidents usually warranting a smaller area.

Each team is led by a constable who is assisted by Community Service Officers (CSO). The CSOs are “second tier” paid officers.¹²⁶ In conjunction with the community, the police identify issues which disrupt community order and the police act as a catalyst for a coordinated joint approach to problem resolution. Evaluation of the initiatives is conducted by the Home Office and through the British Crime Survey which is an annual assessment of reported and unreported crime. However, the issues addressed by NPTs may include matters which are not crime but which simply impact a public sense of well-being.

Besides identifying and resolving community issues, the intent of the initiative is to provide greater visibility of, and accessibility to, the police.

Sheriff Services Expanding¹²⁷

In Alberta, the Sheriffs’ role in public security has also recently expanded to include patrolling highways across the province as part of Sheriff Highway Patrol. Sheriffs also provide a surveillance service to assist law enforcement agencies in Alberta with ongoing investigations. This allows police officers to focus on more serious crime in the communities they serve. As of September 1, 2006, Alberta Sheriffs conduct traffic enforcement on some of the province’s busiest highways. Sheriffs are working out of seven offices province-wide and patrol roadways identified by law enforcement as problem areas.

Sheriffs have authority under the *Traffic Safety Act*, the *Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act*, the *Gaming and Liquor Act* and the *Provincial Offences Procedure Act*. They can also execute outstanding arrest warrants under the *Criminal Code*.

Auto Crime & Traffic Safety Partnerships

In British Columbia, there has been a long-term public safety partnership between the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) and the public police forces. Initiatives which the public police would not have been able to undertake alone have been made possible through this form of policing continuum. For example:

¹²⁶ See later section on NPTs and CSOs.

¹²⁷ Alberta Solicitor General and Public Security

- *Fraud Prevention:* ICBC's Special Investigation Unit employs officers with Peace Officer status to conduct criminal investigations into Fraud and Thefts. The officers have worked cooperatively with local police officers for many years to conduct these investigations.
- *Auto Crime Prevention:* ICBC provided funding to establish the Auto Theft Task Force now renamed IMPACT (Integrated Municipal Provincial Auto Crime Team). In the late 1990s, ICBC began providing salvage vehicles and equipment to individual police target teams for auto crime surveillance operations focussed on serial offenders and high risk locations.
- *Road Safety:* ICBC's road safety partnership dates back to 1982, when ICBC began developing CounterAttack advertising to support drinking driving enforcement campaigns. Research indicates that high levels of traffic law enforcement, coupled with high levels of public awareness, produce an immediate reduction in traffic deaths and injuries.
- *Research:* ICBC provided funding for the Vancouver police to undertake research in conjunction with Simon Fraser University. This tripartite initiative provided an in-depth analysis of speed infractions and traffic flows on major arterial roads and allowed for the development of targeted enforcement initiatives.
- *Technology:* In the mid 1990s, ICBC provided funding and project management support to implement new enforcement technologies such as photo radar and intersection safety cameras. In 1996, ICBC began providing overtime funding to the RCMP and municipal police departments to increase the number of drinking-driving road checks. The program was expanded to also include funding for the Targeted Traffic Enforcement Program, where extra enforcement was applied to deter high risk driving behaviours at high crash road locations.
- *Bait Car Program:* In 2002, ICBC partnered with the Vancouver Police Department to launch the Bait Car Program, which was expanded to the Lower Mainland in 2004 and later into other areas of the province in 2004. ICBC also supports community policing strategies to prevent auto crime. Since the mid-1990s, ICBC has provided funding for community auto crime prevention programs.
- *Integrated Road Safety Units:* In 2004, the overtime program model was altered to provide funding to the Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor General for fulltime additional traffic police officers in addition to some overtime support. The Ministry and police have developed Integrated Road Safety Units, which bring together officers from the RCMP and municipal police departments to focus on high crash locations and high risk behaviours in their local jurisdictions.

ICBC invests about \$18 million annually in law enforcement partnership programs and continues to strongly support the partnership model.

Resources Donated to the Police

Donations to public bodies, especially the police, are problematic due to the actual or perceived conflict of interest. The Vancouver Police Department has addressed this issue as follows:

The Vancouver Crime Prevention Society (VCPS), formed in 1990, has responded with proactive leadership in an effort to make Vancouver a safer place to live and work by asking people and corporations to participate in a range of community crime prevention programs. Since its inception, VCPS has raised more than \$500,000 to fund dozens of programs and initiatives in Vancouver. More than 1,500 volunteers work in programs to make a difference in the daily lives of all Vancouver citizens. The VCPS accepts donations in cash and in kind. These donations may be donated for specific VPD projects. Any donations not specifically targeted for a project will go into the VCPS general fund where it will be used for smaller crime prevention initiatives identified by the VPD and VCPS. The VCPS is registered as a charitable society and can issue tax receipts for donations, if required by a donor. The VCPS is governed by a Board of Directors representative of the Vancouver community¹²⁸.

In the case of a contracted policing service, it may be appropriate – subject to suitable policies and governance – for donations to be made to the City and made available to the police service.

Private Security providing policing services in Public Places

In the early 1980s private security companies commenced patrols on public streets in cities in the United States, usually funded through Business Improvement Associations (BIAs). At that time this practice was viewed as a radical departure from the traditional role of private security - normally restricted to the protection of private property on private property. It was also viewed as a departure from the public police being the agency solely responsible for the patrol of public venues.

The increase of mass-private property, that is, privately operated and owned public spaces (such as malls, housing complexes, industrial parks, entertainment parks, transportation facilities, airports) resulted in the private security function moving to providing first level policing services to the public in public spaces¹²⁹. For example, the implementation of initiatives that are often referred to as “Operation Cooperation”.

¹²⁸ VPD website

¹²⁹ Mass private property thesis, Shearing and Stenning 1981

This involves the creation of functional partnerships between public police services and private security services¹³⁰.

Today, it is more accurate to suggest that policing is carried out by a complex mix of public police and private security. In many cases these networks of policing are overlapping, complimentary, and mutually supportive. Within this context, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between public and private responsibilities¹³¹.

Over the past two decades the role of private security, in various forms, has become larger than the public police. The *Review* considers the conclusions of the Law Commission¹³² and BC Progress Board¹³³ reports to accurately reflect the policing environment in British Columbia. Private policing (functions authorized by law and conducted by licensed private security) staffing is estimated at over 12,000¹³⁴ and there is an unknown number of unlicensed security staff working on the premises of their employers (retail stores, hotels, office complexes) in British Columbia. These networks of safety and security are present in downtowns and commercial areas but are usually uncoordinated and operate in silos. Liaison and coordination would provide the opportunity to significantly increase their efficiency and effectiveness for the public good with a comparatively small contribution of public resources.

The Vancouver Downtown Ambassadors® Program was established by the Vancouver Downtown Business Improvement Association. The goal of the program is to address "quality of life" issues such as panhandling, litter, illegal vending and graffiti with the understanding that these issues not only affect the general quality of life in the downtown but also the overall crime rates. The program is comprised of 16 full-time licensed private security 'Ambassadors', who are trained to provide hospitality assistance and crime prevention services to the Vancouver Downtown BIA area. The Ambassadors patrol a 90-block area both on foot and by bicycle, Monday to Friday from 7:00 am to 10:30 pm and on Saturdays and Sundays from 9:00 am to 10:30 pm.

The Ambassadors currently patrol the downtown business district, South Granville (Granville Street from the south end of the bridge to 16th Avenue), the West End, and Yaletown. It is anticipated that they may expand operations to Robson Street, and West 4th Avenue.

¹³⁰ BC Progress Board Recommendation Reducing Crime and improving Criminal Justice in British Columbia: Recommendations for Change 2006

¹³¹ In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada Law Commission of Canada 2006

¹³² In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada Law Commission of Canada 2006

¹³³ BC Progress Board Recommendation Reducing Crime and improving Criminal Justice in British Columbia: Recommendations for Change 2006

¹³⁴ Estimates: 8000 provincially licensed security personnel, 2600 Commissionaires, 2000 airport security staff.

The VDBIA reports that since the introduction of the *Safe Streets Act* in 2004 the number of incidents where the Ambassadors have been required to intervene has dropped from 3000 to 1100 per annum. Over 120 local businesses have signed authorizations under the *Trespass Act (Trespass Amendment Act 2004)* authorizing the Ambassadors to act under the *Trespass Act* on behalf of the owner or occupier of the premises. In another jurisdiction, downtown businesses have posted signs on their premises providing local police with explicit authorization under the *Trespass Act* to act on their behalf in relation to trespass offences on the premises. Prior to the *Trespass Act*, Downtown Ambassadors had approximately 50% success in obtaining co-operation from trespassers blocking store entrances to move and police were frequently called (approximately 50 to 70 times per month). After the *Trespass Act* was amended in January 2004, the compliance rate rose to about 98% and calls for police assistance decreased to, usually, less than ten occasions per month by 2006.

The Vancouver Downtown BIA also contracts with a local security company to provide a Loss Prevention Team (LPT), of six licensed private security personnel, to patrol the area seven days per week during the daytime and evenings. The LPT works closely with the VDBIA, businesses, Operation Cooperation, and the VPD. The mandate is to protect BIA members' property from theft and vandalism but there is a public good in that many of the arrests made by the LPT are serial offenders who victimize a wide variety of citizens and businesses. The LPT make approximately 500 direct and indirect arrests per year in the business district.¹³⁵

This large number of apprehensions in a small area is likely to have a significant effect on the level of crime and disorder, especially as the arrests are mostly of serial and chronic offenders. In the Downtown Business District of Canada's third largest city, the resources of the private security function (through the BIA and Operation Cooperation) provide a large portion of the local "policing services".

¹³⁵ Direct arrests are where the LPT arrest offenders; indirect arrests are where the LPT may have no power of arrest, such as persons wanted-on-warrant, but call the VPD and maintain contact with the offender, or where the danger from a direct arrest is high and the VPD is called.

Operation Cooperation

Operation Cooperation is a term coined by the US Department of Justice which supports public-private partnerships in the field of policing. Instead of being separate and often conflicting entities, the reality of public/private policing is acknowledged. The resources of the two groups are combined in a more effective way with a common goal of reducing crime through general deterrence created by both visible presence and announced electronic surveillance (CCTV), fast response to calls involving the security of property, and a willingness to arrest offenders seen committing crimes even when the target is not the property being protected by the private security service. While the challenges are numerous, the potential is enormous and it is significant that the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area has already started its own version of Operation Cooperation, with some good results¹³⁶.

In 1994, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) established its own version of Operation Cooperation in Vancouver with one of the key principals being the Vancouver Downtown Business Improvement Association (VDBIA). The Association helped Operation Co-Operation, as it now exists¹³⁷, to obtain an agreement with the VPD under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* allowing and governing the protection and use of information supplied by the VPD. The introduction of the *Personal Information Privacy Act* in January of 2004, which covers the Operation Cooperation members (the DVVIA, see above section, private security companies, and retail security functions), opened the door for this relationship with the public police where personal information must be protected. This arrangement enables the private security function to receive information on chronic offenders where police have an active investigation ongoing and require assistance to apprehend or notify the police when they encounter serial offenders or persons wanted on warrants.

In addition, the VDBIA forwards maps of the area to the VPD with the locations of various incidents and occurrences involving the Downtown Ambassadors and Loss Prevention Team members, drug use, arrests, and various other categories. This information complements the police analyses of incidents in the area.

The VDBIA engages in quarterly joint crime-suppression initiatives with the VPD, a number of private security providers, city staff, and parking companies. The projects extend over four days and focus on serial offenders.

¹³⁶ BC Progress Board, 2006

¹³⁷ Vancouver Operation Cooperation is led by a board of business, police, and community representation. The members pay a \$25 fee to cover the minor administrative expenses. Interview, DVVIA.

The *Surrey Retail Theft Prevention Project* is another example of Operation Cooperation. The website¹³⁸ for the program contains information regarding warrants issued for persons likely to come into contact with loss prevention staff and police photographs of wanted persons. The program has the effect of coordinating the resources of retail business security and the public police.

Richmond City Staff report that previous City examinations of Business Improvement Areas were not supported by the business community. It may be that a density threshold is required to enable the businesses to operate with the economies of scale necessary to support programs. As density in the downtown continues to develop and the increased levels of activity through SkyTrain have effect, the anticipated increased crime and disorder problems¹³⁹ may create an environment supportive of BIAs.

Leadership of the *policing continuum* and programs such as *Operation Cooperation* enhance and promote effective partnerships, contact, and communication between the public police and various community and business groups.

The public resources for such initiatives are small, usually comprising communication and liaison in order to coordinate the activities of the various components of the police and continuum. In the Vancouver example, the results far exceed the police time devoted to the function¹⁴⁰.

Recommendations

- 4.B The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency facilitates and develops the essential components of a policing continuum and Operation Cooperation and the coordination of a *policing network*.
- 4.C The City of Richmond, as density increases to a critical mass creating business support, should facilitate the establishment of Business Improvement Areas and Business Improvement Associations with local businesses to provide an important additional component in the policing and public safety network.
- 4.D The City of Richmond should establish suitable protocols for accepting donations for public safety resources.

¹³⁸ <http://surreyrtpp.org/index.php>

¹³⁹ Crime increases with density. See chapter 2

¹⁴⁰ Review interviews

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

The RCMP Detachment, subject to support and direction from the City of Richmond, can effectively form part of the policing continuum.

An independent municipal police force

The municipal model may have the most immediate opportunity to customize police service directly to the community's needs and other complementary municipal services and initiatives.

Contracting with another municipal police force, and A regional police force

A regional or contracted model can also, subject to appropriate negotiation and governance models, effectively form part of the local policing continuum.

4.3 Crime Analysis

Premise

Crime Analysis identifies patterns and trends to determine the most effective use of the detachment's resources. Without accurate, timely information, managers cannot deploy resources effectively, field personnel are ill equipped to target crime and disorder problems, and expensive resources are wasted.

Introduction

Crime analysis is an essential component of an effective and efficient field deployment and investigation model. Without accurate analyses, managers are unable to identify priorities and develop strategies. The data required for the analysis used with the *Review* took five months to obtain. Such data is crucial to effective management of services and field personnel require timely information to enable them to target community problems and identify crime issues and offenders.

In '*Competing on Analytics*', Davenport¹⁴¹ suggests that any initiatives founded on 'gut-based decisions' will only be tactical and limited in impact. Strategic decision making is based upon reliable quantitative data.

Until recently, data were paper based and the search process labour intensive and unreliable. PRIME BC (Police Records Information Management Environment) provides police forces with a province-wide¹⁴² data system. However, currently, PRIME cannot provide the data in a form that immediately lends itself to timely crime and workload analyses. The data warehouse project is progressing on schedule with five agencies participating in the pilot project. It is anticipated that the warehouse will be providing data to agencies by February 2008; each agency will be responsible for their analysis software (such as i2)¹⁴³. Data stored on PRIME can currently be accessed through supplementary software. Some BC police organisations have introduced this level of analysis¹⁴⁴. The necessary software tools are described in Chapter 9.

Crime analysis is a tool which provides information support for the missions of policing and / or criminal justice agencies. The crime analysis process involves the:

¹⁴¹ *Competing on Analytics*, Davenport, T., Harvard Business School Press, 2007.

¹⁴² Introduced in 2003, PRIME BC targets 2008 to have all BC police served by PRIME.

¹⁴³ PRIME BC

¹⁴⁴ Examples: Delta PD, Surrey RCMP, Vancouver PD

- study of criminal incidents;
- identification of crime patterns, crime trends, and crime problems;
- analysis of these patterns, trends, and problems; and
- dissemination of information to a police agency so that the agency can develop tactics and strategies to solve patterns, trends, and problems

Crime analysis is critical in supporting the Compstat function¹⁴⁵ and further assists in developing geographic and temporal deployment models.

Other similar types of public safety analysis include criminal intelligence analysis and criminal investigative analysis, usually found in specialized units such as sexual crime and robbery investigation.

An example of successful crime analysis is highlighted as follows:

Irvine Police Department utilized advanced law enforcement methodology and DNA technology to apprehend a suspected serial burglar believed responsible for as many as 500 residential burglaries and the theft of more than \$2.5 million in property over a 20-year period.

Geographic review of similar crime scenes gave investigators important clues about how, where and when the burglaries were being committed. Additional analysis helped them pinpoint the most likely sites for future crimes. Further, advancements in DNA technology allowed them to gather trace amounts of DNA evidence from some of the crime scenes and match it to a single individual. The Specialized Investigative Unit of the Irvine Police Department¹⁴⁶ is the 2006 recipient of the International Association of Chiefs of Police /ChoicePoint Excellence in Criminal Investigations Award.

In addition to the Specialized Investigative Unit of the Irving Police Department (IPD) being a recipient of the International Association of Chiefs of Police / Excellence in Criminal Investigations award¹⁴⁷, this example reinforces the role of strategic resource deployment. That is, the IPD with an authorized strength of 165 sworn officers utilizes five crime analysts. Richmond Detachment with an authorized strength of 192 utilizes one crime analyst¹⁴⁸. In local comparisons, Vancouver Police have twelve crime analysts, New Westminster PD has two, and Delta PD utilizes three for this purpose. The deployment of positions to service the crime analysis function, as illustrated by the example of the IPD, is a positive utilization of resources.

¹⁴⁵ See later in this chapter of the report. COMPSTAT stands for 'Computer Comparison Statistics' a process by which divisions or functions in a police agency are examined via computer analysis and screen display in round table meetings and attending managers held accountable for statistical changes in incidents rates.

¹⁴⁶ Irvine PD, California, has 165 sworn officers and five crime analysts.

¹⁴⁷ policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/issues/12007/pdfs/2006IACPAwards

¹⁴⁸ Interview information indicates that one other position is approved, but not yet deployed.

Calls-for-service analysis as a tool for use in the development of geographic and temporal deployment models is also evident in the recent Vancouver Police Department Patrol Study described later in this report.

The RCMP has funded three research chairs, two at Simon Fraser University and one at the Fraser Valley University College, to conduct research on behalf of the RCMP¹⁴⁹. It is envisioned that regional analyses and specific studies will be conducted through the universities (example: the effects of the Canada Line) but timely, local crime analysis needs to be in the Detachment for effective liaison, communication, and reporting with operations¹⁵⁰.

The majority of crime analyst positions were originally staffed by police officers with the interest and necessary knowledge. The function has now evolved where it is now usual for non-police persons with the required training and knowledge to be hired.

Dissemination

The logical end to the information gathering process is dissemination: provision of valid, reliable, accurate, and timely information for multiple tactical and strategic purposes within the organisation. The organisation must have an effective dissemination process customized for each geographic area, temporal shift deployment, and specialist investigation function.

Also, there is the opportunity for suitable information to be made available to other city departments and other organizations such as private security and social agencies engaged in public safety matters¹⁵¹.

The process should also include protocols for identifying issues where information or a warning would be made to the public regarding specific risks.¹⁵²

Accuracy and timeliness are, perhaps, the two most important elements of crime analysis dissemination. Patterns of crime often change within days and the organisation must be able to deploy resources rapidly. Weekly analyses are the

¹⁴⁹ See chapter 4.9 Research

¹⁵⁰ All crime analysts interviewed stated that even the location within the building was critical for effective communication.

¹⁵¹ Example: Operation Cooperation described earlier.

¹⁵² See, Jane Doe and Toronto Police Services Board, 1994.

accepted minimum frequency, with the decision-making process occurring at the end of the analysis period; often, the past few days will indicate an emerging trend.

Field officers require weekly - at a minimum and preferably daily - updates to ensure they are properly equipped to target crime and public safety issues. The organisation must have a continuous flow of information from the analysis function to the operations managers, to field supervisors, and to field personnel. Without current incident data, officers perform random, serendipitous patrol. Data detailed elsewhere in this report demonstrates that a very small percentage of offenders are found by chance.¹⁵³

Richmond RCMP Analysis

The Richmond Detachment has one crime analyst with a second position approved. In its expanded form, it is anticipated that the crime analysis function will be able to conduct tactical crime analyses for investigative and intervention purposes, and strategic crime analyses (geographic and temporal) to support deployment decisions and the Compstat process.¹⁵⁴ During the course of the Review it was reported that the Richmond crime analysis function has been equipped with iBase database software.

Analyses completed by the Detachment include:

- Calls for service analysis, 2004”
- Richmond RCMP Criminal Code Review 2005-2006
- Traffic (2005) temporal analysis
- Richmond in Review 1995-2006
- Richmond Policing Services Plan 2003-2008
- Richmond RCMP General information – police services July 2003

Currently, the Richmond Detachment dissemination process is informal communication from the crime analyst to field personnel. The crime analyst meets regularly with members of specialized sections to brief on target-specific intelligence, problem premises, and hot spots. These are informal briefings and consist of intelligence sharing between members, discussing possible strategies, targets, and operational plans.

The crime analyst also identifies crime series and new targets, potential suspects, monitors prolific offenders, and assists in preparing timelines, charts, intelligence reports, and spatial/temporal analyses. Weekly crime analyst reports are forwarded by e-mail to all members and placed on bulletin board, and disseminated by supervisors during daily briefings.

¹⁵³ The Review's data analysis showed that "on view" reported incidents accounted for approximately 2% of incidents.

¹⁵⁴ See chapter 9.

Notwithstanding the above, it was noted that the Detachment does not have a formal process for ensuring crime analysis data is disseminated in a meaningful and effective way and holding supervisors accountable. It is essential that general duty supervisors are able to brief their watches quickly and effectively. To do so requires technological support in presenting relevant¹⁵⁵ and timely¹⁵⁶ material and information in memorable¹⁵⁷ and actionable¹⁵⁸ ways. As Davenport observes,

“Even if an organisation has quality data available, it must have executives who are predisposed to fact-based decision-making.”¹⁵⁹

Intervention

Supporting the information flow, the organisation must:

- deploy resources rapidly;
- use effective strategies; and
- conduct relentless assessment & follow up.

For these interventions to occur the crime analysis information must be submitted formally to operational managers and a formal process established to act on the information.

The organisation should ensure its various resources are viewed as a whole and deployed collaboratively. The *Review* identified a police organisation¹⁶⁰ which uses a four-step approach to targeting and deployment, and accountability:

- The first step is the ongoing comprehensive crime analyses where the operations managers and field personnel are kept informed of levels and trends and any significant issues. A customized electronic pre-shift briefing is prepared by the crime analysts for each shift and area including a twenty-four hours update, a Compstat summary, serial offenders / recent releases, and crime maps.
- The second step, based on these data, is for the local area commander to immediately deploy existing resources which may involve changing shift times.
- The third step is for the organisation’s managers to collaboratively assess department-wide resources and deploy weekly to the most important areas and issues. The key element to these steps is that the deployments are made immediately, effective the day of the decision.

¹⁵⁵ Relevant to the shift period and location.

¹⁵⁶ The information must be as recent as possible.

¹⁵⁷ Field personnel must be able to easily remember information provided; usually, this requires a visual format.

¹⁵⁸ Personnel will clearly understand what action they can take to address the issues.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. Davenport, 2007.

¹⁶⁰ Vancouver

- The fourth step is a department-wide Compstat meeting monthly where the executive assess the most recent crime trends and the tactics and strategies to address them.

The Richmond Detachment is disadvantaged in this area in not having the technology or formal processes to provide operational staff with suitable information. The necessary technology is described later in the report.¹⁶¹

Compstat

The design and success of the Compstat model rests with the commitment level of the leaders of the law enforcement agency. Law enforcement officers must sponsor and champion Compstat to their employees. Also, they must ensure that all administrative details are handled effectively and efficiently to produce the most important aspect of the process: data collection, analysis, and presentation¹⁶².

The concept of Compstat is for police commanders to be provided with the crime analyses they require, and then be held accountable for initiating strategies and tactics to address the problems which are identified. Whichever agency uses the process, the common approach is that the Compstat meeting is held before the executive leadership and a wide agency audience. The crime analyses are illustrated by computer graphics projected on a large screen and the executive can question the analyses and responses. The process enables the audience to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the city-wide crime problems and encourages cooperation between various components of the police agency to ensure resources are deployed in the most effective manner¹⁶³.

Conducted appropriately, the process can ensure the entire leadership and management are familiar with current pressing issues and are committed to a complementary policing response. Representatives of the City and other *policing continuum* components could attend the session in order to deploy their resources in a cooperative strategy.

Compstat is the executive agency-wide review of policing activities, but depending on the size of the organisation, various local and lower-level processes (as described above) need to be in place to ensure everyday deployment and activities are accurate and effective.

¹⁶¹ Chapter 9

¹⁶² Shane, Jon. May 2004. Compstat Design. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

¹⁶³ See also, Chu, J., Technology in Law Enforcement., 2004

Recommendations

- 4.E Technology – see Chapter 9
- 4.F The City of Richmond should ensure there is a formal reporting structure for the crime analysis function at the policing agency to report to the police operational executive leadership.
- 4.G The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency establishes a timely formal dissemination process for crime analysis information, including:
- daily electronic watch briefings;
 - daily specialized unit briefings;
 - specific assignment of issues to members and sections;
 - a weekly operational executive review of the appropriate deployment and assignment of resources;
 - a monthly Compstat process to assess the effectiveness of the tactics and strategies employed; and
 - a protocol to identify and disseminate information of value to the City, other appropriate organisations, and the public.

Model Options

The *Review* identified successful crime analysis functions in police organisations of various types. Regardless of the nature of the police service (contracted, municipal, or regional), the processes described above are essential and can be effectively utilized in the Richmond model.

4.4 Audit and Assessment ¹⁶⁴

Premise

Internal systems auditing and assessment are essential to enable effective, efficient, and economical policing to take place. The organisation requires an internal audit function reporting to the executive leadership. In addition to auditing against standards and policies, the audit function is ideally placed to train and mentor the organisation's managers as well as coordinate research partnerships with academic institutions.

Introduction

Management systems, functions, and organisational audit and assessment must be a central function of the organisation - the audit should be seen to be a best-practices audit. That is, not simply for looking at the functioning of a unit but rather facilitating continuous improvement - state of the art policing techniques should be known and implemented. The police leadership must ensure managers see the audit as providing assistance in moving forward. Typically, such an audit would examine the mandate of a function or component¹⁶⁵ and determine whether the mandate continues to reinforce the goals and priorities of the organisation. Secondly, the audit will examine and compare best practices, and, thirdly, assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of the function or component.

The function must buttress the culture of the organisation; support a culture of rational decision making, openness to assessment and research; and enthusiasm to modify strategies, tactics, components, and practices based on evidence. The audit function must be permanent and supportive of an on-going research partnership with suitable research organisations. Police auditors interviewed in the course of the *Review* report that it is insufficient for the organisation to rely solely on infrequent compliance audits; it is more effective for managers to make everyday decisions and develop strategies based on a self assessment and audit philosophy.

The Vancouver Police Department recently re-established an audit function as follows:

The Audit Unit has the mandate to provide timely information and data that can be leveraged by the decision-makers. This makes the Audit Unit an important change catalyst within the VPD. The Audit Unit is currently staffed by an Audit Manager and an Audit Assistant. Both are civilian members. The Audit Unit falls under the authority of the Director of the Planning, Research & Audit Section (PR&A) who reports directly to the Chief Constable.

¹⁶⁴ Audit Recommendations are included in the next section under Standards & Research

¹⁶⁵ Function: an activity performed; component: an organisational unit.

4.5 Standards & Research

Premise

External standards, such as the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)¹⁶⁶ and Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in British Columbia, provide objective goals and criteria based upon 'best practices' to develop and assess the strategies and programs and policies of the agency.

CALEA

In 1979, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA®) was created through the combined efforts of four major law enforcement organisations: the International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organisation of Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriff's Association, and Police Executive Research Forum. These organisations continue to serve in an advisory capacity to the Commission and are responsible for appointing members of the Commission's Board.¹⁶⁷

In 1988 the Edmonton Police Service became the first Canadian police force to be accredited through CALEA.¹⁶⁸ Since that time, nine other Canadian policing agencies have gained accreditation.¹⁶⁹

The Process

The accreditation process involves a comprehensive agency self-assessment of the 439 standards. The standards address six major law enforcement subjects:

- *role, responsibilities, and relationships with other agencies;*
- *organisation, management, and administration;*
- *personnel administration;*
- *law enforcement operations, operational support, and traffic law enforcement;*
- *prisoner and court related services; and*
- *auxiliary and technical services.*

After undergoing self-assessment, an on-site assessment is completed by a team of trained independent assessors. These CALEA assessors verify the

¹⁶⁶ CALEA was included in the RFP section 2. Note: it would be redundant to use the CALEA Standards in BC – see later discussion.

¹⁶⁷ www.calea.org/Online/AboutCALEA

¹⁶⁸ Alberta Policing standards are currently being drafted: www.solgen.gov.ab.ca/policing/

¹⁶⁹ Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation C V Enforcement, Red Deer, Accreditation: 2001

Brandon Police Service, Brandon, Manitoba, Accreditation: 2004

Brantford Police Service, Brantford, Ontario, Accreditation: 2004

Camrose Police Service, Camrose, Alberta, Accreditation: 1993, Reaccredited: 2004

Canadian Pacific Railway Police Service, Calgary, Alberta, Accreditation: 2002

Edmonton Police Service, Edmonton, Alberta, Accreditation: 1988, Reaccredited: 2004

Lethbridge Regional Police Service, Lethbridge, Alberta, Accreditation: 1999, Reaccredited: 2002

Montreal Airport Patrol, Dorval, Quebec, Accreditation: 2003

Peel Regional Police, Brampton, Ontario, Accreditation: 1994, Reaccredited: 2002

Winnipeg Police Service, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Accreditation: 1992, Reaccredited: 2005

agency's compliance with standards by checking its proofs and interviewing operations and management personnel. The assessors also conduct a public hearing to elicit citizens' comments. Accreditation periods are three years in duration. During this time the agency must maintain in compliance with the standards, and must submit annual reports attesting to this fact. Re-accreditation occurs at the end of this period, pending another successful on-site assessment and a hearing before the Commission¹⁷⁰.

Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in British Columbia

In 1989, the BC Association of Municipal Chiefs of Police and the BC Police Commission initiated a process to create policing standards for British Columbia¹⁷¹.

The Standards were developed from the CALEA Standards and designed for the Canadian and British Columbia environment. They are influenced by legislation, court decisions, reports of Royal Commissions, and any other relevant issues. The Standards were used by the BC Police Commission, and now the Police Services Branch, against which municipal police forces are audited. Audits are conducted, primarily, in two situations: through an ongoing process of compliance audits and, also, when the action of a department causes concern for an oversight authority and an assessment against objective criteria is required.

The RCMP utilizes a different set of standards to assess effectiveness and efficiency and to guide administration and operations. RCMP audits based upon RCMP standards are conducted by internal auditors or, on occasion, by the Auditor General of Canada - although some specific standards are the same or similar to BC standards, others differ. The differences in standards do cause disjoints in services. For example, dog squads and forensics teams and specialists are trained to different standards which, at times, prevents the cross support of RCMP and municipal services. Complaints processes for municipal services and the RCMP are different. However, in cases where a complaint is made against an RCMP officer, a municipal police chief can be requested to investigate the officer's actions. There have been recent cases of this nature in the LMD.

¹⁷⁰ www.canpac.org. Canadian Police Accreditation Coalition

¹⁷¹ One of the current Richmond Review team members was the leader of the project team that created the *Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in British Columbia* in 1989 and 1990, and completed the first review and update of the *Standards* in 1993. The team member visited Edmonton and studied the process for accreditation.

Unlike British Columbia, some provinces and states do not have uniform standards for policing. Alberta is presently drafting new standards. CALEA is a useful tool to assist police and law enforcement agencies in those jurisdictions without legislated standards to improve and monitor policies, procedures, and practices. The CALEA standards provide a baseline for administrative and operational polices, but do not lead the organisation in the essential areas identified in this review.

In British Columbia, it would be redundant to use the CALEA process which is more generic and not designed for this province. The Richmond policing service model will be audited against the standard RCMP policies or the *Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in BC*.

It was identified by an experienced police systems auditor that the audit process is greatly enhanced if the audit function and concept is provided in local management training. Managers would then be able to implement effective, efficient, and economic practices into their everyday activities rather than relying on infrequent audits to identify issues and make recommendations. As an integral facet of a learning organisation, the ongoing audit process provides valuable feedback to managers.

Research Partnerships

Objective research in areas as complex as public safety and the delivery of policing services are challenging and often beyond the ability of the police agency.

Conducting research on the effectiveness of public policing strategies and tactics is difficult. The organisation is not free to conduct experiments with the public's safety, external factors often distort measurements, and the measurements must be valid and reliable. In partnering with academic institutions and other appropriate organisations, objective research can be conducted to guide strategies, policies, and training.¹⁷²

¹⁷² Examples of such partnerships: Enhanced Call Management. VPD & by Darryl Plecas, RCMP Research Chair, Director, ICURS - University College of the Fraser Valley Research Lab, 2007.
Canada Way Enforcement Strategy. Burnaby RCMP & ICBC, 2001.
Granville Street Corridor Enforcement Study. VPD & Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) 1998-99.
Violence in Relationships, Vancouver Police (VPD) & Simon Fraser University (SFU) Department of Criminology, 1991-1999.
Cost Benefit/analysis of 1997 CounterAttack police impaired driving roadblock campaign. ICBC.
Exceeding the Crime Threshold: The carrying Capacity of Neighbourhoods. City of Vancouver, VPD, & SFU, 1993.
Study of Drinking Establishments in the City of Vancouver. City of Vancouver, VPD, & SFU, 1993.

Based on the community's and the organisation's needs, the audit function can also assist in facilitating research partnerships.

The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy includes the following:

Understanding the root causes of crime will assist in directing resources towards actions that will have the greatest impact on preventing and deterring priority crimes. Crime analysis by the RCMP along with research and analysis by academic researchers will provide information that will assist in targeting public safety resources and identifying hot spots within the city¹⁷³.

Another recent research announcement also has implications for Richmond.

A \$5-million donation of new technology from IBM will create a crime prevention and analysis lab at SFU. Patricia Brantingham noted: "And with that sort of information, you are able to produce much clearer models of where crimes occur and what kind of crime patterns to expect."

The Brantinghams will use a \$5-million donation of new technology from IBM to create a crime prevention and analysis lab at SFU to link research on offenders' behaviours with the commuting, shopping and living habits of residents to understand the future location, frequency and severity of crime. Models that are maybe more similar to very good weather modelling.," The new Canada Line, being built to connect the airport and Richmond city centre to downtown Vancouver via rapid transit, is the type of development the SFU lab will likely research¹⁷⁴.

In addition, as noted above, the RCMP has funded three research chairs, two at Simon Fraser University and one at the Fraser Valley University College, to conduct research on behalf of the RCMP.

Recommendation

- 4.H The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency has an internal audit & research function¹⁷⁵ reporting to the police executive leadership and/or public oversight body¹⁷⁶ which:
- conducts internal systems reviews and best-practices audits;
 - trains and mentors managers in audit principles as they apply to their functions; and
 - facilitates, guides, and encourages research projects with other suitable organisations.

¹⁷³ City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy pg.12

¹⁷⁴ News release, SFU. April 24, 2007 No report of anticipated police issues from the Canada Line was made available to the Review by the RCMP

¹⁷⁵ The internal best-practices audit function is intended to be led by the police executive and not imposed externally thus avoiding legal authority issues.

¹⁷⁶ Depending on the police service, the Community Safety Committee of Council or Police Board

Model options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

Audit of RCMP functions by municipal authorities has proven to be difficult. Also, municipalities are often denied access to RCMP internal audits even when the topic of those audits impacts municipal service or administration costs¹⁷⁷.

The City of Richmond should request that the ability to conduct and have access to RCMP audits should be negotiated via the UBCM into municipal agreements.

The Detachment can take advantage of the Crime Prevention Lab at SFU especially in relation to macro-issue effects such as the Canada Line.

An independent municipal police force

Contracting with another municipal police force

A regional police force

The Review determined that all models are able to effectively use internal audits, self assessment, and research partnerships.

¹⁷⁷ See Finance Chapter

Finance ¹⁷⁸

Premise

The cost of policing is often the largest single portion of municipal service costs. The effective development of the policing budget and the appropriate due diligence applied to its spending are important elements in both the responsible oversight of municipal services and the provision of efficient police services.

5.1 Introduction

Governments continue to be faced with the challenge of addressing growing public safety requirements while satisfying increasing operating and capital funding requirements. As federal, provincial, and local governments confront significant growth in funding demands from all areas of operation, they are being forced to use more creative means of financing in order to attempt to balance budgets. Governments are also beginning to show more concern that current budgeting practices, where capital expenditures are treated as current expenditures, are having the impact of reducing the incentive to invest in public infrastructure. Evidence of this concern includes the increased use of public/private partnerships for funding capital projects where the financial impacts to governments and ultimately taxpayers are spread out over time using a variety of financial vehicles.

The City of Richmond faces the financial burdens described above, with 2006 net policing-related costs that total approximately \$26 million or approximately 19 per cent of the City's annual operating budget¹⁷⁹. Generally, and as evidenced by the call for the current review, increased cost pressures on policing and increased demand for public transparency are forcing a greater level of scrutiny in terms of whether municipalities are receiving acceptable value for money for the policing services they receive. The Financial issues section of this report outlines the key financial aspects of the RCMP police contract, describing areas of concern and providing recommendations to potentially remedy those concerns. In addition, the revenues and expenditures incurred by the City of Richmond to support the RCMP contract are examined. This section also reviews financial aspects of various alternative models of policing to the RCMP contract that could be implemented by the City of Richmond. While a full economic analysis of each alternative is outside the scope of this report, the alternatives are examined at a high level to provide an indication of the financial impacts of pursuing those options including recommendations for further analysis.

¹⁷⁸ Given the complexity of the financial portion of the review and the separation of issue areas, this section is presented such that 'Recommendations' follow each issue area.

¹⁷⁹ City of Richmond 2006 Annual Report Consolidated Statement of Financial Activities.

5.2 RCMP Contract – Financial Considerations

5.2.1 Background

The *Province of British Columbia Municipal Policing Agreement* (April 1, 1992) and more narrowly, the *City of Richmond Municipal Police Unit Agreement* (April 1, 1992) between the Province and the City of Richmond, provide the terms under which the RCMP provides policing services to the City of Richmond. The financial articles of the agreements outline the basis of payment by the City of Richmond to the RCMP including the funding split between the Government of Canada and Richmond, financial and resource planning, the components of direct and indirect costs, cost exclusions, equipment costs, ownership transfer issues and the term of the agreement.

5.2.2 Funding Split

Article 9.2 of the *Province of BC Municipal Policing Agreement* outlines the cost sharing ratio between the federal government and each municipality. As a municipality with a population greater than 15,000, Richmond pays 90 per cent of the RCMP costs, both direct and indirect, that are incurred on its behalf, with the federal government paying the remaining 10 per cent. The 10 per cent cost sharing by the federal government is intended as proxy funding to account for emergency situations where police resources from the Richmond detachment would be required to assist in incidents outside of the municipality.

To the extent that the Province and/or the City of Richmond renegotiate a new *Municipal Policing Agreement* (or renew the existing agreement with amended terms) before the expiration of the current agreement on March 31, 2012, the funding split could certainly come under scrutiny. Staff with the BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General have indicated that this would be a likely area of discussion and that, while no major incidents have occurred that would support upward or downward adjustments to the percentages, the federal government could seek a reduction in the cost sharing. Conversely, the Province could seek an increase in the cost sharing given sufficient justification.

Recommendation

- 5.A The City of Richmond should assess, although it is unknown at present to what extent the cost sharing will be a negotiation point, the financial impact of a 10 per cent increase in policing costs if the cost sharing were removed entirely; and, develop a rationale for continuing or increasing the cost sharing to assist the Province in future negotiations with the federal government.

5.2.3 Financial and Resource Planning

The timeline for financial and resource planning for the City of Richmond RCMP contract is provided by Article 14 of the Municipal Policing Agreement. The agreement dictates annual communication between the Commanding Officer of 'E' Division and the Mayor of Richmond and between the Commanding Officer and the Commissioner of the RCMP regarding the financial resources required for the next fiscal year. On a practical basis, communication tends to occur mainly between staff with the City of Richmond, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Richmond detachment and the Contract Policing section at 'E' Division.

Following from the language in Article 14, prior to September 1st each year, City of Richmond staff are to consult with 'E' Division regarding the forecasted number of members required for the Richmond detachment, any budgetary limits that are to be imposed upon the Richmond detachment by the City for the up-coming budget and forecast, and approval for any equipment costing in excess of \$100,000. Practically, City staff correspond with the OIC of the Richmond Detachment and Detachment staff in terms of budgeting for the number of members required and any equipment or facility requirements.

The results of budgeting discussions between Richmond and 'E' Division are then provided to the RCMP Headquarters in Ottawa for consideration. Prior to December 31st each year and following completion of national RCMP HR budgeting, the provisional cost per member is to be provided to 'E' Division and the City of Richmond, outlining the provisional cost per member (officers), all direct and indirect costs, inflation factors applied to all operational and maintenance costs based on CPI (excluding salaries), and a best estimate reflecting expected adjustments to salaries. Under the *Public Service Labour Relations Act*, members of the RCMP cannot engage in collective bargaining. As a result, the RCMP Pay Council was established to resolve issues of pay and benefits. Salary adjustments are based on the compensation agreements arrived at in the Pay Council.

Each year 'E' Division prepares a full direct cost budget including all costing elements for the Richmond detachment for the following fiscal year. This budget is confirmed with Headquarters and communicated to Richmond by June 1st with accompanying explanation of line items including direct and indirect costs including expected overtime costs. 'E' Division also produces a five-year financial plan each spring that is designed to assist both the Division and the City of Richmond in planning for future police resourcing and costing. The forecast uses the budget year data as a base and then builds on of the estimated number of members

and inflated provisional costs per member. Non-salary related direct and indirect costs are inflated using estimates for CPI or are forecasted using HQ or divisional allocation models.

Following receipt of the budget and five-year financial forecast, the City forwards a letter of approval in principle to 'E' Division that enables RCMP HQ to budget sufficient resources to cover its share of future municipal RCMP costs and YVR costs through their ARLU process (Annual Reference Level Update). This approval in principle is forwarded to the 'E' Division Financial Management group in mid-July of each fiscal year; however, City Council approval of the financial plan does not occur until spring of the following year, once the RCMP forecast is finalized. Each municipality is requested to send a Confirmation Letter confirming approval of the budget no later than May 15 of the budget year. In practice, 'E' Division requests receipt of confirmation letters prior to the beginning of April, the beginning of the RCMP fiscal year.

Details of year-to-date expenditures are provided to Richmond monthly and an annual variance report of direct and indirect costs for the previous year is to be provided in July of each year. Line items in the RCMP budget are per the RCMP Expenditure Coding Dictionary, used by the force as part of their accounting practices. In terms of payment, 'E' Division provides quarterly invoices to Richmond.

An item of note with regards to the financial planning process is the fact that the RCMP and the City of Richmond have different financial year-ends. The RCMP year-end is March 31 whereas the City of Richmond has a December 31 year-end. Although a seemingly minor point, with budgeting done on an annual basis, all RCMP financial statements must be translated into quarterly figures by the City in order to annualize for Richmond's calendar year year-end. Provision of RCMP budget data broken down by quarter would facilitate easier translation. In addition, invoicing is done based on quarterly estimates with a final quarter adjustment made to tie to year-end actuals. This has resulted in fourth-quarter invoicing at significantly higher levels than the previous three quarters in past years.

The budgeting process described above, while intended to be somewhat collaborative, is exceedingly top-down in nature. With the exception of the number of members, top line budget items are dictated by the RCMP using an allocation model without input from the Municipality. While this tends to be typical of any contracted service, it leads to a lack of transparency that runs counter to the increasing attention that public safety is now receiving. Civic staff is not made fully aware of the significant cost drivers which impact the RCMP budget. The nature of the process also makes it very difficult for City staff or council members to explain and defend increases in policing expenditures that cause budget shortfalls and draw funding from other important areas.

Recommendation

- 5.B The City of Richmond should establish an annual budget review meeting whereby financial staff from Richmond would meet with 'E' Division financial staff to review the line items in the budget and to discuss the rationale for cost increases and expenditures.
- It is not practical for the RCMP to involve every contracted municipality in the country in its budgeting process; however, a consultative process could be established to enhance City staff's understanding of the key drivers in the budget
 - Furthermore, an interim, perhaps half-year, meeting could be established to review expenditures to date and the proposed balance to year-end costs.

5.2.4 Term of Agreement

The Province of British Columbia Municipal Policing Agreement (April 1, 1992) and the City of Richmond Municipal Police Unit Agreement (April 1, 1992) between the Province and the City of Richmond both have a term of 20 years and expire on March 31, 2012. On or after March 31, 2010, the agreements can be renewed for an additional period upon terms that are agreed to by the parties. The agreements can also be terminated by either party with 24 months notice.

In terms of the financial implications of either terminating or renewing the agreement, many of the recommendations in the financial section of this report could be explicitly included in any contract renewal or renegotiation.

In either public or private finance, it would be considered prudent in any long-term contract to include contract re-openers to re-examine financial terms to the extent that any significant changes occur to contract terms, pricing, or cost drivers. The current RCMP contracts contain fixed per member costs that could change over the 20 year contract period. As such, a formal re-opener clause would assist in beginning discussions to ensure that the contract is based on current financial data.

Recommendation

- 5.C The City of Richmond should consider, if the RCMP contract is renewed or renegotiated, that a "re-opener clause" be negotiated to enable the impacts of changes to major cost drivers to be reflected in an amendment to the agreement. A reasonable automatic re-opener period would be every five years. This is, of course, could prove to be an advantage or disadvantage for the City.

5.2.5 Review of Direct and Indirect Costs

The total cost of policing for the City of Richmond is comprised of RCMP contract costs as well as additional costs incurred by the City to support the RCMP policing effort. The next section, below, reviews the major cost elements of the RCMP contract, including both direct costs such as salaries and equipment costs as well as indirect costs such as pensions, divisional administration, recruit training, records management and integrated teams. The following section F review the additional costs incurred by the City to support the RCMP contract.

5.2.5.1 *Direct Cost - RCMP Pay*

The City of Richmond's total RCMP policing contract cost for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2006 was approximately \$25.4 million¹⁸⁰, of which the City paid \$22.9 million and the federal government contributed approximately \$2.5 million per the contracted 90/10 funding split. By far the largest component of the RCMP contract cost is salaries and related costs, which comprised \$14.7 million or 58 per cent of the total contract cost in 2006 based on the average actual member strength (number of officers) of 173.59 officers. Total salary related costs (excluding indirect costs for pensions and EI) rose from \$11.4 million in 2001 to \$14.7 million in 2006 while the number of sworn officers stayed essentially flat. This resulted in a five-year compound annual salary growth rate (CAGR) of 5.2 per cent. 'E' Division's latest five-year forecast shows total salary costs growing from \$14.7 in 2006 to in excess of \$21 million by 2012, or a CAGR of 8.0 per cent. 'E' Divisions five-year projections estimate that the number of "on the watch" officers increases to 206 in 2007 and then stays flat at 217 officers for the 2008-2012 period.

The total RCMP salary cost is comprised of regular pay, plainclothes officer pay, kit upkeep, senior constable allowances, overtime, retroactive pay, and shift differentials. Regular pay comprises the largest component of total salary costs at approximately 80 per cent of the total salary costs and appears to be in line with other forces, with RCMP salaries ranked 4th in its comparator universe¹⁸¹.

However, concerns have been raised regarding the on-going levels of overtime paid. Overtime paid in 2006 accounted for approximately \$2.3 million or 16 per cent of the \$14.7 million total. While it can be expected that police forces will incur significant overtime expenses from time to time, it is the lack of transparency of the cause of these costs that is of

¹⁸⁰ Based on 06/07 Final RCMP Invoice with annualization for Richmond calendar year-end.

¹⁸¹ RCMP Contract Advisory Committee Cost Rationalization Discussion Document, May 17, 2005

concern to City staff. While it is suspected that gaps in the numbers of sworn officers caused by sick time or maternity leave are made up for by the use of overtime, no detail has been provided on these costs. The

City has no contractual right to conduct an audit of RCMP practices. 'E' Division has stated that they do not employ the level of payroll coding necessary to provide that level of detail. However, it should be noted that 'E' Division is currently studying vacancy situations and the extent to which overtime is used to fill shortages (which causes excess costs for the municipalities contracting with the RCMP). This study may lead to increased clarity regarding the uses and impacts of overtime. It has also been suggested that certain roles currently undertaken by sworn officers could also be filled by civilian staff. While this does currently occur to a certain extent, both City staff and 'E' Division staff agree that this area could be examined in greater detail and that cost savings could be realized with the increased use of civilian staff. The increased use of civilian staff applies to full and part time positions and with regards the policing of events in the City where sworn personnel are used and could be replaced by volunteers.

Recommendation

- 5.D The City of Richmond should request that a detailed breakdown of overtime costs should be provided on a quarterly basis by 'E' Division.
- This would allow the City to better assess appropriate staffing levels and whether the level of overtime is excessive. To the extent that the RCMP payroll system coding does not allow for this, it is suggested that the addition of detailed overtime coding would greatly enhance the understanding of staffing costs, particularly overtime costs, by those municipalities with RCMP policing contracts.
 - In addition, opportunities for cost reductions resulting from the increased use of civilian staff should continue to be explored.
 - Provision should be made within any future police agency agreement that the City has a right to conduct audits of practices and processes that impact the finances of the City.

5.2.5.2 Other Direct Costs

Although payroll costs represent the most substantial proportion of the RCMP contract costs, certain other direct costs are not insignificant. The City of Richmond pays all Richmond RCMP detachment costs associated with transportation and travel, information services, professional services, rentals, repair & upkeep, utilities/materials & supplies, minor capital expenditures, and other subsidies & payments. The complete range of operational and maintenance expenses are established by the RCMP Expenditure Coding Dictionary, which

describes each line item in the RCMP expense statements. In order to contrast the scale of payroll versus non-payroll expenses, Table 1 highlights the actual 2006 totals for non-payroll direct costs.

Table 1 City of Richmond
2006/07 Actual RCMP Contract Operating & Maintenance Costs ¹⁸²
(\$ 000's)

Salary/Overtime/Allowances	15,261
<u>Other Direct Costs</u>	
Transportation & Travel	496
Information Services	9
Professional & Special Services	1,908
Rentals	117
Repair & Upkeep	290
Utilities, Materials & Supplies	733
Minor Capital Expenditures	449
Other Subsidies & Payments	<u>128</u>
Subtotal	4,129

Transportation and travel costs include regular detachment related travel costs as well as the cost to travel to conferences and training courses. Professional and Special Services costs include the costs of detachment staff training and seminars, radio communication systems related to E-Comm and also costs related to Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) which support the use of mobile workstations in RCMP vehicles. Police vehicles, weapons and ammunition are accounted for under minor capital expenditures.

Richmond also receives credits from the RCMP for certain detachment expenses such as transfer costs, legal services, health services, compensation claims, ICBC repairs to police vehicles, and medical leave. Actual 2006 credits totalled \$885,301.

As outlined in the Financial and Resource Planning section above, Richmond's main area of influence in the RCMP budgeting process is the ability to request certain officer staffing levels to meet the needs of the municipality. A number of City staff have expressed concerns regarding the lack of input they have regarding the detachment budget. As noted, other than staffing levels, the remaining budget is primarily a function of RCMP HQ and 'E' Division

¹⁸² 2006 Actual RCMP O&M Costs are for the 06/07 RCMP fiscal year ending Mar. 31, 2007 and exclude the 10 per cent federal COST SHARING

budgeting and allocations with little input from the City. This lack of transparency of costing causes a great deal of concern from City staff. With one-sided budgeting such as this, there are no checks and balances when purchasing equipment or retaining services. A large element of the cost that the City of Richmond is responsible for each year is essentially out of its control, notwithstanding an arrangement described as follows:

“... the agreed upon principles, roles and responsibilities between the City and the RCMP... To provide confidence that public funds are appropriately managed, the City, with the support of the RCMP, will conduct periodic ‘value for money’ audits on the policing contract¹⁸³.”

Recommendation

- 5.E The City of Richmond should seek to become more involved in ‘E’ Division’s budgeting and approval process in order to ensure that it is receiving value for money and to fully understand the drivers of cost growth.

5.2.5.3 Indirect Costs¹⁸⁴

a. Member Pensions

The costs of pension contributions in respect of the officers of the Richmond detachment are paid by the City at a rate determined by the provisions of the Provincial Police Service Agreement. The pension rate for actual 2006 was 8.67 per cent of pensionable salaries which resulted in a total pension contribution for 2006 of just over \$1 million.

b. EI Contributions

The City of Richmond is responsible for 100 per cent of the cost of EI contributions for the Richmond detachment’s members which amounted to \$156,047 in 2006.

c. Division Administration

The division administration costs associated with ‘E’ Division are shared on a pro-rata basis with all provincial municipalities contracting for RCMP policing services. HQ and departmental costs associated with the Commissioner, grievance unit, security, recruiting, internal affairs, and communications are excluded from contract policing costs. As such, the City of Richmond pays its pro-rata share of ‘E’ Division’s expenses for:

¹⁸³ See letter, General Manager of Community Safety, City of Richmond, to Assistant Commissioner, June 24, 2003, “To provide confidence that public funds are appropriately managed, the City, with the support of the RCMP, will conduct periodic ‘value for money’ audits on the policing contract.”

¹⁸⁴ Actual 2006 Indirect RCMP Costs sourced from the RCMP Richmond Contract 2006 final quarter invoice.

- E- Division Commanding Officer;
- human resources;
- corporate management branch;
- informatics (LAN support and communications); and
- staff relations.

'E' Division costs for capital construction, the Corps of Commissionaires, legal fees and compensations claims and interdivision transfers are borne by RCMP HQ.

Actual 2006 divisional administration costs were \$15,185 per member resulting in a total cost of \$2,635,964. The per-member cost is expected to rise to over \$20,000 by 2009. The magnitude of these costs and the lack of detail regarding cost drivers has been a major concern of City of Richmond staff for some time. It should be noted that 'E' Division financial management staff met with the City of Richmond's General Manager of Law and Community Safety, the Director of Finance and other City staff this year to review a detailed breakdown of the components of division administration costs and to provide an opportunity for clarification. This type of dialogue should be encouraged in the future and should serve to lessen the level of uncertainty with regards to the rationale for future administration cost increases.

d. *Recruit Training*

The RCMP contract includes indirect costs for training associated with recruit training at the RCMP's training academy in Regina. The cost is calculated as the product of \$3,500 multiplied by the number of officers employed by the detachment. For 2006, this cost totalled approximately \$600,000. It is of note that the rate of \$3,500 per member has been in place since 1994 and it is unlikely that the costs of training have remained static during the past decade. 'E' Division staff has indicated, however, that the \$3,500 number is still reasonable. This type of static figure highlights the need for contract re-openers in any future renewal or renegotiation. In this case, however, since these types of costs tend to rise over time and revised costing could lead the municipalities to be responsible for increased training costs.

e. *Amortization of Equipment*

In accordance with the RCMP policing contract, any equipment with a capital cost in excess of \$100,000 is amortized over 10 years with interest of 10 per cent paid on any unpaid balance. This equipment includes aircraft, vessels, telecommunications systems, and identification systems. It does not include the cost of construction of buildings since 'E' Division buildings are funded by RCMP HQ and Richmond detachment buildings are funded by the City of Richmond separately from the RCMP contract. While amortization of these capital costs fits with public sector accounting best practices, the interest rate most certainly reflects 1992 rates

and not current borrowing rates. Given current Bank of Canada long-term (10 year) bond interest rates of 4.0 per cent and assuming a 200 basis point risk premium associated with municipal financing, it is suggested that an indicative rate of 6.0 per cent would be appropriate for the City of Richmond, which is far less than the embedded 10 per cent in the current RCMP contract.

As far as best practices, when entering into an interest rate agreement related to the amortization of capital expenditures, tying the interest rate to a representative benchmark with associated risk premiums is recommended.

Recommendation

- 5.F The City of Richmond should, if the current RCMP policing contract is renewed or renegotiated, suggest that the interest rate paid on unamortized capital investments in excess of \$100,000 be benchmarked and tied to a representative proxy (10 year Government of Canada Bonds for instance) with a risk premium added to reflect the credit rating spread of the municipality over the Bank of Canada.

f. External Review Committee and Public Complaints Commission

The costs associated with Richmond's pro-rata portion of the RCMP's External Review Committee and the Public Complaints Commission were \$400 per member in 2006, yielding a total cost to Richmond of \$69,436. The actual use of these bodies related to policing activities in Richmond is unknown to both City staff and 'E' Division financial managers. In addition, the City has neither access to compiled records of complaints of service or complaints against officers nor access to the outcomes of complaints investigations.

g. PRIME

The Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME) is an initiative sponsored by the Ministry of the Solicitor General legislating all police forces in the province to use the same occurrence records management system. 'E' Division partnered with other municipal police agencies and the B.C. provincial government in the development of a common information system designed to enhance the communication and retrieval of information across multiple policing platforms.

The City of Richmond pays \$500 per member for PRIME annually which resulted in a 2006 total cost of \$86,795. Effective Jan. 1, 2008, PRIME user fees will be based on full cost recovery of the ongoing operating costs of the program, calculated on a pro-rata basis for

each municipality. It is unclear at present what the financial impact of this change will be on the City of Richmond however it could result in cost increases. PRIME training will also be charged directly to the municipalities in the future, at a rate of \$185 per diem. Given the labour intensive nature of the data “feed” to the PRIME system, the City of Richmond also supplies additional clerical staff for data entry in addition to the time spent by sworn officers.

In addition, during the course of the review it was apparent that there was some disagreement regarding which entity owns the Richmond based data that has been entered in PRIME.

Recommendation

- 5.G The City of Richmond should attempt to remain fully informed regarding the status of charge backs for PRIME service and in any changes to agreements and cost incorporate a provision that ensures the City owns and has full access to such data.

h. Integrated Teams

The City of Richmond is billed for its pro-rata share of two integrated RCMP teams, namely the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT) and the Lower Mainland Emergency Response Team. Invoiced costs to Richmond in 2006 were \$661,000 for IHIT and \$127,000 for the Lower Mainland ERT for a total of \$788,000. The Lower Mainland ERT costs are split 50/50 between the federal government and the lower mainland municipalities. Richmond’s pro-rata share of lower mainland municipal ERT costs is approximately 10 per cent.

The costs related to integrated teams have caused some concern and press attention in the past when councillors and the public realized the City of Richmond was receiving large bills for these teams with very little notification and little justification for the value being received. It should be noted that the quarterly expense summaries for these teams now provide a detailed account of all direct and indirect costs and credits.

Recommendation

- 5.H The City of Richmond should continue to work with the RCMP to ensure that the City participates in the annual budgeting process for the integrated teams and is thereby informed as to the expenditures that will be incurred by the RCMP for the teams.

i. Shared Services Review

A working group comprised of ‘E’ Division and municipal representatives is currently undertaking a review of the potential for shared services across several lower mainland municipalities for a number of RCMP policing functions. These include canine units, forensic

identification, and collision reconstruction. A preliminary analysis has been undertaken to determine the financial impact to the municipalities involved in moving to a shared services platform. In terms of potential impacts on the City of Richmond, it should be noted that it is now costing the City \$59,543 in additional budget for 2008. The working group notes that there may be special circumstances where the sharing of resources is not practical or in the public interest. An example of this would be a canine unit dog specially trained for activities at YVR being called out to another municipality, thereby reducing the timeliness of response at YVR. Council has considered the implementation of a shared services model and is requesting that a further more detailed business plan be presented by the RCMP.

j. YVR RCMP Costs

Policing of Vancouver International Airport (YVR) is the responsibility of the Richmond RCMP detachment with the terms of policing dictated by the Richmond Municipal Police Unit Supplement Agreement – Vancouver International Airport (April 1, 1997). Under the terms of the agreement, the cost of policing YVR is a flow-through to the City of Richmond, whereby the City pays 100 per cent of the cost of policing YVR and is then reimbursed by YVR for those costs.

There was a question as to whether personnel are moved between YVR and the Detachment to meet shortages. The Zone 1 RCMP Sub-Detachment, which includes the airport, comprises personnel contracted for airport responsibilities and General Duty personnel funded through the Richmond Detachment. There may be value added for both the airport and Richmond in that the presence of both functions within one team will provide flexibilities and economies of scale. YVR policing operations are dependent upon Richmond Detachment for support services. Currently, a support function and the attendant cost are not recognized in the contract. No statements of the cost of these practices were available.

Recommendation

- 5.1 The City of Richmond should clarify the use and billing for personnel at YVR. Caution should be used as this may be detrimental to one or both parties.

5.3 City of Richmond Policing Costs – RCMP Contract Support Costs¹⁸⁵

In addition to the invoiced costs for the RCMP contract, the City of Richmond also incurs costs to support the RCMP policing effort. Actual 2006 total net policing costs for the City of Richmond were \$25,931,448 million, of which \$22,870,107 million was Richmond's portion of the invoiced cost for the RCMP contract and the remaining \$3.1 million was related to policing services and support. These support costs include salaries for the civilian staff supporting the sworn officers, utilities and building repair costs, E-Comm, vehicle expenses and other miscellaneous support expenses. Expenses are offset by credits associated with gaming revenues from casinos, transfers from the City's general operating provision, traffic fine revenues, criminal record checks, and the YVR policing contract.

5.3.1 Salaries

The largest component of Richmond's RCMP contract support costs is salaries for civilian staff required to support the Richmond detachment. Salary related costs totalled approximately \$3.6 in 2006. This figure has grown from approximately \$3.0 million in 2003 and is expected to grow to \$4.1 million by 2011, subject to no significant increases in the use of civilians to undertake work currently done by sworn officers.

5.3.2 Buildings

Per the Municipal Police Unit Agreement, municipalities are required to provide accommodation for the RCMP in the form of office space, jail facilities, and garage space that meet the security standards of the force. Any space rented directly by the RCMP is charged back to the municipality, although this has not occurred in Richmond to-date. The RCMP is currently housed in existing City-owned facilities. There have been on-going discussions between the City of Richmond and the RCMP regarding a new RCMP building.

5.3.3 E-Comm

E-Comm is the Emergency Communications Centre for Southwest BC. Through a 911 call centre, radio and dispatch systems, E-Comm provides emergency communication services and support systems to emergency responders and the two million residents of southwest BC. Each municipality pays their pro-rata share of the annual E-Comm budget, which totaled \$49 million in 2006. The City of Richmond's pro-rata share of E-Comm costs for 2006 was \$1.7

¹⁸⁵ RCMP support costs per final 2006 City of Richmond Police Services, Statement of Revenues and Expenditures

million compared to the budget of \$2.1 million. E-Comm costs for 2007 are budgeted at \$2.1 million.

One issue that has arisen in the past related to E-Comm is the situation where the City receives large bills for radio dispatch equipment without having been consulted with regarding justification for these expenditures. These amounts are not insignificant, with 2006 dispatch costs totaling in excess of \$1.9 million. It is unclear whether this arises from the actions of the detachment or EComm. As such, further involvement by the City in terms of exploring the root cause and budgeting for these costs would be warranted.

5.3.4 Surplus Account

To the extent that actual policing costs are under budget, the differential flows into a general surplus account which is typical in any municipality. The RCMP does on occasion request the City to utilize a portion of the surplus for specific items. For 2007, surplus funds will be used to fund additional officers. The historical officer vacancy pattern for Richmond has been approximately 14 officers and rather than continuing to generate salary related budget surpluses that are offset by increased overtime costs, Council has approved for 2007 funding from the surplus for six additional officers with an additional four officers to be funded from casino revenues, and two for the Electrical Safety Inspection Program. To the extent that RCMP overtime has been utilized to fill the officer vacancies in the past, the addition of new officers should serve to lessen the overtime expense to some degree. The costs estimates for personnel are addressed in the workload and police costs analysis portion of the report.

5.4 Alternative Policing Models - Overview of Potential Financial Impacts

While a detailed economic analysis of potential alternative policing models is beyond the scope of this report, certain major costs components would undoubtedly be impacted by pursuing a policing model other than the current RCMP contract. Any combination of municipal policing, regional policing, contracted municipal policing or a hybrid of these would result in increased costs in certain areas and potential cost reductions and efficiencies in others. Areas that could be impacted would include staffing costs, administration and support activities, on-going operations costs and costs related to integrated teams and shared services. In addition, the 10 per cent federal policing cost sharing currently enjoyed through the RCMP contract would no longer be available. Finally, increased exposure to litigation liability and claims would be incurred as a result of pursuing a non-RCMP policing model as this liability is currently absorbed by the RCMP. [this is addressed below]

Discussions with City of Richmond staff, 'E' Division, and staff at the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General indicate the expectation that the utilization of any policing model other than the current RCMP contract would result in increased policing costs for the municipality, at least initially.

These costs would be offset by certain non-quantifiable benefits such as improved governance and greater City input into service levels, which are described elsewhere in this report. The expectation of increased annual costs is also supported by the 2001 Surrey Police Services Option Review¹⁸⁶, which provided a high level analysis of a municipal policing option for the City of Surrey and indicated expected annual cost increases in the order of \$2 million plus initial start-up costs. To the extent that an alternative model of policing is undertaken by the City of Richmond, cost, although an important element, would most likely not be the primary determinant of change.

5.4.1 Staffing

To the extent that a new model of policing is undertaken in Richmond, certain elements of 'E' Division's management structure would need to be recreated at the municipal level and consistent with the *Police Act*. A senior officer rank structure would also have to be determined¹⁸⁷. The exact management staffing levels and cost would depend on whether Richmond created its own force or pursued a regional or contracted model with another municipality. In the case of a regional or contract model, cost increases could potentially be lessened through the use of shared management and resources.

With regards to police officer deployment, Richmond is involved with 'E' Division in terms of planning to ensure that adequate officer deployment is in place to meet required levels of public safety and crime prevention. As such, it could be expected that the creation of a new force would be based on similar numbers of uniformed officers. However, the potential exists that pay rates for officers in a new force could be negotiated in order to facilitate certain payroll gains over the longer term. It is unclear what the impact on personal benefits would be as a result of pursuing an alternative model and more detailed analysis of compensation and benefits would certainly be required.

In addition, with the increase in governance and control resulting from employing its own force, Richmond could also choose to increase the use of civilians in place of sworn officers in certain roles where the types of calls for service allow, thereby increasing levels of cost

¹⁸⁶ KPMG, The City of Surrey – Police Services Option Review, Report to City Council, January 24, 2001

¹⁸⁷ See Chapter HR.

savings. To the extent that a regional force is employed, certain functions and roles would likely be shared across municipalities, also resulting in cost reductions.

Recommendation

- 5.J Staffing and associated compensation and benefits discussions undertaken during the assessment of the potential creation of a new force should be based on benchmarking and best practices from other cases where municipalities have moved to a municipal or regional policing model. Examples of these initiatives are noted throughout this report.

5.4.2 Administration and Support Costs

As noted previously, Richmond pays its pro-rata share of 'E' Division's expenses for the Commanding Officer, human resources, corporate management branch, Informatics (LAN support and communications) and staff relations. While the RCMP do not provide a breakdown of these costs on a functional basis, total 2006 division administration costs were \$15,185 per member resulting in a total cost of \$2.6 million.

The Surrey study indicated that, based on a very tentative macro-level analysis, administration and support costs for a new municipal force could be reduced by approximately 30 per cent. The actual cost differential could be quite different for the City of Richmond given its smaller size, different crime patterns and policing requirements and depending on which alternative model of policing would be undertaken. A key conclusion regarding these costs is that with any increase in governance and control, the municipality would be in an enhanced position to be able to control administrative and support costs and to use its own budgeting and costing procedures in order to potentially reduce overhead costs. However, any financial model developed for a municipal service or portion of a regionalized service must include the costs of liability insurance. Under the provincial contracted model, cost of such coverage is currently borne by the RCMP¹⁸⁸.

5.4.3 Other Operating Costs

In the event that Richmond decides to implement its own municipal police force or enter into an arrangement for regional or contract policing, impacts on other operating costs could be expected. These would include cost impacts related to vehicles, records management, radio communications and dispatch, recruit selection and training and the creation of a new Police Board.

¹⁸⁸ See below, 'Litigation Insurance',

Vehicle costs are provided for in the current City of Richmond policing budget and, as such, would not be expected to be significantly different under an alternative policing model. However, the number of vehicles required would vary given changes to officers staffing levels, which could result in changes to the annual vehicle cost.

Richmond utilizes the provincial PRIME system for records management and E-Comm for 911 related dispatch and services which would not change under an alternative policing model. However, there may be cost impacts related to additional radio communications equipment and computer equipment depending on the model chosen.

Richmond currently pays the RCMP \$3,500 per officer for recruit training, uniforms and equipment. Under a non-RCMP policing model, recruit training would be provided by the Justice Institute and would be funded by the provincial government on a cost recovery basis. Increased costs would be incurred for recruit salaries during the 32 weeks of training in blocks I, II, and III¹⁸⁹ and also for recruit uniforms and equipment. There would, however, still be other training costs associated with the members to attend, for example, the Canadian Police College and for other courses, conferences and workshops

It is expected that the implementation of any alternative model of policing would necessitate the creation of a Richmond Police Board. The Surrey report estimated the cost of this board to be \$92,000 annually, based on comparable municipal police forces elsewhere in Canada. This assumes the employment of a full time secretary to administer board business. Other agencies use part-time staff.

¹⁸⁹ Depending upon the costing arrangement made with prospective personnel and the number who, based upon experience, may be subject to an accelerated training program or appointment via lateral entry.

5.4.4 Integrated Teams

The City of Richmond participates in two integrated RCMP teams, namely the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team and the Lower Mainland Emergency Response Team. It is understood that the equipment associated with these teams is not owned by the City and as such, would need to be replaced if the RCMP contract were to be discontinued. These costs are not insignificant, amounting to nearly \$800,000 in 2006; undetermined start-up costs would also be incurred for these teams. However, if a regional or contract police service were to be implemented, some cost sharing for these teams could occur with other municipalities¹⁹⁰.

5.4.5 Transfer of Existing Equipment

Under the terms of the *Municipal Police Unit Agreement* regarding RCMP policing in Richmond, existing assets would be transferred to the City upon termination of the contract at a cost equal to the amount that the current market value exceeds the amount, exclusive of interest, already paid by the municipality. The equipment affected by these terms includes vehicles, radios and computer equipment that typically have short useful lives. As such there would likely be very little impact in terms of transfer costs of equipment.

5.4.6 Litigation Liability

With the current RCMP policing contract, litigation liabilities associated with policing in the City of Richmond are assumed by the RCMP. While there have not been any large litigation cases recently, the potential for liability exists and may not be unsubstantial. To the extent that Richmond establishes a municipal police force, amalgamates with another non-RCMP force, or contracts with another force, it could be open to claims resulting from police operations. The financial exposure resulting from such claims would depend on the per claim deductible of the City's insurance policy that covers this type of activity. Claims resulting from police activities would be a part of the revolving book of business in terms of claims management, legal expense, and financing protocol. City of Richmond staff has indicated that the breadth and nature of any associated increase in risk exposure is within the expectations of local government operations. It should also be recognised that, in some instances, the City must take the ethical high ground and not simply pay out a claim on the basis that it is a better, less expensive business decision in comparison to costly litigation to defend the integrity of the police service.

¹⁹⁰ Given the current policing operational environment, it is likely that any form of policing model would require participation in integrated teams such as Homicide and Emergency Response.

Recommendation

- 5.K The City of Richmond should, to the extent that a detailed feasibility analysis of pursuing an alternative form of policing in Richmond is undertaken, investigate the issue of litigation liability in greater detail.
- Discussions with insurance carriers should confirm to what extent the City is covered with regards to potential claims with any additional costs being factored into the feasibility analysis.

5.4.7 Capital Budgeting

Governments are showing increasing concern that current budgeting practices treating capital expenditures as current costs are reducing the incentive to invest in public infrastructure. As such, they are beginning to implement capital budgeting techniques designed to remedy any perceived bias in investment decision making. Proponents of the use of capital budgeting in the public sector argue that deficit constrained governments often choose to defer major capital or maintenance expenditures since the benefits of those expenditures may not be immediate relative to the costs that would be incurred. It is argued that governments would be more willing to invest in new or replacement infrastructure if capital expenditures were accounted for separately over time, incorporating all costs and benefits accrued by the investment over its life.

With regards best practices, as a result of municipal financing constraints and increased demands for funding, municipalities have been forced to become more creative in terms of funding capital projects. The use of economic techniques such as cost benefit analysis and discounted cash flow analysis combined with traditional accounting have enabled municipal governments to enhance their ability to undertake difficult choices between short-term consumption and current income impacts and long-term investment and cost recovery.

Recommendation

- 5.L The City of Richmond should, to the extent that an alternative model of policing is desired and the potential exists that the RCMP contract may not be renewed, conduct a long-term economic analysis incorporating all projected costs and benefits for each alternative.
- This analysis would provide the City with an increased understanding of both the short term taxpayer impacts associated with various policing options and also the longer-term life-cycle economics over the life of the associated policing contracts.

Human Resources

Premise

Effective police management must ensure human resources are utilised to their best advantage.

6.1 Introduction

The effective and efficient management of human resources has come to the fore as a primary focus of agency attempts to improve overall performance. The best use of human resources not only refers to the most appropriate deployment of personnel in both the operational and administrative capacities to meet workload demands, but also, equally important, is the appropriate recruitment, selection, and retention of staff. Human resource practices have changed to incorporate an understanding that personnel management must also include, as crucial elements, an emphasis on employee well being and personal safety. With the reduced availability of prospective employees along with the negative facets of shift work, work stresses and safety issues that are inherent in policing, employee wellness becomes a prime factor in ensuring an effective and efficient organisation.

The issue of human resources, in the Richmond police context, figured prominently in feedback gathered during *Review* interviews and focus groups. The nature of the existing relationship in Richmond is somewhat clouded with regards the degree that the civil authority, the Council, or by extension the Community Safety Committee, is able to influence human resource policies.

In the case of a municipal police service the nature of the relationship is structured by legislation. The Chief Constable is the conduit for information flow between the municipality, the police board, and the police service. A municipal police board is able to establish policies (which may include direction for human resources) and shape procedures and practices within a municipal service.¹⁹¹ These policies and practices are implemented by the Chief Constable and can be audited by, or on behalf of, the Board.

In the case of contracted services, such as exist in Richmond, the nature of the relationship is more remote and very much one of non-involvement by the civil authority with regards internal policies.

¹⁹¹ *Police Act, Section 26. (4)* In consultation with the chief constable, the municipal police board must determine the priorities, goals and objectives of the municipal police department. (5) The chief constable must report to the municipal police board each year on the implementation of programs and strategies to achieve the priorities, goals and objectives.

The Agreements which relate to the Province and the City of Richmond (Article 3.0) stipulate that

“The internal management of each of the Municipal Police Services, including its administration and the determination and application of professional police procedures, shall remain under the control of Canada.”

Consequently, although the Chief Executive Officer, the mayor, may set “objectives, priorities and goals” for the Municipal Police Unit¹⁹², the RCMP detachment, the implication is that these refer to the strategic operational approaches to addressing safety and security related incidents rather than human resources policies. Furthermore, the set “objectives, priorities and goals” must be not inconsistent with those determined by the Minister for policing in the Province. The City is, therefore, somewhat limited in its ability to ensure that a broad range of human resource policies and practices are introduced to the service that ensure support for all staff, which dovetail the administrative processes of the City and also buttress the philosophies and ideals within the community. Also, as was mentioned by several interviewees, the City has limited ability to conduct due diligence in human resource related matters such as ‘overtime’ to ensure that police practices are appropriate, record keeping, and billing is accurate and in line with the approaches of other municipal departments.

Given this legislative agreement and administrative backdrop, what follows is an analysis of the human resource ideals.

6.2 Human Resource Planning

In a 2006 study commissioned by the Police Sector Council, the researchers concluded

“A labour shortage coupled with a skills gap is of special concern to the policing community for many reasons:

*The majority of the police leadership is poised to exit;
Crime is becoming more advanced and demands more
knowledge, experience, analytical abilities, technical skills;
Selective recruiting based on ethical, personal, medical,
technical, physical, and intellectual criteria requires a large
applicant pool;
Labour pool competition as all industries vie for a small
pool of skilled resources”*

These issues not only exacerbate the challenges for the City in establishing a different policing model, but will also influence the ability of a contracted service to meet the specific resourcing requirements of the City.

¹⁹² Municipal Policing Agreement, Article 4.0

In a separate study for the Police Sector Council in 2005, the authors confirmed that the five priorities established by the Council in 2000 were still valid and that very little sector-wide progress has been made on:

- recruitment
- increasing sector-wide efficiencies (i.e., sharing resources such as training)
- improving the sector's HR planning capacity
- improving labour-management relations, and
- increasing funding and resources

These responsibilities would fall to the City under other non-contracted policing options.

Human resource planning is more than simply applying for additional personnel. A seminal work by the Centre of Criminology in at the University of Toronto explained,

*"Resources should be allocated to police in relation to the objectives communities want served and not, as now, in order to maintain police capacity as measured in terms of numbers of officers."*¹⁹³

*"The reason that the number of police personnel cannot be related to changes in public security, apart from problems of measurement, is that police organisations do not use their personnel rationally, that is, in relation to the requirements of public safety"¹⁹⁴. Personnel are allocated by police managers according to formulas, institutional traditions, tacit understandings, and contract rules, all of which have hardly anything to do with public safety. Indeed, it is fair to say that the major determinants of police allocations are not considerations of community safety, but organisational convenience and worker morale."*¹⁹⁵

During the *Review* interview process reference was made to the Detachment's application for twenty-four additional officers. The rationale for this was based upon the ratio of police to population. The application provided minimal additional business case support and, furthermore, was not developed with any recognition of the City planning or management processes. The RCMP application was also not part of the consensus method commonly used within The Administrative Group (TAG) to assign resources based upon the collective needs of the City. The application would have benefited from a dovetailing with the City planning process supported by a business case and detailed data regarding the need for more officers based upon additional workload or the proposal to introduce new programs.

In Vancouver, a representative of the VPD sits on many committees of the City of Vancouver to co-ordinate their efforts with other departments (Human Resources, Shared Services, Labour Advisor, Legal Department, Neighbourhood Integrated Support Teams). This common, consensual and orchestrated approach ensures that human and capital resources are used in the

¹⁹³ Thinking about Police Resources, Edited by A. Doob, Research report #26, Center of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1993, 1.

¹⁹⁴ See chapter on Deployment to Workload

¹⁹⁵ *Ibdi.* 4

most efficacious manner. Currently, in Richmond, some community-based problem solving for better co-ordination is taking place, particularly between Bylaws, Fire and Policing. The General Manager, Law and Community Services, takes information and ideas from these meetings to City Management meetings.

6.3 Staffing – Sworn staff and the Selection Process

Given the unique nature of the demographics of the City, Richmond is better served by a police force that reflects the population and that has experience living in and serving its community¹⁹⁶. The diversity of the community requires policing resources knowledgeable of, and able to respond to, diverse community concerns and issues.

Managing and valuing diversity is seen as a key component of effective policing. The Durham Police (ON.) strategic plan recognises a police service that is reflective of, and responsive to, the needs of the diverse community it serves, and where diversity is no longer an issue but a founding principle, will be a service that will be seen as a leader by both its members and its community¹⁹⁷.

The RCMP have identified and publicly stated their commitment to cultural diversity.¹⁹⁸

The Richmond RCMP Detachment's deployment of auxiliary members is an example of this commitment. In this instance a high degree of representation by female officers and officers from the Asian population attempt to approximate the civic population's ethnic and gender mix. Of the complement of officers at the detachment, 55 or approximately 25% are female. The national average is 19.4%¹⁹⁹. They represent a variety of ranks with four sergeants, five corporals, and 46 constables. Twelve of the females are visible minority - this is significantly more than the RCMP national average of 6%.

This issue of diversity is important to all police jurisdictions. The Law Enforcement Aboriginal and Diversity (LEAD) network, formally launched by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and Canadian Heritage in 2005, consists of police officers at the national, provincial/territorial, regional, municipal, and Aboriginal community levels across Canada. The goal is to create a network with

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter 2 for further discussion of demographic variables.

¹⁹⁷ Graybridge Malcolm Consulting. Durham Regional Police Service : 2005-2010 Diversity Strategic Plan. February 4, 2005.

¹⁹⁸ http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/recruiting/index_e.htm

¹⁹⁹ Thiessen, P., RCMP.

the infrastructure to connect the officers so they can share best practices, establish links in the community, devise a Canadian training program, set up a Web site and an electronic newsletter, and conduct research.

Broad representation of the community within the police agency is not merely a question of desirable optics. It is essential that the police agency is exposed to the diverse perceptions of public value and that policy and processes reflect more than the traditional Western values. Equally important is the agency's access to persons with knowledge of diverse cultures who are able to actively participate in inquiries and provide an investigational entrée to cultural issues that may have contributed to a specific occurrence or incident trends. The active recruitment of members of diverse communities presents logistical problems for police recruiters due to cultural backgrounds and perceptions of policing. However, best practices research suggests that those agencies which are motivated to actively and fully engage representatives of minority groups benefit from a diverse workforce.²⁰⁰

New hiring is conducted centrally in the RCMP, and orientation and training of cadets occurs at the RCMP Academy in Regina.

RCMP HR in E Division makes almost all assignment decisions based on RCMP protocols which is almost entirely paper based. This system is the same as that described below for promotions. When no "matches" can be found between the skills Richmond requires and candidates who have requested to come to Richmond, the recruiting officer requests new recruits from headquarters.

RCMP sworn officers include a substantial number of junior members, with a large number on their first assignment. These officers are generally required to stay at the City for the minimum five years but then typically 70 – 80% transfer to other locations. In 2006, 33 constables transferred out of the Richmond Detachment and 39 transferred in to the detachment. Of the transfers in to Richmond, 34 were cadets and 5 lateral entries. In February 2007, in the Richmond RCMP Detachment, 25 of the approximately 214²⁰¹ sworn members (12%) were undergoing their field training following graduation. Training officers with as little as three-and-a-half years of service are expected to impart knowledge and experience to new members of the detachment. Examples were provided where officers with only two years of service were responsible for training recruits. Junior members may stay for less than five years if they have an opportunity for promotion. City interviewees said the City would not stand in the way of a RCMP member's promotion. Most typically, an RCMP promotion involves a transfer to another location.

²⁰⁰ Conference Board of Canada, *The Business Case for Diversity*, 2007.

²⁰¹ Source: Interview with RCMP representative.

A policy has been instituted within the LMD²⁰² to maintain continuity within detachments and alleviate some of the pressures of the hard and soft vacancy rates. New members are expected to remain at the detachment for five years²⁰³. An experienced member transferred to a detachment is expected to remain for three years. A newly promoted NCO is also expected to remain for three years and cannot be promoted until they have two years in that rank. Even though this might be an improvement from the RCMP perspective, it provides Richmond only three years for the NCOs to integrate with the community, and these are the key people who make the difference and influence junior officers.

Interviewees suggested that while Richmond police officers are primarily junior members, they are described as well motivated, enthusiastic, and idealistic²⁰⁴. They are committed to learning quickly and performing well as an avenue to career progression throughout Canada within the RCMP. They are likely to have received training in up-to-date police methods and knowledge of recent trends in the policing environment. Thus, on the positive side, the continuous change in staff provides the City with an ongoing upgrading of these skills.

The converse is that new members have fewer practiced skills and less police knowledge, and less experience with the Richmond environment and its unique demographics than would more seasoned members. When new recruits arrive at the City, they are paired with a more senior officer until they are considered to be competent to function alone. Since they need more training, supervision, and monitoring than would more experienced members, more of the seasoned members' time is spent on training than would be the case where staff was a more even mix of experience.

A preponderance of less experienced personnel may result in a greater liability for the City. Although, financially the RCMP bares cost of civil litigation, negative police incidents will reflect upon the City.

RCMP HR interviewees indicated that high housing costs in Richmond means that the junior officers do not choose to stay in the region. However, other regional police forces do not validate this belief. For example, in the VPD, most members remain in the force for their entire career²⁰⁵, and solve the issue of high housing costs by living in nearby communities rather than in Vancouver.

²⁰² LMD pool, ref.

²⁰³ One RCMP interviewee indicated that some junior members, who move after their first five-year assignment, might come back to Richmond later in their career.

²⁰⁴ Interview information

²⁰⁵ As an illustration, the VPD reported to the consultants that of the last ten people who left the VPD up to February 2007, 8 were retirements, leaving the City after 20 – 30 years service. Average age of sworn officers with the VPD is 38 years.

A more comprehensive explanation of the “juniority” is that RCMP officers are recruited from across Canada and have not joined specifically to work in Richmond. Thus, many may have aspirations to move around Canada, some may wish to live in specific regions other than the Lower Mainland or BC. As new recruits, few would aspire to remain for a longer term in their first assignment. In addition, the RCMP is not focused solely on the needs of the City of Richmond. Interview information stated that, when making a transfer of staff, the RCMP considers both the needs of the City and the more general needs of the RCMP. They might decide to “hold back” an officer until his/her skills can be replaced, but in some cases they may decide that the needs of the RCMP are more pressing.

Specialized units (such as the canine unit) are staffed from the RCMP headquarters. If a specialized member transfers from Richmond, the position will be vacant until a replacement is obtained and has been able to move (with the attendant house sale, registering of schools for children and other tasks). Currently, Richmond is down 1 staff sergeant, 1 watch sergeant, 2 watch corporals, there are no temporary replacements for these positions. This matter was considered in a report prepared by the Union of BC Municipalities which proposed to the RCMP the formation of a pool of personnel who are able to be moved between LMD detachments to fill required positions on a temporary basis. However, there are no resources to staff such a pool. The regionalization of selected RCMP services such as the Dog Unit or Forensics may serve to alleviate this problem however; the resources will then be shared with other jurisdictions²⁰⁶. Specialist functions such as Forensic Identification and Police Dog Section are staffed by Centralized Staffing in Ottawa.

Ironically, “E” Division HR sometimes operates against the development of a detachment with long-service members in that officers are rarely allowed to stay in one location for more than eight to ten years. With their careers in mind, RCMP members are counseled in terms of the RCMP nation-wide, rather than taking a City-oriented view of advancement. For example, if a more senior officer appears to be settling into the region without advancement goals, they are strongly encouraged to transfer to another location. This tension between the local and force-wide needs works against the City’s retention of sworn members. Many interviewees noted that it is unusual that the current detachment management team has been consistent for approximately five years.


Staffing issues are also significantly impacted by what is essentially a crisis in recruitment. The Auditor General report on the RCMP suggested that there would be a vacuum of 3500 members by 2010. In the mid-1990s, 10,000 applicants wrote the RCMP qualifying examination; in 2006, there were only 8000 for 1000 anticipated positions. Last year, there were 358 personnel shortages in provincial and municipal contracts and 600 positions unfilled or a 25% reduction in

²⁰⁶ The transfer of the budgets to the LMD has not been approved by Council


strength in federal enforcement roles²⁰⁷. The RCMP continues to have difficulty in filling vacant positions in a timely manner.

Information from other municipal forces suggests that a significant number of officers would typically spend their entire career with the municipal force. While this can have some drawbacks, such as complacency and a sense of entitlement, it also creates a higher ratio of seasoned officers compared to recent graduates, a balance that would provide the benefit of their experience in the region. The following graphs illustrate the seniority sworn staff and of the patrol / general duty staff in the VPD. Although the VPD has experienced the loss of significant numbers of senior staff over the past few years, the average length of service for patrol officers of 4.7 years will likely grow. In addition, these personnel will most likely remain within the city for their career.

VPD Patrol Constables - Years of Service - June 2007



VPD Sworn Officers - Years of Service - June 2007



Within the current context where the RCMP has a high turnover and typically assigns new recruits to the Richmond Detachment, the RCMP can match the ethno-cultural make up of the City through assignment of officers, and can change the composition of the City's police workforce. However, while the RCMP encourages local recruitment, the force does not tend to place new recruits in the location from which they originated. This both reinforces the RCMP's expectation of mobility for its members and also tends to avoid potential conflict of interest situations.

In the short term, the high rate of turnover of RCMP staff allows the RCMP to more quickly match the population in ethnicity and gender. However, with a municipal force members drawn from the local region would more likely be knowledgeable about and committed to the region and its diverse communities.

6.4 Accountability

In most private and public sector organizations, when services are contracted out, the parties typically agree on clear "deliverables" and often benchmark and establish milestones. These contractual arrangements frequently include human resource elements as the management of human resources is an important determinant of contractor effectiveness.

The City of Vancouver and the Municipality of Delta are typical of many municipalities, in that the administrations have direct access to the staffing information of the police departments through a shared IT (SAP) or other systems. In addition, both agencies make regular reports to Council, which include human resource issues. When there is a new Council, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) provides an overview of the department and its human resource elements.

An example of best practices in the area of human resource accountability is described in a recent review of the Edmonton Police Service. In 2004, the Edmonton Office of the City Auditor produced the report, "*Edmonton Police Service Overtime Review*" with recommendations for change. The review provided very detailed process recommendations regarding policy that was to be developed, information for managers and supervisory staff, tracking systems that were to be set up by HR and internal audits that would be required, along with amendments to the Standard Operating Procedures. The Edmonton Police Service then produced "*A Report to the Edmonton Police Commission (2006)*" detailing its responses to each of the original recommendations, including actions undertaken in response to each recommendation.

Such reporting processes on human resources are not introduced merely to enforce accountability. Oversight of matters such as complaints against police and feedback regarding

action taken may provide important information to the City concerning exhausting work schedules, a need for more staff, problem employees, or requirements for personnel with different competencies. Although the City of Richmond has an agreement whereby any complaints against police are forwarded to the Officer in Charge, no reporting of outcomes is required.

Other concerns with regards human resources and accountability were voiced by City staff. For example, the Officer in Charge initiated a Multi-cultural Policing Advisory Committee – a positive action – but the City does not receive any information on its ongoing activities or effectiveness. City staff advised the *Review* that the detachment took staff from Community Police stations without consultation with Council to create a Bike Patrol.

6.5 Response to Change

– Adjusting Human Resources to Increasing Privatization

The City and its citizens expect the most cost-effective police force that meets its requirements. As more traditional police tasks are assumed by private policing and security organisations, the police agency must adapt human resource approaches to adjust to the wholesale reorientation of policing²⁰⁸. It is estimated there are currently over 12,000 private security personnel in British Columbia, comprising approximately 8000 provincially licensed, 3600 federally licensed, and an unknown number of in-house security functions. These figures suggest that the difference in relative numbers has increased even further as police resources become more expensive and police agencies more selective regarding the types of incidents which they are prepared to attend - the resulting void in services is filled by private industry in various guises²⁰⁹.

The recent study of policing by Human Resources and Social Development Canada²¹⁰ concluded:

“The increasing need for specialized skills will (also) require a more flexible and creative approach to how police services obtain them. The shift in focus will need to include employment of civilian specialists as well as police officers, in a variety of employment arrangements – full time, temporary, part time, or fee for service contracts.”

The use of civilian specialists is widespread throughout police forces. Provincially, an example of specialized civilian support is the crime analyst function with training being provided at the British Columbia Institute of Technology.

²⁰⁸ Initiatives such as privatization of policing are discussed in other sections of this report. See Ch.4.

²⁰⁹ See also, Police Sector Council. Policing Environment 2005: Update of the 2000 Sector Study And Implications For HR Planning and Management Today And Into The Future, 2005.

²¹⁰ HRSDC. Strategic Human Resources Analysis of Public Policing in Canada”

The degree to which specialised services are available to smaller agencies is crucial to overall effectiveness and the financial viability of the agency. The occurrence of a homicide or complex kidnapping could severely strain the agency resources at best and, at worst, lead to insolvency of the agency. The importance of agency size and degree of specialisation and joint programs is discussed elsewhere in this report.

The RCMP structure and network provides cost efficiencies that benefit the City. For example, there is a HR protocol in place for all RCMP Detachments to address most human resource support, policy and program development, finance, testing and procurement of uniforms and equipment, and IT system development and support.

The RCMP OICs over the years, in Richmond, have a varied experience with respect to responsiveness to the political and municipal staff systems. Interviewees considered this as an important issue that should be addressed. City HR staff felt the police chief should be chosen in a manner similar to that of other senior city officials.

Police managers typically do not have the time, the background or sometimes the interest in becoming knowledgeable about all aspects of human resources. Similar to organisational reliance on financial professionals to oversee budgets, HR professionals are also employed to oversee the human capital which consumes 85% of agency operational budget. The selection, training and retention of the right employees and the reprimand, counselling, and dismissal of inappropriate employees is an important process to be managed by staff that is fully conversant with the relevant legislation and human rights codes. In the case of a Richmond municipal force or a regional municipal force, these responsibilities and costs would fall to the City.

The City has 57 fulltime employees located at the detachment. Richmond HR department provides consulting advice to the RCMP regarding the CUPE Local 718 employees, on a request basis. The City HR department has no input into HR related issues with sworn RCMP officers.

The City currently has a Collective Agreement, a Code of Conduct, and a Harassment Policy for City staff who work as civilian staff in the RCMP unit and provides related training for City staff. The RCMP sworn staff does not participate in this training and HR does not know if the RCMP sworn staff has equivalent training. The City does not have established standards or benchmarks for HR for the sworn officers and relies on RCMP developed job descriptions, competencies, human resources policies and practices, and salary scales for each position.

Although input to, and control over, RCMP policy is non-existent, Richmond can take advantage of the wide range of resources that the RCMP has put into the task of developing its HR policies and practices.

6.6 Labour Relations and Employee Retention

With its arms length relationship with sworn RCMP staff, the City does not have the responsibility of dealing with labour relations or discipline of members. The RCMP has a structured process for discipline of members. However, given the high public impact of policing, the process of complaints and compliments should be a more public process. A similar criticism has been leveled at the municipal police complaints process.

There are advantages and disadvantages to having a unionized sworn staff. The union can hold management accountable for principles and process and a collective agreement may mean that members feel that their specific concerns are well represented. Thus, there may be fewer individual conflicts. For example, in recent months, the police union at the VPD bargained for access to a psychologist who would deal with general employee issues, particularly in response to critical incidents. The RCMP non-commissioned officers are currently represented by "Divisional Representatives". Although these representatives do not assume the role of union representatives they are becoming a stronger voice in internal RCMP affairs.

Unions are likely to create more labour relations work, in that management will need to justify its decisions to staff. The probability of a unionized workforce would mean that these principles would be implemented within the context of a union contract. This often means lengthy processes, for example, to discipline and terminate an employee.

The City deals with a unionized City staff and a fire-fighters' union consequently it would appear that it has the appropriate experience and expertise in labour relations to work effectively with a police union.

6.7 Inter-governmental Support and Transferability of Personnel

The most significant factor affecting the ability to move from a provincial police contract to a municipal department, a regional department, or a contract with another municipal department is the ability of the new force to retain the majority of the Richmond police personnel.

This, in turn, hinges on a number of key factors:

- The City of Richmond would need to be satisfied as to the desirability and benefits of such a change;
- The Minister will need to approve such a change²¹¹;
- The Federal Government will need to be supportive and amend pension legislation²¹²;
- The RCMP would need to assign personnel to the Richmond Detachment who are desirous of moving to the new force; and
- All personnel who express an interest in moving from a provincial to a municipal service would need to meet hiring criteria established by the City of Richmond.

The Richmond component of the new force will require approximately 200 sworn officers. Given the current challenge in recruitment being experienced by many police agencies, nationally, it will be a formidable task for the new organizations to hire and place such a number of personnel on a specific date. In addition, the continuity of everyday policing and investigations must be maintained. Some jurisdictions, such as Halifax Regional Municipality have negotiated MOUs which accept RCMP transfers into the municipal service without loss of seniority or rank.

The issue of pensions is the greatest determining factor as to whether RCMP personnel would be willing to remain in place. Unlike the numerous policing amalgamations in Ontario where the municipal and provincial police are members of the same pension plan, the RCMP personnel are members of a federal plan, separate from the BC provincial / municipal plan.

The *Public Service Pension Plan BC, Transfer Agreement*, January 2006²¹³ allows plan members who meet the eligibility criteria to transfer their service from other pension plans into the Public Service Pension Plan, thereby increasing the pension benefits they will receive.

The Public Service Pension Plan has transfer agreements with the Government of Canada. The agreement is silent on transfers from federal to provincial plans. An interview with a pension expert suggests that an agreement would have to be negotiated to achieve such a mass transfer of personnel from the RCMP to a municipal entity.

²¹¹ *Police Act* Section 3(1) (c) with the approval of the minister, entering into an agreement with another municipality that has a municipal police department under which policing and law enforcement in the municipality will be provided by the municipal police department of that municipality. Section 18 (1) Subject to the minister's approval, the councils of 2 or more municipalities may enter into an agreement providing for the amalgamation of their municipal police boards and municipal police departments.

²¹² Interviews indicated that pension transfers arrangements have been negotiated in some jurisdictions. At the time of printing this report, copies of any such agreements or MOU's could not be obtained.

²¹³ <http://www.pensionsbc.ca/pls/portal/docs/>

Recommendation

- 6.A The City of Richmond should consider that human resource issues, policies, and practices are significantly different between the various agency models. The advantages and disadvantages of a contracted vs. municipal model are discrete - there is little overlap between the options.

Matters such as: contract negotiation, problem employees, and influence of agency practices are compared and contrasted against issues such as: the inconsistency of personnel, loss of employee skills and knowledge, and absence of influence on recruiting, selection and promotional policies.

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

The City would have no responsibility for any additional wage or direct personnel cost above those included in the contract. The City would also have no responsibility for negotiation with employee representatives. However, the City would have minimal input to human resource policies or practices and could merely lobby the RCMP or Provincial government on matters such as representation of minority groups in the agency (except with regards municipal employees at the detachment), unless specific issues are formally placed within the 2012 contract.

Since the RCMP members are recruited from across Canada, it would be 'best practice' for Richmond to develop a "Core Curriculum" for inclusion in training new members of the Richmond RCMP and also curriculum for senior staff. The Core curriculum should include:

- The demographics of the region and the implications for policing,
- Orientation to the municipal organization and processes including presentations by the union regarding the civilian members working for the RCMP,
- Cultural competency training regarding the major ethnic/cultural minorities in the region.

The size and scope of the RCMP establishment as a whole means that the City of Richmond potentially has a wealth of knowledge and experience it can draw upon, particularly for relatively infrequent events such as the Olympic Games.

If the City contracts with the RCMP or other provider, the City should build into the contract specifics as to how the contractor will meet the City's future needs for expertise related to new trends in policing and new city developments (for example, the use of technology and police responses to technologically related crime, and major physical changes such as SkyTrain and the downtown development). The contract should also include a specified review of the City's emerging needs on a yearly basis.

An independent municipal police force

This model permits the City input to agency policies and practices and works toward long term retention of personnel skills and knowledge. However, the municipal model entails additional responsibilities and costs to the City such as full employment costs, outreach, recruiting and selection, negotiation of employment contracts with employee representatives, and the sometimes, difficult resolution of discipline cases.

If the City has its own police force, with a more stable staff complement, it will need to set aside resources for training and continuous learning and upgrading with respect to technology and other changes in the policing environment. Further, it will need to plan how it will source specialized “one time” expertise such as that needed to plan for the 2010 Olympic events.

Contracting with another municipal police force

The City would benefit from some retention of personnel’s skills and knowledge. Depending upon the receptiveness of the contracted municipality some input to human resource policies and practices may be present. The City would be absolved of much of the responsibility for labour relations issues such as contract negotiation or responsibility for problem employees.

See *A contract with the RCMP for policing* above for proposals regarding acquisition of special staffing expertise.

A regional police force

Like the municipal model, through a shared responsibility of a police board, this model permits the City input to agency policies and practices and ensures long term retention of personnel skills and knowledge. However, the regional model also entails additional responsibilities and costs to the City such as full employment costs such as outreach, recruiting and selection, negotiation of employment contracts with employee representatives and the, sometimes, difficult resolution of cases of problem personnel. However, all these costs and responsibilities are shared with regional partners.

Administrative Bridges

Premise

Being a crucial municipal service, the police agency must forge and maintain a series of contacts within the municipal administrative structure as well as the community. This serves to ensure that, at one level the service dovetails with other municipal functions and takes full advantage of joint service options. At another level, this series of connections ensures that the police understand and can translate into practice the mores of the community.

7.1 Introduction

A principal difference between contracted (other municipal or RCMP) and engaged (municipal or regional) services is the character of the relationship between the City and the policing service. At one extreme, the relationship is one of 'detachment' and arms length where management is limited to the establishment and monitoring of a contract, usually in terms of service outcomes. At the other extreme is a relationship which is based upon a series of bridges between the policing agency and the various levels of the administrative hierarchy of the City.

There are advantages to both approaches. With a contracted service, the City is relieved of any obligation to develop and engage staff and processes to ensure that policing services are provided beyond the development and monitoring of a contract. This can result in a very simple and problem-free approach to service provision. On the other hand, the engagement of staff and the construction and maintenance of bridges between the administration and its service provider can allow the dovetailing of strategies and greater oversight of, and insight into, the nature and quality of the service.

Although employed municipal policing services are, perhaps, perceived as the norm for municipalities, policing services based upon contract are ubiquitous. A pattern has been noted,²¹⁴ the RCMP across the country provides services through agreements between the federal and provincial governments. The Ontario Provincial Police and Quebec Provincial Police also provide extensive service on contract to communities. In British Columbia, of the more than 150 municipalities, only twelve are served by municipal police forces.²¹⁵ The remainder are policed by the RCMP, under contract as the provincial police. Approximately 25% of the population, largely

²¹⁴ Chapter 1.

²¹⁵ Abbotsford, Central Saanich, Delta, Esquimalt (with Victoria), Nelson, New Westminster, Oak Bay, Port Moody, Saanich, Vancouver, West Vancouver, Victoria.

clustered in the population centers of Greater Vancouver and Greater Victoria, is served by municipal police.

The form of service along with the structure and administration of the contracted or engaged agency is largely a matter of local preference and history based against a backdrop of provincial requirements and guidelines.

As a long term contracted service provider to the City of Richmond, the RCMP acts, in some ways, like a City department. The RCMP is paid to provide defined services linked to community needs and priorities and relies on the local tax base for funding. Unlike municipal departments, the Detachment does not use a range of City administrative support services such as Finance, Human Resources, Information Technology, Purchasing, and Payroll. Halifax Regional Municipality demonstrates the difference between the Chief of Police of a municipal service and the Officer in Command of an RCMP detachment. In Halifax, where both the Halifax Regional Police and the RCMP police under the direction of one Police Commission, the Chief of Police is a Director in the City administration and actively participates in management meetings, whereas the Officer in Command attends the Regional management meetings to inform the members of the management committee of RCMP activities.

The RCMP, as one of five divisions reporting to the Community Safety Department, is represented on the senior management team, The Administrator's Group (TAG), through the General Manager. TAG is responsible to ensure that the strategic directions of the City are in place, are coordinated between departments, are understood and supported by staff, and flow throughout the organization for efficient and effective implementation. City Council provides high level direction to establish community priorities for goals and service delivery. To achieve this orchestration of services the goals and planning for service delivery for policing should be clearly integrated with City Council and administration directions.

Performance measurement is a natural companion to goal completion as is periodic performance evaluation to monitor progress to goal completion. As such, the provision of effective and efficient services is only possible with performance-based information. Ready access to information is crucial to support evidence-based analysis, decision making, and continuous improvement.

Regardless of the policing model selected, the integrated elements of a strategic management framework inclusive of planning, service delivery, and performance analysis and improvement is essential to success. Information flow and appropriate access to data and personnel is crucial to effective service delivery for the direct service provider and for the City.

The *Review* identified a number of strengths associated with the current contracted policing model²¹⁶.

Relationships: Interviewees reported constructive relationships between the management representatives of the detachment and the staff of Parks, Recreation & Cultural Services. Similarly, public events planning and response with RCMP field staff was described as excellent with the managers being seen as innovative, helpful, responsive, philosophically aligned to the concept of community support, with strategies such as the youth initiative (positive tickets) being both locally and nationally recognized.

Community Focus: The current OIC and the philosophy and staffing now in place have evolved to support newer models of community policing and support. There is a concern that when transfers occur at senior levels it may be difficult to select senior managers who are able to adopt a similarly innovative approach to newer models of community policing²¹⁷.

The Event Review Team (formerly Safety Operations Steering Committee): This monthly meeting was seen as a beneficial opportunity to meet with the senior managers, receive a verbal update on activities, and for detachment managers and City staff to participate in community oriented planning and operations discussions.

In the course of the *Review*, five principal elements²¹⁸ came to the fore as important administrative bridging issues for the City of Richmond.

- Strategic Management Framework
- Information
- Governance & Resource Utilization
- Operational Service Delivery
- Teamwork

²¹⁶ Identified through the interview process.

²¹⁷ See Ch.6 Human Resources for a further discussion regarding selection of the OIC

²¹⁸ Some of these issues are addressed in other sections of this report.

7.2 Strategic Management Framework

A strategic framework ensures that the municipality is able to focus all organizational resources on meeting the needs of the community, based upon an agreed set of priorities. The strategic framework also permits the planned and budgeted acquisition and development of appropriate human and capital resources. Regardless of the ultimate selection of policing model, clear supported strategic directions are the foundation upon which operational planning, performance expectations, service delivery, and behavioural expectations occur. Evaluation of service-delivery effectiveness and efficiency occurs when actual results are compared to performance measures. The absence of clear expectations results in inadequate evidence-based evaluation. Relationship tensions inevitably result when expectations are not mutually understood.

The substantial majority of administrative issues raised by interviewees in the course of this *Review* could be traced back to a lack of clear strategic direction which is mutually supported and understood within the City and into which the Detachment dovetails its planning process. Along with governance, the absence of a clear and orchestrated planning process on the part of the RCMP was a cause of significant frustration. Direction and expectation must be clear to all parties.

The City has the responsibility to ensure its expectations in terms of deliverables, service levels to be provided, and performance management processes to be applied are clearly articulated. Provincial contract policing has three core focuses – national, regional, and community. Clarity on some community-based policing expectations should be primarily driven by the City. The complete “package” of services to be provided and funding should be clearly articulated and documented by the police service provider. The catalyst for police planning must lay with the detachment acting within a framework provided by the City. In the case of a contracted service, an orchestrated planning process requires the dovetailing of two processes, the RCMP internal process and the City process. The source of frustration in Richmond resulted from the lack of confluence of these two systems.

The planning resources of the City are currently engaged, primarily, in the planning for the Olympics. The full development of the City plan has, therefore, been delayed. However, many civic departments have delineated priorities and objectives, and the City Centre Area Plan (CCAP) details the development which is anticipated within the downtown core of Richmond. RCMP involvement to date in the CCAP has been minimal even though increased density envisioned in the CCAP will affect policing response for these areas. The police agency should initiate dialogue to address any perceived or actual gaps that impact the development of a strategic approach to policing the City.

Several interviewees commented on the lack of information provided on policing activities essential to performance management and measurement and to support municipal planning activities. Information will be addressed as a separate issue below. It is important to note, in this section, that information provided and performance feedback data is essential to support the elements of a strategic planning framework.

Several interviewees commented that effective teamwork by the City and RCMP at the senior levels was less than optimum.²¹⁹ Teamwork is addressed as a separate issue below, yet it is important to note in this section that teamwork, by its very nature, cannot occur without a clear and mutual understanding of community safety strategic directions and the implications of those directions between both parties. Regardless of the policing model adopted, if clarity of direction and performance expectations are not present for both parties, dissatisfaction is virtually guaranteed. Without a mutual understanding of policing objectives and the actions required of City staff in support of the plan, staff is placed in the position of initiating their own contacts and developing relationships to support their service delivery component. Relationships become personalized, and while these relationships are laudable and often effective, the preference is to have them develop within the context of clear, mutually supported, and integrated directions.

The Current Police Planning Process

In 2007, the RCMP national priorities were established as:

- *Organized Crime: Reduce the threat and impact of organized crime.*
- *Terrorism: Reduce the threat of terrorist activity in Canada and abroad.*
- *Youth: Reduce youth involvement in crime as victims and offenders.*
- *Economic Integrity: Contribute to Canada's economic integrity through crime reduction.*
- *Aboriginal Communities: Contribute to safer and healthier Aboriginal communities.*

Historically, the RCMP has utilized various models of performance management in an effort to attain an appropriate blend of goal setting, resource management and fiscal responsibility. For the past six years the RCMP has adopted a performance management system based upon the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model which was developed by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton²²⁰. Once the score card program had been implemented within the RCMP for a few years, the next progression adopted by senior management was that of the Strategy Focused Organization: a concept described by Kaplin and Norton as being “a new approach to management”.

²¹⁹ A workshop on 'Teamwork' was conducted with certain city managers and the O/I/C Richmond Detachment in 2002, Walker Wilson.

²²⁰ *The Strategy Focused Organization*, Robert S Kaplan and David P. Norton, Harvard Business School Press, 2001

The BSC system was developed with the “for profit” business sector and staff within the RCMP²²¹, were tasked to re-work the model to suit police management needs. Interviews suggested that during the implementation, the process of populating BSC related documents created a work-load burden for front line officers. The BSC process involves a lateral spreadsheet format requiring the listing of key objectives supported by related initiatives, time lines, and activities. The national objectives were distributed to divisions and divisional objectives were to be implemented at detachment level to provide framework for local priorities as the Detachment Performance Plan (DPP).

While the national objectives were intended to be a framework for local priorities, RCMP managers interviewed were of the opinion that if the local priority did not fit within the BSC framework, then it would not be included. On occasion, if a previously provided local policing service was not identified within the objective portion of the scorecard, it was not to be provided as a service. Further, in some locales this was articulated as the previous “no call too small” model of the RCMP was not feasible. This conflicted with the practice in many rural jurisdictions where ‘small calls’ are the norm. Also, the attempt to conform to a nationally prescribed agenda ignored the safety and security concerns of the particular community being policed.

An interviewee suggested that responses to “small calls” provide a sense of security to the public. This particularly applies in areas with a more senior demographic. In addition, attention to the “small call” eliminates its escalation to a more bothersome, time consuming and, perhaps, unsafe incident. Further, an effective service provided on minor issues in many instances leads to assistance from the public in solving more serious or complex investigations.

In busier, urban settings it may be necessary to filter calls for service and consequently the police service protocols change. The position adhered to by senior management in this regard can concern and confuse many operational supervisors and their staff. In turn, the public detects a perceived void in policing services previously provided. The interviewees suggested, those with an absence of inside knowledge have attributed the lack of police service to the rise in crime when, in fact, it is really the changing of police service provision.

On the other side, the application of the current police planning process in Richmond has also caused concern within the City administration. The concern is not with the mechanics of the BSC *per se* but with an absence of involvement in any planning process that pertains to the policing of the City. Staff responsible for various aspects of the safety of the City had not been contacted to provide formal input to the DPP, even though the DPP document relevant to Richmond indicates

²²¹ See Harvard Business Review, Spring, 2005.

that local input is required²²².

The Performance Agreement Process is cascaded from top level RCMP managers down to middle management and uses the BSC as a foundation for the primary indicators of effective management. As a result, there is concern that information gleaned from the field is massaged to meet the requirements of the BSC process with the intent of meeting documentation and perception requirements at each successive level of management rather than to measure the success of addressing community crime concerns. It was voiced that a shift has occurred from headquarters administration supporting field operations to field operations supporting the administrative requirements of headquarters. This concurred with the view of some interviewees that the allegiances of local RCMP are divided between two or more masters.

The annual report generated via the BSC is provided by RCMP HQ Ottawa to the Federal government level. However, the representatives of the City had not been privy to the results of the local, divisional, or national roll-up of the Performance Agreement Process.

As noted above, the next phase of the approach to be adopted by the RCMP, building upon the BSC, is the Strategy Focused Organization. Kaplin and Norton note:

“A successful Balanced Scorecard program starts with the recognition that is not a “metrics” project; it’s a change project. Initially, the focus is on mobilization and creating momentum, to get the program launched. Once the organization is mobilized, the focus shifts to governance, with emphasis on fluid, team-based approaches to deal with the unstructured nature of the transition to a new performance model. Finally, and gradually over time, a new management system evolves - a strategic management system that institutionalizes the new culture values and new structures into a new system for managing. The various phases can evolve over two to three years.”

Taken together, Planning, Performance Measurement, and Performance Evaluation enable the proven and well known Plan – Do – Study – Act cycle. Simply stated, plan development is followed by doing which in turn is followed by studying the results of the action to the plan (i.e. heavily information dependent), and then acting to adjust direction. The cycle is repeated with lessons from previous cycles incorporated in the next cycle. Evidence-based continuous improvement is an outcome. Such an approach fits with the anticipated ideal police model and builds upon the BSC of the RCMP.

²²² “E” Division has a “Strategic Business Plan, 2006/2007” which provides a brief environmental scan and summaries “Specific Major Undertakings for 2006/2007”. The consultants were not provided with a strategic plan with measurable objectives for 2007 related to Richmond Detachment. However, the Detachment did release a “Report to the Community” which describes the range of services provided by the RCMP along with the Richmond – West Fraser Area Strategic Framework.

7.3 Information

Information access and reporting is crucial to support strategic management framework activities, performance measurement, and day-to-day operations. Information as a basis for tactical and strategic planning is mentioned elsewhere in this report.²²³

During the course of the *Review*, several information flows were mentioned as supporting or reporting on service delivery outcomes or efficiency.

- *Routine Written Information Reports:* None were identified in written format from the RCMP provided to City Council, The Administrator's Group, or for staff reference in their various planning responsibilities.

Council and the civic administration receive large value resource requests in budget submissions. The lack of routine periodic information reports, from police, that identify emerging policing issues creates a sense of unwelcome surprise during budget submissions. The issues and likely budget response should be communicated well before budget submissions.

The RCMP, because they are not a civic department, is not held to the same degree of business case rigour as are civic departments in Richmond.

The provision and retention of written records is a fundamental aspect of accountability.

- *Routine Verbal Information Reports:* Verbal reports are provided to the Mayor by the OIC and to the Community Safety Committee by the RCMP committee member; however, there are no formal written reports making reference to statistical or performance data.
- *Resource Allocation Information:* Resource allocation reports were not identified to match resource assignment to defined priorities or resources allocated to specific roles.
- *Access to Statistical Information:* Although periodic reports were provided to the City by the RCMP on crime and incident trends, interviewees stated these reports were of limited value and were never accompanied by written reports. As has been noted elsewhere, in attempting to obtain from the RCMP statistical information regarding community safety and security for this *Review*, limited data was available from the RCMP. Although it was proposed that this lack of information was a consequence of changes in the IT systems from PIRS to PRIME, such data is crucial in the resource management of the organization, the effective deployment of personnel and the monitoring of effectiveness. Such incident data is a foundation for rational resource planning and the acquisition of resources. Other agencies, including RCMP detachments, have downloaded and made use of such information.
- Transportation planning requires access to accident information to support analysis of road design features that may be implemented to reduce accidents. The MV #104 accident reporting forms that were previously copied by the RCMP to Transportation with personal information blacked-out are no longer provided. Transportation now relies on less valuable aggregated information from ICBC. Transportation planning requires easily accessible information in appropriate formats to support roadway safety design.

²²³ Chapters 2 and 9

The ideal police model should have the following information characteristics provided by the senior officer and/or accessible on a timely basis, consistent with the *Freedom of Information* and *Protection of Privacy Act* and the *Personal Information Protection Act*.

- *Routine Performance Management Reports:* This series of reports would be provided on timely intervals to City Council, The Administrator's Group, and the General Manager, Community Safety (and the Public Security Board if implemented) to support progress reporting on Annual Work Plans and achievement of strategic and operational long range plans.
- *Routine Operational Reports:* This series of reports would provide information supporting development and updating of operational plans and implementation of Annual Work Plans at a detailed level. As well, these reports would provide service delivery information and statistics. Information reports would be provided on resource allocation inclusive of the efficient use of staff time and well being of the organization, for example, overtime usage for public events and general overtime, sickness, and complaints. The information would also be used to support discussions of service levels provided matched to performance expectations.
- *Ad Hoc Reports:* These reports would be provided on a timely basis to support strategic and operational planning, work planning, and information requirements arising from time to time as part of normal operations, emerging issues and events.
- *Plan Development Participation & Input:* Both parties would take the initiative to involve and seek information from the other in all manner of responsibilities from planning through execution through evaluation at the appropriate time

7.4 Governance & Resource Utilization

While governance (which is discussed in Chapter 3 in the report²²⁴) and resource utilization issues are not directly related to administrative bridges, interviewee perceptions of such issues directly impact integrated planning and information reporting on performance expectations.

- *National, Regional & Community Policing - Conflicting Priorities:* National (i.e. RCMP) and regional policing (i.e. Richmond and adjacent communities) issues are perceived to take precedence over community (i.e. local) policing issues and preventative initiatives. It is unclear how resources are allocated proportionately to each of these three groupings. It is very difficult for Council and the administration to identify the relationship between funding provided and services received.
- *National versus Community Funding:* It is unclear where policing funding is expended and the extent to which community priorities is being achieved. For example, staff is reassigned from the traffic division and youth team to other work, resulting in a decrease in these services. These changes are introduced with limited discussion with City representatives.
- *National versus Community Direction:* There are two "masters" that continuously arise. The relationship is not always satisfactory for the community when local policing issues are not addressed, yet the community pays for the service. Relationships are strained at times over service priorities.

²²⁴ Similar issues were raised by different review participants to different members of the consulting team.

- *Relationships:* Several interviewees reported good working relationships with the RCMP and felt these relationships were integral to successful implementation of community prevention and policing initiatives. These same interviewees also expressed a sense of vulnerability over losing these relationships through job transfer to a person less open to innovative community policing models. The loss of, for example, a committee member on joint teams such as police and fire, to a transfer to another detachment meant a steep learning curve and possible lesser interest level from the new appointee.

Several interviewees expressed a strong wish for the City to be involved in the selection of key RCMP positions assigned to the community. However, other interviewees reported poor relationships expressed as poor response to complaints, unnecessary bureaucracy such as e-mailed complaints not being accepted by the RCMP, and difficulty getting information without applying pressure and waiting an inordinate amount of time for a response.

- *Community Prevention Orientation:* There is a concern over the “old” policing model towards enforcement alone versus prevention and physical presence in the community. It was felt that the “old” model may be well suited to national and regional criminal issues, but be less well suited to local community prevention and visibility requirements.

Although conclusions concerning governance and resource utilization are specifically addressed in other sections of the report, the following brief conclusions are noted in the context of administrative bridges in the ideal model.

- *Service Delivery Model:* The ideal governance model should recognize core differences between national and regional policing from community policing.
- *Priorities & Funding:* Priorities and the allocation of resources to different activities and categories should be clearly understood. Provision of core community services should be protected.
- *Staffing & Selection:* City staff should have a greater role in the interviewing and selection process for the Officer In Charge position to ensure community needs and values are matched.

7.5 Operational Service Delivery

Operational issues were noted as follows.

- *Community Policing:*
 - Police are available during daytime hours for school liaison yet they are also needed in the evening; shifts do not match evening coverage needs for Community Centres and youth events
 - Like Traffic personnel, without appropriate consultation, Youth Team members are reassigned to other tasks creating a concern regarding a lack of accessibility and visibility and a reliable presence for youth services.
- *Cost of Services – Public Events:*
 - Policing services for events is largely done on overtime resulting in large costs for event organizers and banked overtime for officers.
 - The subsequent banked time-off becomes an erosion of resources available for other services.

- The mix of officers, private security and volunteers is overly skewed towards officers compared to other jurisdictions resulting in larger than required costs for event organizers.
 - The high cost for events can be a potential impediment to hosting events in Richmond.
- *Response to Complaints:* As noted, the RCMP response to complaints is somewhat unpredictable resulting in an erosion of relationships with elected officials and senior administration, as well as community members. The RCMP will not accept e-mail complaints and require written letters even though some 80% of complaints are e-mailed to Council or the administration.

7.6 Teamwork

Several interviewees referred to a perceived lack of teamwork between the RCMP, Council and senior administration. Conversely, instances were reported of good teamwork between Parks, Recreation & Cultural Services staff and RCMP staff.

The issues raised by some interviewees referenced the Council and senior staff's teamwork issue.

- Annual budget submissions from the RCMP are often a surprise in terms of the magnitude of funding and staff increase requests. It was felt the RCMP does not appreciate the City's need to manage within a budget envelope, acceptable to taxpayers, and recognising other departments also have high priorities.
- The RCMP uses the media to promote their budget cause in a manner not available to City departments. Politicizing budget requests creates a feeling of being manipulated amongst City administration and Council.
- The RCMP is not held to the same degree of rigour as are City departments in preparing business cases for requests. There was feeling that the RCMP used rationale for budgets that was based upon a 'because it's the RCMP' mindset.
- Relationships are not consistently positive at all levels in the City and for all departments with the RCMP. This adversely affects overall teamwork even though some groups may be currently satisfied with their relationships.
- The above points and the deferral to the national RCMP does not create an environment of reciprocal teamwork with the City.

Teamwork is largely symptomatic of other issues including a lack of mutually supported strategic directions, performance measures and information reporting of actual results to performance expectations.

Recommendations

- 7.A The City of Richmond should ensure that the police agency is able to articulate the goals of the agency which support community safety and security and, further, that the agency is able to monitor progress against goals and regularly report on progress to the Public Safety Committee or Public Security Board²²⁵.

²²⁵ The term "public security board" is used as a more generic term than "board" or "commission" and to differentiate the new governance organization from the existing Community Safety Committee. This places the concept and discussion outside the bounds of the Act or Agreements. The term is used in the 2006 report of the Law Commission – In Search of

- 7.B The City of Richmond should define resources to be allocated to police program activities and require that appropriate consultation occurs between the City representatives and the management of the police agency prior to the reassignment of those resources to other programs. This discussion should not pertain to individual investigations unless these are anticipated to be major, time consuming investigations which impact overtime costs. Even then, discussion should be restricted to the fiscal aspects of the incident and not the operational aspect of the investigation.
- 7.C The City of Richmond should require the police agency to redefine the mix of resources for policing public events to ensure service levels are met for other work through initiatives like Community Service Officers, volunteers or shift schedule changes to minimize overtime and banked time.
- 7.D The City of Richmond should require the police agency to establish shift schedules for community police stations that includes evening coverage and, more generally, as observed in Chapter 2, all deployment should address workload demands.
- 7.E The City of Richmond should ensure a shared complaint tracking system is in place with the police agency with complaint response timelines and processes detailed.²²⁶

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

The tension created by the need of the detachment to be aware of the priorities of other levels of the RCMP makes it difficult to demonstrate full allegiance with, and affinity to, the priority requirements of elected municipal representatives and the City administrative departments. Not least of which is an RCMP planning process which may not entirely dovetail with the framework, business case or timing requirements of the City process.

An independent municipal police force

A municipal police agency can be required to dovetail all planning and other administrative processes with those of the City. The municipal service could also take advantage of the expertise resident in municipal civic departments. The involvement would not extend to participation in decisions regarding specific operational cases.

Contracting with another municipal police force

The City would be able to lobby the contracting municipality for input to the planning and other processes. However, the prime orientation for administrative purposes would be the principal municipal employer.

A regional police force

Through the participation in the regional board, the City would request that the planning and other administrative services of the police dovetail, as far as possible, with the City processes. However, this coordination would be a matter of consensus with other regional partners.

Security, and is used here to avoid confusion with any existing bodies. The resultant name of the oversight body would be determined by Council.

²²⁶ The issue of complaints processes is subject to perennial debate. Municipal police and the RCMP are subject to different complaints processes. A review of police complaints processes in BC was conducted by Josiah Wood, April 2007

8.1 Deployment to Workload

Premise

The General Duty function represents approximately 40% of a police organisation's resources; in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiencies these resources must be deployed to meet the workload and provide the best service for the community.

Deployment

Policing has an important temporal component. Consequently, an efficient deployment model must seek to deploy resources in accordance with the workload, both geographically, and with consideration that calls are not received at a constant, uniform rate²²⁷. Additionally, the daily deployment of human resources (and accompanying equipment such as vehicles and communication devices) must balance conflicting needs created by call load, tactical crime prevention initiatives, court appearances, officer-initiated activities and targeting, minimum staffing levels for emergencies and officer safety, and quality of life issues.

The 1992 Report of the Auditor General reinforces the challenge of finding an optimum deployment model²²⁸. While commenting on the scheduling of RCMP shift models police, the Auditor General notes:

The number of crimes and calls for police service changes from hour to hour. Scheduling of equal numbers of officers at all times of the day, without regard to the demand for service, can be wasteful and costly. In fact, no single schedule pattern is the "best". Accordingly, police departments across Canada use a wide range of schedules to meet particular conditions.

Shift schedules in certain large RCMP detachments do not correspond to workload

However, we found that many large RCMP detachments with similar fluctuations in demand for service did not follow the PDHR²²⁹ method. Instead, they were operating on a 12-hour and "equal-watch" schedule. That is, while each police officer worked a 12-hour shift, equal numbers of police officers were on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, all year round.

Because the equal-watch schedule is easy to manage and members generally prefer 12-hour shifts, there is a tendency to accept it without considering its effects on efficiency and on the quality and level of service provided. This is an issue that the RCMP has been aware of and has studied for some time; there are always trade-offs between morale and efficiency. Given the current fiscal constraints at all levels of government and the focus on meeting community

²²⁷ Vancouver Police Department, (2007) Patrol Deployment Study pg.400

²²⁸ Auditor General Report Chapter 22. 1992

²²⁹ 22.36 To avoid inefficient scheduling, the RCMP's policy on work scheduling prescribes a proportional distribution of human resources (PDHR) method. This method helps detachment commanders to schedule their police officers according to the demand for service. The principles of this method are logical and consistent with those practised by other police departments. Auditor General Report Chapter 22. 1992

expectations, the RCMP will need to balance members' morale with operational efficiency in approving various shift schedules.

The Vancouver Police Department (VPD) recently completed a comprehensive review of deployment and shifting issues. The study found:

Independently of staffing considerations, scheduling must account for workload variations and take steps to smooth out these predictable fluctuations as much as possible by adjusting deployment. In the context of patrol operations, best practice patrol scheduling implies stabilizing average workload by hour of the day and day of the week. In turn, this requires assigning more officers to work when the expected call load is greater and fewer officers when the expected call load is smaller. This approach is called 'staffing to workload' in the field of patrol deployment and is recognized as a best practice by most leading-edge police agencies. Ensuring that patrol officers are scheduled to work when they are most needed is desirable not only because of efficiency considerations but also it is more equitable for the officers²³⁰.

The VPD current shifting model, utilizing five 11-hour shifts, two of which overlap the previous shifts, matches patrol resources with call load very closely²³¹. This is similar to the work schedule in other leading North American police agencies. For example, the Buffalo Police Department, in the State of New York, utilizes a shift schedule that consists of five overlapping 10-hour shifts. Some preliminary analysis showed that Buffalo's shifting model was also matching very closely the actual call-load patterns and was highly efficient. Agencies such as the Cincinnati Police Department and Dallas Police Department respectively rely on four or five distinct eight-hour shifts. The Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department includes overlapping shifts. Similarly the police services in Calgary and Edmonton attempt to align the shifting model to workload.²³² To optimally adjust the deployment model, the specific shift start /finish time, it is necessary to know when the call load is concentrated on average and how it will likely fluctuate day after day or even hour after hour²³³.

The Patrol Deployment Study Project Team recommends that a permanent fixed team be implemented using existing patrol resources. ... A team of 11 constables would work Wednesday to Saturday from 1800 to 0400 hours. This would provide more officers in the Entertainment District during the busiest days of the week and the busiest hours of the day. (23)

The call load handled by regular patrol units is usually greatest between Wednesday and Saturday. ... A different scheduling pattern must be adopted to match staffing with call load more closely. (461)

²³⁰ Vancouver Police Department, (2007) *Patrol Deployment Study*. Chapter 12, *The Patrol Shifting Model* pg990.

²³¹ Ibid. pg. 13 The study also suggests that the VPD shifting pattern is efficient.

²³² The Cincinnati Police Department: 0700-1500, 1500-2300, 2000-0400, & 2300-0700; Charlotte-Mecklenburg: 0600-1400, 1400-2200, 2200-060, & two overlapping shifts for the 1400 and 2200 shift changes; Dallas: 0700-1500, 1000-1800, 1500-2300, 2000-0400, & 2300-0700; Edmonton: 0700-1700, 0800-1800, 1200-2200, 1600-0200, 1800-0400, & 2200-0800; and Calgary: 0600-1600, 0800-1800, 1200-2000, & 2100-0700,


²³³ Ibid. pg.400.

The compressed work week is another factor that influences deployment models. Since the 1980s, the compressed workweek, generally regarded as an essential component of quality-of-life issues, has been adopted across many public occupations providing continuous services. However, the compressed workweek can be difficult to match to the seven-day cycle of human urban activities.

Municipal police departments in BC must also consider the Provincial Standards, which govern municipal policing. In this case, procedures for shifts changes must provide for continuous patrol coverage²³⁴. The intent of the standard is to ensure a patrol response is available at all times. All models described in this chapter, including Richmond's, comply with this Standard.

Beyond a critical mass of population and police activity, there is usually a common bell curve of calls for service and police workload. The following graph compares Richmond, Vancouver, and Seattle. Richmond's calls-for-service peak period is from 1200 to 0100 hours.


Calls for Service by hour: Richmond, Seattle, and Vancouver



Vancouver Police Department, Patrol Study, 2006

²³⁴ Provincial Standards for Municipal Police Departments in British Columbia. Standard D2.1.4

The following graph from the *Review's* analysis of *Incidents by Time of Day and Day of Week* illustrates the hourly calls-for-service from June 2006 to June 2007.



Calls for Service by hour: Richmond

The data confirms the anticipated policing workload: a peak of calls during the working day, plus a higher call load Friday and Saturday evenings and the early hours of Saturday and Sunday mornings.

The Richmond Deployment Model

The general duty function of the Richmond Detachment is staffed by approximately 80 officers or approximately 40% of the Detachment.

The equal-watch deployment, that is, the constant even deployment of resources over the four watches, currently used by the Richmond Detachment, is administratively easy and uses the minimum amount of equipment. However, it is contrary to the concept of 'staffing to workload', mentioned previously. Presently, the Richmond Detachment deployment model creates periods

when the resources (human and capital) are greater than required and other periods when the resources are strained to service the workload²³⁵.

The RCMP LMD Administration Manual, Section D reads²³⁶:

1. *General Duties – RCMP Members*

a. *The four (4) watches, “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”, will work a combination of 11 and 12-hour shifts.*

b. *Rotation*

1. *Two (2) day shifts*

Hours of work at the discretion of the Watch Commander and reflect known work levels.

2. *Twenty-four (24) hours rest period*

3. *Two (2) night shifts*

Hours of work at the discretion of the Watch Commander and reflect known work levels.

4. *Three (3) clear days off.*

The night shifts are 11-hour shifts and the day shifts are 12 hours.

The “hours of work” are defined as:

Day shift 0600 to 1800 or 0700 to 1900

Night Shift: 1600 to 0300, 1800 to 0500, 1900 to 0600, or 2000 to 0700.

Two watches are deployed daily, with the other two watches on days off, as follows (numbers rounded):

<i>Day shift</i>	<i>10 positions</i>	<i>0600-1800</i>
	<i>10 positions</i>	<i>0700-1900</i>
<i>Night shift</i>	<i>10 positions</i>	<i>1800-0500</i>
	<i>10 positions</i>	<i>2000-0700</i>

The splitting of each watch into two start times effectively creates a four-team shift model. Note: the figures are based on the number of positions assigned to the function; the number of officers deployed will be decreased through leave, training requirements, sickness, and personnel shortages.

The model deploys the same number of positions (20) each hour – other than 0500 to 0600 and 1900 to 2000 when only 10 positions are deployed.


The following graph illustrates the current deployment model, in accordance with the RCMP Administration Manual, where two watches in four teams totaling 40 positions are deployed daily.

	0700-1900 10 officers		2000-0700 10 officers	0700
	0600-1800 10 officers		1800-0500 10 officers	0600

²³⁵ Note: Zone 1, the Airport Sub Detachment, reports modifying the basic model to facilitate meeting the demands of the airport workload.


²³⁶ The Administration Manual includes 8, 10, 11, & 12-hour shifts for various police functions.

The next graph illustrates the same deployment model showing the number of officers per hour. A comparison of this graph to the Richmond “calls for service” illustrates the discrepancies of resources to workload.



Deployment Models

The following graph illustrates the Vancouver Police Department District 4 calls-for-service – not too dissimilar to Richmond’s.




VPD District 4, the south-west part of the city, adjacent to Richmond, is useful for comparison. The shifting model is a combination of rotating shifts and fixed shifts to provide a deployment model consistent with the call load. District 4 deploys 112 patrol officers. If this number is reduced to 80 for purposes of a theoretical Richmond model, a similar shift model is represented in the

following graph where 40 positions are deployed daily, on 11- and 12-hour shifts, resulting in 24 officers deployed during the peak demand period of 1200 to 2400, 16 officers deployed during quieter periods, and 8 officers deployed from 0500 to 0600. This model is used only as an example of what type of shifting might be appropriate.



Using the current Richmond four-watch model, with subtle changes, the deployment could better fit the workload as the following graph illustrates.



* The 1500-0200 shift could be adjusted on Fridays and Saturdays to 1600-0300.

The analyses of *Incidents by Time of Day and Day of Week*, chapter 2 in this report, show that the later hours of Friday and Saturday nights (i.e. midnight to 0400 Saturday and Sunday mornings) represent almost 50% of the week's total incidents for this time period. On the other days the workload decreases after 2100 hours; on Fridays and Saturdays the workload continues to increase to a peak at midnight

Since 2004, the RCMP has been piloting a Reserve Program that would allow up to 400 retired and former RCMP officers to be used for temporary deployment and support to front-line police services in British Columbia²³⁷. The concept may allow a more accurate deployment model especially as Reserves are, in effect, part-time employees who could be assigned to peak periods. Interviews during the *Review* indicated that in the Lower Mainland a significant resource pool has not been realized. Interviewees indicated two reasons: many RCMP personnel retire to other locations, and "Friday-night" policing may not be attractive to senior personnel. Notwithstanding the challenges, it would require only a few Reservists appropriately deployed to assist the

²³⁷ Auditor General Report Royal Canadian Mounted Police—Contract Policing, November 2005

efficiency of the deployment model and consequently this option should continue to be considered.

In order to deploy resources effectively, the following options could be considered:

- Adjusting the current shifts as illustrated in the previous examples.
- Creating a fifth team by moving a small number of positions from the other watches and deploying the team on 10-hour shifts, 1800-0400 Wednesday through Saturday.
- Creating a fifth Watch by assigning additional positions from staffing increases and deploying the fifth Watch on 10-hour shifts, 1800-0400 Wednesday through Saturday.
- Examining the potential for deploying *RCMP Reservists** on 8-hour shifts 2000-0400 Fridays and Saturdays.

All or any combination of these options would improve the service to the public in Richmond and make better use of detachment resources.

Recommendation

- 8.1.A The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency implements a shift model that is consistent with the workload.
- This would result in a better service to the public, more effective use of resources and a more even workload distribution for mobile units.

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

There is no reason that a contracted provincial model cannot be sensitive to local conditions, however, currently the RCMP uses a regional or national shift model which makes it difficult for the Detachment to deploy effectively to the workload.

An independent municipal police force

The City of Richmond would have greater influence over the shifting model and the opportunity to establish a model to fit the workload.

Contracting with another municipal police force

The contracting force may wish to use shift models complementing their current deployment. In the event the force's model did not fit the Richmond workload pattern, negotiations should establish a more appropriate deployment to meet the needs of Richmond.

A regional police force

The establishment of a new, regional police force would provide the opportunity to establish shifting models for the region based on workload.

8.2 Investigation and Specialized Units

Premise

Police agencies have difficulty in resourcing all of the specialized investigation areas. No police agency can be all things to all people; however, there continues to be an enormous amount of pressure exerted on police organisations to offer an extremely broad spectrum of capabilities that relate to: law enforcement, emergency response, public order maintenance, assistance to victims of crime, and crime prevention²³⁸. Certain criminal investigations and police response to emergency situations; including but not limited to: homicide, child exploitation, gang investigation, bomb disposal or emergency response team (ERT), to name a few, are more appropriately addressed by the deployment of specialized units and equipment required to provide a more in-depth and concentrated focus. The composition of the units and the mandate for deployment is governed by the needs of the community.

Specialised units are generally comprised of sworn officers who have been selected based upon certain competencies and subsequently trained in the use of specialized equipment and investigational process and procedure. The equipment may range from a canine unit with bomb or drug detection capability, to laser speed-detection devices or identification equipment such as Print Capture Stations. For example, computers with connections to the Internet are the primary hardware associated with Child Exploitation investigation.

In the same way, some police agencies that are unable or choose not to support the employ of highly specialized staff such as forensic experts or to pay for large capital items, such as helicopters, forensic analysis technology, or public order units, share services or contract the function to larger services. Such decisions are important strategic decisions on the part of the Police Board and senior management.

The requirement for these specialized skills and equipment is primarily dependent upon the likely frequency of use and the ease of access to the resources and skills of the other partner agency(s). An additional factor is the ability of the funding agency or government department to maintain sufficient expertise and equipment without the necessity of user fees.

The RCMP is currently engaged, in Richmond, to provide general duty policing services and specialized support services. The Richmond Detachment does not possess a number of police support capabilities; rather, it relies on its organisational relationship, to the RCMP E-Division (the

²³⁸ Paul F. McKenna , Foundations of Policing in Canada. pp.183

provider of provincial policing within British Columbia) to provide the necessary resources. As indicated in a following chapter regarding integrated units, specific examples of specialized services would include, but not be limited to:

- Under Water Recovery Team;
- Forensic Identification Services (FIS);
- Tactical Troop;
- Critical Mass Response To Civil Emergencies;
- Emergency Response Team (ERT);
- Explosives Disposal Unit (Bomb Squad);
- BC Integrated Gang Task Force;
- Integrated Hi-Tech Crime Unit;
- Clandestine Laboratory Search Team;
- Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT);
- Integrated National Security Enforcement Team;
- Graphic Arts & Forensic Video Sections;
- Integrated Sexual Predator Observation Team (ISPOT);
- Integrated Child Exploitation (ICE);
- Violent Incident Classification Linkage & Analysis System (VICLAS);

It is also noted that a proposal²³⁹ has been made to regionalize selected specialist services such as dogs, forensics, and traffic reconstruction. Specialist needs are also location specific. For example, the presence of the international airport within Richmond creates the contractual obligation to have ready access to a bomb-sniffing dog. Some specialist services, such as homicide investigation, are given over to combined RCMP and municipal units such as the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team.

The benefits of the integrated/regionalized services are said²⁴⁰ to include:

- Reduce duplication of administrative costs through centralization.
- Coordinate resources and shifts enabling the efficient management of personnel.
- Reduction of on-call shifts and overtime costs.
- Increased mentorship and information and skills sharing.
- Improved command.
- Increased opportunity for bulk and large capital item purchases.

The report to the Municipal Principal Policing Contacts²⁴¹ identifies the major challenges with the existing arrangement. These include problems regarding:

- Shift coverage and vacancies.
- Training, mentorship and supervision.
- Infrastructure and equipment.
- Accommodations and administrative support.
- Reporting and assessment.

For the partner (funding) municipalities, the crucial question with respect to integrated units is value for money. During the course of the *Review* concern was expressed regarding the

²³⁹ Proposals from RCMP to Mayors Committee.

²⁴⁰ RCMP, report to Principal contacts. Version reviewed by the *Review* was prepared by the "E" Division Integration Team and noted "Not approved by the RCMP"

²⁴¹ September 26, 2006

cost/benefit of the regionalized/integrated units. The answer to this concern must await the final costing of the proposed changes and the accounting for services.²⁴² Establishing specific performance measures can work toward ensuring transparency cost benefit analysis.

McKenna in his discussion, "*Organisational Strategies: Making the Best Use of Resources*", notes that there are a number of areas of specialization which require constant skill maintenance and practice²⁴³. These include:

- Crowd Management;
- Incident Command;
- Hostage Negotiation and Barricaded Person(s)
- Search and Rescue
- Tactical and Emergency Response Units
- Undercover and Surveillance Assignments
- Pornography and Child Exploitation
- Canine Patrol
- Explosive disposal
- Serial Murder, Serious Sexual Assault and Violent Crime
- Missing or Abducted Children.

In the experience of the RCMP LMD, integration of services is the mechanism of choice to address resourcing the specialist needs²⁴⁴. Consequently, the RCMP has been a principal driver of the integration processes. The establishment, for example, of the BC Integrated Gang Task Force and Integrated Homicide Investigation Team illustrates how resources from diverse agencies are brought together, to focus and address specific problems in a community requiring specialist function. The disadvantage for civic administration, the funder of the police service, is that personnel may be deployed outside the community to assist in the investigation of incidents that did not occur within the funding community. Conversely, the funding community can also receive significant extra resourcing to conduct specialised investigations when these occur within the jurisdiction. These resources would be very difficult to fund on a full time basis. The 'Picton' investigation is a case in point. Participation in regionalised services provides, for the lack of a better term, an 'insurance policy' for the participating municipalities and also an opportunity for exposure to higher level investigations for agency staff. The accurate and transparent costing of services and monitoring of use will serve to assure the funding municipalities that the investment, in integrated services, is worthwhile.

Joint Force Operations (JFOs) are another mechanism to ensure an appropriate specialist response. The formation and use of JFOs facilitates the contribution and sharing of human, technical and physical resources between law enforcement partners for a collective purpose on a continuing basis. JFOs are an established practice within Canadian policing. Generally operating within the context of *Memoranda of Understanding*, the combining of resources, in both the short

²⁴² which are outlined in Finance above.

²⁴³ op.cit. pp.166-189.

²⁴⁴ See also Chapter 5.6

and long term, are used by most jurisdictions for strategic and tactical law enforcement purposes such as local -interest files or special projects. JFOs are consistent with RCMP policy which notes that JFOs should be considered in major multi-jurisdictional cases that are in support of national priorities and consistent with the mandated responsibility of the particular resource.

The experience of Canadian Intelligence Service Alberta (CISA) in 1998, is an example of a productive JFO. In this instance the RCMP, the Executive Committee of CISA, and the Government of Alberta engaged in a financial partnership in pursuit of effective strategies to detect, combat, and control organized and serious crime. This same strategic approach, utilizing specialist functions, can be observed in the Organised Crime Agency BC²⁴⁵ which is similar to the structure and authority of municipal police departments in British Columbia, but having a specific mandate to facilitate the disruption and suppression of organized crime which impacts British Columbians.

An audit of specific integrated units operating in the LMD and Richmond RCMP Detachment, in terms of cost/benefit analysis, including calls for service and clearance rates is not within the mandate of this Review.

Recommendation

- 8.2.A The City of Richmond, subject to consultation and a suitable business case, can consider a broad participation in regionalized and specialized services dependent upon the perceived likelihood of use versus the cost. The details of costing and full service options are not yet available from the RCMP. An analysis of cost vs. benefits should be conducted at that time.

²⁴⁵ Since integrated to create the [Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit](#) (CFSEU — BC)

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

The Richmond Detachment, RCMP has the organisational resources, expertise, procedures and policy framework, through its provincial and national mandate to respond to specialized investigations.

An independent municipal police force

The City of Richmond can consider continuing the current integrated functions and determine which specialized functions will be maintained by the municipal police and which functions will be undertaken in cooperation with the RCMP or other agencies through user fee agreements.

Contracting with another municipal police force

A contracted municipal police model will face the same issues as a municipal police agency, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the size of the force.

A regional police force

Regional police will face the same issues as a municipal police agency. They will have to determine which specialized function will be maintained by the police agency and which functions will be undertaken in cooperation with other agencies or through integration agreements.

8.3 Integration

Premise

There are two areas of special interest for the City of Richmond: the assignment of police personnel to integrated units and the discussion surrounding the potential for the Richmond Detachment to integrate with the University (UBC) Detachment.

Richmond Integration Issues

The staffing of integrated units and the LMD shared services provides economies of scale and specialized investigative support when required. During the *Review*, some issues were raised concerning the funding of positions in the integrated units without a corresponding reduction in the staffing of the function within the Richmond Detachment. Based on the previous chapter's description of the advantages of integrated units, this issue may be better considered a business matter and discussed within the general staffing levels of the Detachment rather than a discussion of the effectiveness of the integrated units which is beyond the scope of the *Review*.

City staff also expressed some frustration over the funding and budgeting process for the integrated units; this matter is addressed in the Finance Chapter.

Richmond and University Detachments

The *Review RFP* includes the following:

6. Conduct an Environmental Scan to ascertain the impact of external factors, and future trends, for example: d, University Endowment Lands integration proposal.

The RCMP University Detachment, comprising 17 sworn members, and the University Endowment Lands (UEL) are located on the west side of the City of Vancouver (adjacent to District 4 of the Vancouver Police Department) and geographically isolated from the Richmond Detachment, indeed isolated from any RCMP jurisdiction. The area of the UEL is unincorporated and is administered directly by the Province; consequently there are funding differences between the Richmond and University Detachments²⁴⁶. The UEL is an anomaly: it is adjacent to Vancouver, but being a provincial detachment policing is administered by the Province and provided by the RCMP. The Detachment reports to the RCMP District Office in Surrey.

²⁴⁶ Police Act 3 (1) The government must provide policing and law enforcement services for the following: (a) unincorporated areas of British Columbia.

No reports were provided to the Review on this matter but the concept of integration was mentioned during interviews. Such integration would place the UEL policing functions within the bailiwick of the City of Richmond. However, the City of Richmond has no responsibility for the policing of the UEL.

Location of the University Endowment Lands (A)



Wikipedia

Such integration may provide greater efficiencies for the RCMP and potentially an improved police service for the residents of the UEL²⁴⁷.

The residential population of the UEL was 7,816 in the 2001 census and is listed as 10,831 in the 2006 census; the estimated university population is approximately 40,000; the UEL enjoys a low crime rate²⁴⁸ however disorder issues are a significant issue.

Notwithstanding the low crime rate, other issues create deployment challenges for the University Detachment. There is considerable development underway which will increase density²⁴⁹ as illustrated by the population increase from 2001 to 2006. There are significant numbers of *ad hoc* special-function licensed premises in the UEL, frequent large events staged at the arenas, and the Detachment receives applications for approximately 500 Special

²⁴⁷ It is expected that the community will benefit as a result of the RCMP UBC Detachment having access to a greater range specialized services that are available through the Richmond Detachment and other RCMP resources in addition to establishing protocols for more immediate access to additional manpower available through the Richmond Detachment as required for special events or other emergency requirements. This sharing of Richmond resources is currently conducted on an informal basis. Source: University Neighbourhoods Association web-site, Dec 2005

²⁴⁸ 98 residential break-and-enters (usually student housing) in 2006, 48 motor vehicle thefts, and 499 thefts. Source: RCMP University Detachment correspondence. Note: the 'calls-for-service' data received from PRIME for the Richmond Detachment did not include data regarding the UEL.

²⁴⁹ Density increases crime, see chapter 2

Occasion Licenses per year. Disorder incidents fueled by liquor consumption are an ongoing problem. The Detachment relies on an overtime call out through the RCMP LMD for the policing of special events and during peak periods²⁵⁰. Despite the preparation, unanticipated problems occur and the University Detachment has made requests to the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) for assistance. No compiled record of calls was available from the RCMP, however, the VPD reports having responded on seven occasions, dispatching 38 units, since January 1st 2007²⁵¹. In the event of integration between the University and Richmond Detachments, the lack of contiguity with Richmond would create operational delays and wastages.

The *Review* noted that fire services are provided to the UEL by the Vancouver Fire & Rescue Services²⁵² and a rational approach for policing services may lie with a similar model; however, this is outside the scope of the *Review*.

It may be anticipated that short-term, emergency requests for assistance would more likely be made to Richmond through the shared E-Comm radio dispatcher if the UEL is part of the Richmond Detachment. Police forces willingly and immediately provide assistance when requested, and in the absence of an agreement and without any extraordinary incremental costs, with no expectation of compensation.

Requests for temporary assistance

Police Act 68 (1) The provincial police force, a municipal police department or a designated policing unit must, on receiving a request for temporary assistance made by another police force, police department or designated policing unit, assign to the requesting police force, police department or designated policing unit the officers and equipment practicable to assign for the purpose.

However, for assistance to be anticipated on a regular basis and between different funding sources, it would be essential for there to be support and agreement for the integration to occur and an agreed formula for compensation. In addition, it may be anticipated that the administrative functions of the University Detachment would, if such integration were to occur, be assumed by the Richmond RCMP administration – notwithstanding that the LMD may address administrative details, and a corresponding movement of resources to Richmond would be necessary. It may be possible for an agreement between the City and the provincial government reference to the *Police Act*.

68 (2) A police force, police department or designated policing unit that requests and receives assistance under subsection (1) is responsible for all costs of that assistance.

²⁵⁰ RCMP Report

²⁵¹ VPD assistance: Traffic accident injury, priority 1, eight units; Domestic, priority 1, four units; Traffic accident injury impaired hit & run, priority 2, ten units; B&E in progress, priority 2, five units; B&E in progress, priority 2, four units; Suspicious circumstances, priority 2, five units; Missing person, priority 3, three units.

²⁵² Vancouver Fire & Rescue Services website.

However, the effect of such integration could be to reduce the policing commitment to the City of Richmond.

Recommendation

- 8.3A The City should not consider the integration of the University Detachment with the Richmond Detachment.

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing

Integration with the University Detachment creates the potential for reduced policing levels in Richmond. The City should not consider the integration of the University Detachment with the Richmond Detachment.

An independent municipal police force

The City of Richmond can consider, by fiscal and skills necessity, participation in the integration of some police services, for example ERT, Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT), Police Dog Services (PDS), as opposed to providing such services as stand-alone units within the City.

The integration with the University Detachment would not be an option.

Contracting with another municipal force or a Regional police force

The integration with the University Detachment would not be an option - unless the Vancouver Police Department was part of the regional model or was the contracting municipal force, in which case a rationalization of the UEL policing would occur.

8.4 Differential Response

Premise

Non-urgent calls for service account for the majority of police responses, over seventy-percent. Although not urgent, these calls from the public are an important part of the policing service and must be addressed appropriately to ensure both service to the public and the capture of data that provides background on crime level and workload.

Police Response to Calls for Service

The evolution of current methodologies for police response is based upon the police responding to calls for service from the public²⁵³. As the workload has increased, the police have redefined the types of calls they will attend and introduced differential responses and priorities for the calls that they do attend. The process is usually intended to reduce the number of calls attended by police so that available resources may be used more effectively. The long standing problem for police in many jurisdictions²⁵⁴, and a cause of considerable public frustration, is the delayed response to routine, non emergency investigations. Although requiring the police to attend, they are not urgent – in the priorities of the police – but there is often a considerable wait before the police arrive. This inconveniences the victim, may jeopardize the gathering of evidence and impacts the public satisfaction of the police service.

In Richmond, lower priority calls represent the majority of calls for service (41.5% priority-3 and 30.8% priority-4 calls) and it is in this area where there are opportunities to enhance service for the public and more effectively use personnel. Differential response can facilitate a process whereby the Detachment can provide a better service in the event major incidents disrupt the normal pattern of calls or the number of high priority calls for service increase to the point where response times are significantly compromised. Managing calls for service obviates the need for increased personnel to deal with increases in 'calls for service', which is sometimes a rationale used to solicit more resources. PRIME also offers an excellent opportunity to maximize the advantages of the one-time entry of data. This again saves personnel time by reducing labour intensive data entry.

²⁵³ See, for example, Utilizing Activity-Based Timing to Analyze Police Service Delivery, Malm. A, et al, .Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 2007, 7 (5)

²⁵⁴ In 1981, the Vancouver Police Department Communication Section identified effective and responsive processing of citizens' non-urgent calls as the greatest challenge facing the Section. The responses included adopting a mail-in follow-up crime report in an attempt to provide enhanced service. In 2007, providing a timely service for non-urgent calls for service was identified to the Review as a major issue Police response time for non emergency calls has also been an issue in Calgary AB. In the more outlying areas of Halifax District there is still a public expectation that all calls for police service, including issues such as minor theft with no suspect, will result in an officer attending

Currently the Detachment routine-call response times²⁵⁵ are within accepted norms: 44 minutes 45 seconds for Priority-3 and 62 minutes 12 seconds for Priority-4.

Enhanced Call Management

The *Review* identified two police departments²⁵⁶ which had established telephone response functions; the first originally comprised of incapacitated police officers (often pregnancy or injury) working in the communication centre to assist in the processing of routine calls. Using the call-waiting display, the officers contact complainants by phone and conduct an initial investigation. Most of the information for the incident report can be completed at this time. The officers were also able to provide practical advice regarding what items of evidence can be moved and what items or areas to protect for forensic examination. The result appeared to be more successful than anticipated and the program was changed to a regular assignment (although incapacitated personnel have priority) and the program expanded.

Often, the telephone investigations are sufficient and the complainants do not require the presence of the police. Normally, the majority of the incident reports are completed electronically and the investigating field units are required only to add the details of the investigations at the scenes and evidence recovery. The attending officers are able to access the interim reports completed by the telephone officers through PRIME

The program was expanded further, and renamed Enhanced Call Management, to include direct integration with specialized field units: the patrol division deploys alternate-response units and two similar units are deployed directly by the supervisor of the communication centre. These units are staffed by one officer and are assigned the lower priority calls, making appointments with the complainants via cell phones. In addition, scenes-of-crime officer (SOCO)²⁵⁷ units are directed to the incidents where trace evidence is likely.

The department considers the program to have been successful in providing a better service to victims of crime and in processing information and investigations more efficiently. The research study is not yet completed. The next stage of the measurement will be qualitative with all complainants contacted, both those who received the *Enhanced Call Management* service and a control group who received police service in the traditional manner²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁵ Time call received to the arrival of the police.

²⁵⁶ London, Ontario and Vancouver.

²⁵⁷ SOCO (Scene of Crime Officer) personnel are trained to recover trace evidence but are not certified as Forensic Officers

²⁵⁸ The program is being evaluated by Darryl Plecas, RCMP Research Chair, Director, ICURS - University College of the Fraser Valley Research Lab.

A similar analysis of calls for service has been conducted at the Surrey Detachment. This research will be expanded to all RCMP detachments next year²⁵⁹.

The Richmond detachment has forwarded to E-Comm a list of “actions” to be used with incoming calls to the detachments mobile units. Currently, however, the detachment has no call management system that ensures efficient use of personnel and the continued capture of incident data balanced with customer service. The 70% of calls classified as priority 3 and 4 may be subject for review regarding an appropriate categorization of incidents which may lend themselves to alternate call management methods.

Another strategy, an extension of call management, for dealing with non-urgent calls for service is evident in the London (Ontario) Police Service. Here, a differential-response process assigns urgent calls to the patrol function and routine or less urgent calls are assigned to an Alternate Response Unit. The remaining calls are those in which investigation via telephone is an adequate approach to address the request for service and non-busy staff from other units proactively take the calls and conduct a telephone investigation.

Recommendation

- 8.4.A The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency establishes a process to provide the most efficient differential response process and enhanced call management.
- This may also provide important opportunities to utilize police officer’s skills from officers temporarily unable to perform field functions.
 - This process should not only refine the prioritization of incoming calls and their direction for investigation but also consider the employment of a telephone response function which provides service to the public, ensures the preservation of evidence, and gathers important incident data.
 - It also permits a more effective use of all personnel, both field officers and those whom are unable to perform field functions. While civilian employees could be trained to fulfill such activities that would detract from the valuable human resource accommodation for sworn members.

Model Options

All policing models can be sensitive to local conditions and implement an effective differential response process and enhanced call management: contracted, municipal, and regional.

²⁵⁹ Darryl Plecas, RCMP Research Chair, Director, ICURS - University College of the Fraser Valley Research Lab.

9.1 E-Comm

Premise

Effective communication, including processing calls for service from the public and the dispatch of police resources, requires a highly sophisticated process sufficiently flexible to deal with routine daily operations and large events, whether crime, accidents, or natural disasters.

The Emergency Communications Centre (E-Comm) provides emergency communication services and support systems, through a 9-1-1 call centre, radio and dispatch systems to emergency responders and the two-million residents of southwest B.C.

E-Comm is governed under the *Emergency Communications Corporation Act (1997)* and is incorporated under the *BC Business Corporation Act*. As a cost-recovery model, E-Comm is structured as a non-profit entity.²⁶⁰

The E-Comm building is a post-disaster facility. The 70,000 square-foot reinforced concrete structure is designed to resist a major earthquake and to operate self-sufficiently for up to 72-hours following a natural disaster.

E-Comm processes police calls for service by receiving incoming calls for service from the public and either forwarding them to the police of jurisdiction, for example, Surrey RCMP or servicing the call within E-Comm and undertaking the dispatch function for the jurisdictional police²⁶¹ as in the case of the Richmond RCMP Detachment.

The most salient question for the participating police agencies is whether to have calls for service and dispatching performed within E-Comm using E-Comm staff or to have the calls forwarded to the jurisdiction where local communication staff will service the call and dispatch. The advantages of the local jurisdiction processing the workload include: closer association between the local field/support staff and communication staff, and local policies and protocols are likely easier to manage and harmonize with the local needs. The advantage of E-Comm is the steady supply of trained operators, and the savings in capital on the purchase of a specialized facility and telecommunications equipment.

²⁶⁰ E-Comm costs are discussed in the Finance Chapter

²⁶¹ Bowen Island RCMP, Freeway RCMP, Richmond RCMP, Ridge Meadows RCMP, Sunshine Coast RCMP, UBC RCMP, Whistler & Pemberton RCMP, Vancouver Police Department, and St'l'a't'imx Tribal Police.

To adequately respond to the current call load, Richmond requires 2.5 (FTE²⁶²) communication staff operating 24/7. To staff this number of positions locally would require approximately eleven personnel with little flexibility. However, the efficiencies of the E-Comm model provide one dispatcher, and one information operator (which is shared with Ridge-Meadows for the .5 position). The call-taking functions are shared amongst the RCMP Detachments, with the Report Agents (E-Comm staff) taking non-attendance files, including such things as missing persons and stolen vehicles.

The advantages of the E-Comm process include: greater flexibility and economies of scale, and perhaps most importantly, the ability to reassign on-duty resources in the event of a major incident or disaster.

The Richmond Detachment area includes the Vancouver International Airport, and Richmond will host a number of Olympic events. These factors weigh heavily in favour of the current Richmond – E-Comm relationship.

Recommendation

9.1.A The City of Richmond should continue the current E-Comm relationship regarding the processing of calls and dispatch.

Model Options

The E-Comm process can provide service to any of the policing models

²⁶² Full time equivalent

9.2 PRIME & RMS

Premise

BC is the first jurisdiction in the country to adopt a province-wide, online police records management system that provides interoperability among all policing agencies in the province.

Since April 2003, the *British Columbia Police Act* specifies that all police agencies will implement and use one common Records Management System (RMS) for the enhancement of public safety and law enforcement services delivered to the Province. PRIME-BC (Police Records Information Management Environment for British Columbia), is intended to connect every municipal police department and RCMP detachment throughout the province and provide access to information about criminals and crimes instantly to all police agencies. PRIME provides ease of entry and access for incident data. Richmond Detachment, the Vancouver Police Department, and the Port Moody Police Department, were the first jurisdictions to move to PRIME in 2003.

The roll out of PRIME continues and the anticipated date for every police jurisdiction to implement the use of PRIME is 2008. PRIME is currently addressing and correcting operational technical difficulties. The data warehouse project is progressing on schedule with five agencies participating in the pilot project. It is anticipated that the warehouse will be providing data to agencies by February 2008; each agency will be responsible for their analysis software (such as i2)²⁶³.

PRIME consists of the following components:

- RMS—Records Management System
- CAD—Computer Aided Dispatch
- MDT—Mobile Data Terminal
- MRE—Mobile Reporting Environment
- TRC—Telephone Reporting Centre TRC
- DRE—Direct Report Entry

Recommendation

- 9.2.A The City of Richmond should continue the current use of PRIME.
- PRIME provides a province-wide data management system and is mandatory under provincial regulation.

Model Options

PRIME will provide the same service for any of the Richmond policing models.

²⁶³ Security Programs and Police Technology

9.3 Crime Analysis - Software

Premise

PRIME provides raw data to the organization, but specialized software is required for timely detailed analyses.

The data warehouse project is progressing on schedule with five agencies participating in the pilot project. It is anticipated that the warehouse will be providing data to agencies by February 2008; each agency will be responsible for their analysis software (such as i2)²⁶⁴.

Irvine Police Department (California), the winner of the 2006 International Association of Chiefs of Police and Choice Point *Excellence in Criminal Investigations Award*, uses ArcView GIS, CrimeMap software (produced by GeoSpatial Technologies), and Rigel geographic profiling software (produced by ECRI). The Department, with a staff of 165 sworn officers, has five full-time crime analysts.

The Vancouver Police Department uses ArcGIS - the current industry standard - and is in the process of acquiring i2, supplementary software. PRIME data are dumped into the department's system at 0300 hrs daily allowing for daily analyses of incidents. The department has twelve analysts: four for the general duty function, six in the central analysis unit, and one investigative analyst in both the robbery and sexual offences function. Additional software used by the department includes: Excel (for compiling of spreadsheets, MS Access for data searching and collation, and Microsoft SQL for detailed searching of data warehouses and databases.

The Delta Police Service, visited by the *Review*, has a crime analysis section of three staff: one crime analyst working with the general duty function, one intelligence analyst working with the investigative function, and one data operator. The section is equipped with state-of-the-art computer and software equipment.

The Calgary Police Service has a crime analysis unit of five crime analysts, including geographic analyses, robbery & sexual offences analyses, intelligence analyses, and drug analyses. The unit uses ArcGIS for mapping and i2 software for data mining. In addition, a sixth analyst conducts long-term strategic analyses.

The costs of the specialized software programs are sometimes seen as high: the larger forces may invest up to \$150,000 and the smaller organisations \$70,000. When compared to the funding

²⁶⁴ Security Programs and Police Technology

for the general duty function alone (usually forty to fifty percent of an organization's budget), the cost of tools to accurately deploy resources, while significant, is the equivalent of only one or two person years. Failure to fully utilize PRIME data in a jurisdiction can result in ineffective and undirected general patrol²⁶⁵.

The Richmond Detachment was one of the original PRIME sites and has used PRIME since 2003. The Detachment uses Excel software for the crime analysis function. The Detachment has one person dedicated to Crime analysis and a second position has been approved, but not yet deployed.

During the course of the Review it was reported that the Richmond crime analysis function has been equipped with iBase database software.

Recommendation

9.3.A The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency uses industry-standard technology to assist in crime analysis and workload analysis.

Model Options

The *Review* found varying degrees of technical solutions in various locations and the crime analysis function can be equally effective under any of the models.

²⁶⁵ Note: The *Review* analysis identified only 2% of reported incidents were "on view" or initiated by police.

9.4 Mass Stolen Property Investigation

Premise

Without technical support, the investigation of thousands of non-identifiable items of stolen property is limited.²⁶⁶

The mass of non-identifiable stolen property poses significant investigative challenges. In 2005 there were a reported 8600 property crimes in Richmond, 44,300 in Vancouver, and 3400 in Delta, totaling 56,300 property crimes in the immediate vicinity of Richmond.²⁶⁷ The majority of the stolen property is easily disposable. It is estimated that only 2% of property is identifiable by serial numbers and is entered onto CPIC (Canadian Police Information Centre)²⁶⁸. The remaining 98% is reported by description only, posing a seemingly insurmountable problem for investigators.

Valuable, but unidentifiable, stolen property can often easily be exchanged into cash through secondhand stores or pawn shops. Notwithstanding the best intentions of the operators, it may be difficult to guard against stolen items in the midst of thousands of such sales.

The majority of municipalities have bylaws regulating the reporting of secondhand property transactions (buying of secondhand property). However, the paper reporting process is ineffective when the number of reports is in the thousands. It is estimated that there are 400,000 such transactions annually in Vancouver alone.

The *Review* identified two electronic reporting systems in use in Canada, Xtract and BWI (Business Watch International). A number of BC municipalities have enacted bylaws making electronic reporting the preferred method, including: Vancouver, Kelowna, Chilliwack, and Richmond. It should be noted that not only can an electronic system assist in the sales of property, but can equally assist investigators in identifying property recovered during investigations.

In November 2001, Vancouver City Council approved the implementation of an on-line internet reporting system called Xtract to track inventory deposited at secondhand shops against stolen property reports. Since that time, Xtract has become the cornerstone of the Property Crime and Anti-Fencing Unit intelligence-led policing in Vancouver²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁶ Non-identifiable – not identified by a serial number

²⁶⁷ Police Service Division website

²⁶⁸ a 24/7 data system accessible by police officers in the field

²⁶⁹ Report to Vancouver Council September 2005

The City of Richmond, Business Regulation Bylaw no. 7538 (June 28, 2003) s.19.3 states:

Subject to section 19.4, every second-hand dealer and pawnbroker must:

- (a) maintain the register electronically in a form approved by the Police Chief;*
- (b) record all information in the register electronically;*
- (c) immediately after the purchase of each second-hand item, or taking property on pawn, transmit to the Police Chief electronically, to a specified database via the Internet and using a site licence and password provided by the Police Chief, a report of the transaction in the electronic register;*

The Vancouver Police Department investigated the need for a technical solution to the identification of mass stolen property. Initially, they examined *Leads on Line*, a US-based system. The US model was not usable due to it being inconsistent with BC's *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* and, in addition, investigative searches were slow and the system was not compatible with PRIME.

Xtract was developed in Vancouver to be compatible with PRIME. The system records secondhand property transactions and every 24 hours (at 0300 hours) compares all property by serial number to CPIC and – more importantly - by descriptors to PRIME. The system prepares a daily report of potential matches allowing investigators to quickly recover stolen property and identify the potential offenders. The system continues to compare the reported property daily so that even where property is finally reported stolen day or months, or even years, after it was first recorded by Xtract, it is identified through the overnight report. The key element in the Xtract model is the interface with PRIME and the ability to search for property by descriptors alone without serial numbers.

Business Watch International (BWI) developed a system that is operating in a number of jurisdictions across Canada. At this point, the BWI system is not compatible with PRIME. There have been discussions regarding the relative merits of both Canadian systems but as yet there has been no province-wide decision to implement such a system.

In July 2007, the B.C. Court of Appeal struck down a New Westminster bylaw that required second-hand dealers and pawnshops to report personal information to the police regarding persons selling or pawning property. The ruling will apply to all BC municipalities except Vancouver, which has its own city charter. Other municipalities rely on the Community Charter and the court found that when New Westminster enacted the bylaw, it exceeded its powers.

At this point, it is not know whether bylaws will be re-written to resolve the privacy issues, whether provincial legislation may replace the necessity of individual municipalities addressing this issue, or whether the matter will remain unresolved.

Recommendation

- 9.4.A The City of Richmond should ensure the policing agency uses suitable technology to assist in the identification of property, and, subject to legislation providing the authority, to assist in the electronic reporting of secondhand property sales.
- The technology must be able to interface with CPIC and PRIME.

Model Options

The *Review* found technical solutions and electronic reporting bylaws in various police jurisdictions and the process can be equally effective under any of the policing models.

Options and Process of Change

10.1 Introduction

The determination of an appropriate policing service for the City of Richmond is a very significant strategic decision. Subsequent tasks for consideration will include:

- The development and establishment of approaches and processes that support the safety and security requirements of the community.
- Determination of costs of the proposed changes.
- The ongoing monitoring and honing of management, administrative and operational strategies of the police agency.

This series of decisions with respect to policing will have impact on the level of taxes, the sense of well-being in the community, and how the City projects itself to residents, community agencies, businesses and those individuals or corporations who may contemplate moving to the City.

Although not an everyday occurrence, the transfer of police responsibilities does occur. Such moves have been less common in British Columbia than they have been in, for example, Ontario²⁷⁰ and other, international, jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. However, the examination of the options and intra- and inter-agency service enhancements are more commonplace and have been a recurrent theme in BC for several decades. The intensity of this debate has become more acute over the past five years²⁷¹.

Generally, the transfer of responsibility between agencies or the facilitation of rationalization, regionalization, integration or amalgamation of services²⁷² is brought about by one of two requirements; namely:

- The occurrence of a precipitous event such as allegations of mismanagement or the highlighting of flaws in agency processes or procedures such as lost communication in a pursuit across jurisdictional borders (as was the case in the Ottawa-Carlton amalgamation); or
- The desire to improve the quality of performance or reduction of costs through the engagement of a new service provider or the adoption of combined service of one or more agencies.

While espousing service enhancements, the BC provincial government is reluctant to support fragmentation of services²⁷³:

²⁷⁰ Restructuring of Police Services in Ontario, Ministry of Solicitor General of Ontario, 1997

²⁷¹ See, for example, Wood, D., *To Regionalize or Not to Regionalize? A Study in the Politics of Policing in the Greater Vancouver Regional District*, Police Practice and Research, Vol. 8, 3, July 2007

²⁷² All four terms are used commonly and, almost, synonymously in the literature.

²⁷³ Information received through the interview process.

From a government perspective, “Integration of service continues to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policing through the consolidation of police jurisdictions and creation of specialized units²⁷⁴.” As well, “The Solicitor General supports centralizing those services that are highly technical, capital intensive and specialized while, at the same time, decentralizing those functions that provide service directly to the public²⁷⁵.”

The problem for the City then is to decide upon the correct balance of several, often competing, factors. Although cost containment is crucial, the decision to change to an alternative policing model is rarely simply one of seeking the policing service with the lowest cost. Municipal administrations and elected representatives are now more attuned to the importance of effective oversight, well developed and executed strategic planning processes and due diligence of budgetary processes. As outlined in the report, these are all matters which can be addressed, to a greater or lesser degree, with any of the service model options.

Given the experience in the amalgamations conducted in Ontario²⁷⁶ and based upon the review of the issues as they pertain to Richmond, legislation, adequacy of service, human resources and equipment and facilities are considered important matters to consider. These are discussed below.²⁷⁷

10.2 Legislation - Contractual Ministry Perspectives

Model Options

The current contract with the RCMP for policing – 2007-2012

The *Municipal Policing Agreement*, April 1st 1992, provides for a governance model by which the City of Richmond can enhance its involvement in setting objectives, priorities and goals for the *Municipal Police Unit* (the Richmond Detachment). Notwithstanding anticipation of a new agreement effective April 2012, the City can consider changing the current reporting relationship as described earlier in this report for the duration of the current agreement.

Although there are contractual limitations to the degree of involvement that the City can pursue with regards the internal administration of the RCMP detachment, evidence gathered throughout the course of the *Review* suggest that, approached appropriately, the City is still

²⁷⁴ Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, BC, Service Plan, 2005/06-2007/08.

²⁷⁵ Police Services, 2003.

²⁷⁶ For example, Ottawa amalgamation with Nepean and Gloucester

²⁷⁷ Cost of service is also a principal factor in the determination of the service. The costing of services was outside the mandate of this review. The Surry report, discussed in Finance, above details some of the issues to be considered in costing.

able to influence some of these processes and effect reasonable change. These changes will facilitate better communication between the City and the RCMP, improved planning and monitoring and enhanced resourcing and deployment. Ultimately, this means better service to the public.

Other issues, such as management style or reporting of crime and incident data are simply a matter of requesting such action or data from the OIC. Many of the issues raised and discussed in this report pertain to appropriate accountability or good management practices on the part of the police. Failure to comply with a reasonable request within the terms of the *Agreement* proffered by the mayor or Principal Police Contact should result in documentation of the failures and notification of the officer commanding in the District. Ultimately, continued failure to comply is a breach of the *Agreement*.

A contract with the RCMP for policing – 2012

The City of Richmond, through the UBCM and in negotiations with the Province of British Columbia, can consider putting forward a governance model and other approaches, as described in the report, for inclusion in future agreements.

An independent municipal police force

Policing in British Columbia has undergone considerable rationalization and regionalization of services. There have been a number of RCMP detachments grouped into districts. For example, the municipalities and police forces of Abbotsford (RCMP) and Matsqui were amalgamated in 1995, and the municipal police forces of Victoria and Esquimalt were amalgamated in 2003. PRIME-BC was introduced in 2003. The philosophy within the police community and the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General is one of creating a seamless delivery of police services. It is likely that the establishment of an independent municipal force would be seen by the Ministry as fragmentation of policing and contrary to this philosophy. The *Act* stipulates that such changes in policing are subject to the approval of the Minister.

The *Police Act* is silent on the municipal takeover of an RCMP jurisdiction.

Contracting with another municipal police force

The issues discussed in the independent municipal police force example above may also be salient – to a lesser degree - in the event the City of Richmond considered contracting police

services to another municipal force. There are three municipal forces bordering Richmond: Vancouver, Delta, and New Westminster.

The sworn-officer staffing levels of the three forces are 1174, 151, and 107 respectively²⁷⁸ with the Richmond Detachment having 192²⁷⁹ officers. If the police forces of Delta or New Westminster provided the policing for the City of Richmond, Council would be in the position of providing the majority of funding for the police services of both cities without the commensurate governance rights unless these are negotiated as part of the policing agreement.

The VPD is currently structured in four districts. In the event that the Vancouver Police Department provided police services, Richmond may be seen as a fifth “district” of the VPD. It may be envisioned that to be acceptable to Council, the governance and reporting relationship could be negotiated satisfactorily and evidence of a “Richmond community” service incorporated into the agreement. This may include vehicles marked with “Richmond” insignia; consistency in personnel assignments; and community based hiring and promotional policies which reflect community values and demographics and proportional representation on the Police Board.

A regional police force

It may be considered that to be successful, a regional force must comprise forces contiguous to Richmond. By definition, this must include one or more of the Vancouver, Burnaby, New Westminster, and Delta police organizations.

The difference between the previous model of contracted police service and the regional is the nature of amalgamation of the municipal police forces and police boards under the *Police Act*.

In the case of Burnaby, policed by the Burnaby RCMP Detachment, the regionalization may be considered easier as both currently use the same police force. There would then not be the need to meld cultures, strategies and policies of an RCMP and a municipal service. However, as the economies of scale and support from the LMD and ‘E’ Division are already in place for jurisdictions, cost and effectiveness are unlikely to be increased.

²⁷⁸ Police Services Division Report Dec 2005

²⁷⁹ Number provided by R. Paysen, RCMP, Richmond Detachment.

A regional service can, of course, be introduced on a piece-meal basis. An arrangement could be put in motion with one police service progressing, over a given period, to one or more of the remaining agencies.

It should be noted that section 18 of the *Police Act* (providing for the amalgamation of police departments) appears not to apply to Richmond as it does not have a police board and police department. As in the event of any change in police model, negotiation with the provincial minister will be required.

10.3 Human Resources

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing – 2012

If the current contract is renewed or renegotiated, it is anticipated that there will not be significant human resource issues. Those that are outlined in this report can be placed on the table for negotiation into any new agreements.

An independent municipal police force
Contracting with another municipal police force
A regional police force

These options can be discussed as one since the human resource challenges are similar.

The Richmond Detachment will have over 200 police officers by 2012. This circumstance cannot be compared to the Abbotsford-Matsqui or Victoria-Esquimalt amalgamations. In the former example, the number of officers required was quite modest and was facilitated through a plan to pre-hire and train one third of the required number, hire experienced officers from other forces, and retain a number of current Abbotsford RCMP personnel. In the later case, the existing staff remained in place.

In Cape Breton, policing was originally split across Cape Breton Regional Municipality (CBRM) with the RCMP providing police services in the former county areas and municipal police forces provided services in the incorporated towns and the City of Sydney. In 2000, following a debate relating to the consolidation of policing, it was determined to amalgamate the municipal forces into the Cape Breton Regional Police which would also assume policing responsibility for the county areas. The current force comprises 179 sworn officers; the expanded responsibility required the hiring of 26 additional officers.

The Ottawa-Carlton Police amalgamation provides an example of how the development of a new structure and service delivery model captured the important elements of addressing the policing needs of the communities being served. In undertaking the amalgamation processes there were a number of issue areas identified by the Ottawa service²⁸⁰ that needed to be addressed. These included:

- Strategic analysis - highlighting provincial and national trends and a focus on the demographics of the immediate area as an indication of the demand for police service.
- Financial overview - discussion of the operating budget in terms of revenue and expenditure issues and an examination of the capital budget.
- Planning process - identifying the process to achieve the objectives of amalgamation.
- Police service delivery - reflecting the input from staff, public and determination of an organisational structure consistent with the principles underpinning the amalgamation process.
- Adequacy of police service - ensuring that public and officer safety is maintained.
- Next steps - outlining the tasks required to implement the proposed organisational structure and service delivery model.

The report outlining the amalgamation process demonstrates that the by-product of the new organisation structure and delivery of police services is an adequate and effective service provided to the citizens of Ottawa-Carlton, predicated on the principles of professionalism, safety and accountability²⁸¹.

The Ontario amalgamation examples are not truly helpful for comparison as the organizations were all under the umbrella of the province, both in terms of the *Police Act* and the pension scheme. Each proposed amalgamation is reviewed by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services. These amalgamations occur, primarily, for two reasons. First, brought about by a precipitous event, such as an inability to police effectively due to absence of communication system such as a pursuit across jurisdictional boundaries; or, secondly, a combined decision by police boards of contiguous jurisdictions to effect change to improve costing of services.

In 1997, the Vancouver Police Department assumed policing responsibilities for the Vancouver Port when the *Ports Canada Police* was discontinued. This example is also not helpful to the Richmond discussion as the number of personnel was small and the new Waterfront Team of the VPD was comprised of existing VPD personnel and one previous member of the Ports Canada Police who individually joined the VPD.

Likewise, the Saint John Police Force, New Brunswick, assumed responsibility for the policing of the Port of Saint John. Most of the service responsibilities were incorporated into the

²⁸⁰ Randy Mar, Ottawa –Carlton Regional Police Service, *Ottawa-Carlton Police Amalgamation Report*, November 1996

²⁸¹ Randy Mar, November 1996, *ibid*.

municipal services and personnel selection criteria were established and the amalgamation took place at a much smaller scale the Richmond potential situation

In 1998, the Codiac Regional RCMP (New Brunswick) was formed, including all but three of the incumbent sworn officers from the former Moncton and Dieppe police forces.

In 1969 and 1974, over 140 police forces and over 100,000 police officers were reorganized into 43 regional police forces in England and Wales. The transition was seamless as existing smaller forces became, intact, divisions of the new regional forces, and divisions were assigned as appropriate to neighbouring forces, with personnel and sections remaining in place.

In 1950, the British Columbia Provincial Police was absorbed into the RCMP and the RCMP has provided the provincial police service since that time.

The *RCMP Act*, Section 20, provides for such developments:

Taking over other police forces

(4) There may be included in any arrangement made under subsection (1) or (2) provision for the taking over by the Force of officers and other members of any provincial or municipal police force.

The *Act* is silent on the concept of an RCMP jurisdiction being taken over by a different police agency.

In the event of a transition to a non-RCMP model option, the more of the existing personnel in Richmond that remain in place, then the easier the task of effecting a seamless and safe transfer of policing responsibility to a new organization. In order to facilitate this requirement, support will be required from all levels of government and organizations involved.

In the course of research for the *Review*, the Justice Institute, Police Academy indicated that it has the ability to increase capacity to accommodate additional selection and training of new personnel. The current costs of officer training are estimated to be \$9,000.00 paid by the recruit. The Finance section of this report details the current cost to the City of RCMP training.

One significant issue will be the ability for RCMP personnel to transfer their pensions from the federal plan, intact, to the British Columbia provincial plan. Precedent does exist for such a transfer where MOUs have been established and transfers allowed between federal and municipal pension plans²⁸². This issue has been described earlier in the report.

²⁸² For example, Regional Municipality of Halifax

10.4 Equipment and Facilities

Model Options

A contract with the RCMP for policing – 2012

If the current contract is renewed or renegotiated, it is anticipated that there will not be significant equipment and facilities issues. Equipment transfer and cost is outlined in the *Municipal Agreement* and addressed in the Finance section of this report. Process Four, consulting architects, have been engaged by the City to develop plans for a public safety facility that will be able to accommodate either a new RCMP agency or a municipal department. It is estimated that there will be a difference in personnel numbers for each. Also, an RCMP purpose built facility must meet federal building and accommodation codes which are more stringent than would apply to a municipal agency.

An independent municipal police force

There will be significant start-up costs in the establishment of a municipal force: issues such as recruitment and selection, uniforms, vehicles, firearms, special equipment for units such as ERT, forensics (such as Scenes of Crimes Officers), information technology and relevant software, automated fingerprint recognition equipment and software, detention facilities and security cameras, and other like equipment. Other variable costs such as source-witness protection will also need to be considered given the potential significant liability that may accrue to the City. Presently, all cost of liability is absorbed by the RCMP as part of the service agreement. The actual threat of liability and, consequently the draw on that insurance, is a moot point. Some interviewees suggested that actual claims were rare and of relatively minor value. There are a plethora of other costs the consideration of which are outside the mandate of this review and should be subject to a separate analysis. The liability costs would also impact the terms of the contract with another municipal or a regional force.

As the RCMP control CPIC services and selected other equipment, as with other police agencies, arrangements would have to be made for service cost options. In addition, the ownership of the operational data relevant to Richmond detachment was brought into question during the research phase of the *Review*. The status of this information should be established as soon as possible.

Some services, such as air support or dive teams, may be subject to contract with another police service such as the RCMP or a contiguous agency or private industry.

Contracting with another municipal police force

It can be anticipated that although start-up costs will be less than for the municipal model, the City will need to replace the RCMP complement of personnel with similar number of regional staff. It is further likely that there will be a similar division of labour and location between various units.

A regional police force

The most significant aspect of a regional model on facilities would be where the HQ functions will be located. In a regional model excluding Vancouver, Richmond, as the largest component, will be the logical choice for the HQ and associated functions.

As noted, Process Four is currently engaged to assess the facility needs of an RCMP detachment or a municipal service. Such a design could incorporate any combination of police model options.

If the VPD provided the policing, the Richmond facilities' needs would likely remain as they are for the RCMP model.

10.5 Processes of change – see Appendix 10

APPENDICES

Appendix 2

Appendix 2.1

2.1.1 First Nations Police Services²⁸³

Aboriginal police officers of the RCMP who serve in aboriginal communities are funded through a cost sharing arrangement between the federal and provincial governments. These arrangements are sometimes based upon a community tripartite agreement (CTA) between the federal government, the province, and the First Nations community. This is a First Nations Community Policing Service (RCMP-FNCPS). In other cases, the arrangement is not subject to any signed agreement. This is referred to as an Aboriginal Community Constables Program (RCMP-ACCP). In BC, there are approximately 120 First Nations Communities, with or without CTAs, which receive a police service.

There are also First Nations self-administered police services which are modeled on the provisions of the Police Act which allow for independent municipal police services. These operate under the governance of a board and are jointly funded by the federal and provincial governments.

As First Nations land claims are settled, it is likely that such First Nations policing arrangements will be subject to negotiation, including possible expansion.

Where reserves exist within urban boundaries, such as Vancouver arrangements are made with local police services to provide services on reserves. The Vancouver Police provide service, on contract, to the Musqueam Reserve in south-west Vancouver.

²⁸³ This summary of the First Nations and the Designated Policing Units is sourced in the BC Handbook for Boards which provides a succinct account of policing alternatives.

2.1.2 Designated Policing Units

Designated Policing Units may be established by the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General under the authority of s.4.1 (2) of the *Police Act*. A Designated Policing Unit status is granted to an “entity” such as a municipality (but does not include a municipality with a population of more than 5 000 persons), regional district, government corporation, or any other prescribed entity and allows for “designated policing” which means policing and law enforcement provided in place of or supplemental to the policing and law enforcement otherwise provided by the provincial police force or a municipal police department..

The Minister may also appoint members of the Board of the Unit (s.4.1 (9) *Police Act*) which can then appoint “designated constables” who have the powers, immunities and duties of a provincial constable, subject to any restrictions set out in their appointment and the regulation.

The Minister may make regulations regarding the designated policing units and their boards such as,

- The geographic area in which the unit and its constables operate
- The practices, procedures and quorum of boards
- The boards powers, duties and functions
- Standards of training and retraining of designated constables

The entity which is granted the rights and obligations under the Act is jointly and severally liable for torts committed by any of its designated constables if the tort is committed in the performance of the officer’s duties (s.20(1) *Police Act*). The respective board members are not liable in such a situation. (s.20(2) *Police Act*)

The Minister may also appoint the designated law enforcement unit which is a supplemental law enforcement provided to enforce all or any part or one or more enactments of BC or Canada.

The Minister may make regulations regarding designated law enforcement units and their boards such as,

- The geographic area in which the unit and its constables operate
- The practices, procedures and quorum of boards
- The board powers, duties and functions
- Powers, duties and functions of chief officers, deputy chief officers and enforcement officers
- Standards of training and retraining of designated constables
- Accommodation, equipment and supplies of the designated law enforcement unit

Examples of Designated Police Units in urban settings include the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Police Service (GVTAPS) and the Organized Crime Agency of BC²⁸⁴.

²⁸⁴ Now the CFSEU Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit

Appendix 2.2

Jurisdictions included in the urban analysis of crime-cost producing variables.
100,000 plus populations.

Richmond
Halifax
Regina
Abbotsford
Delta
Niagara Falls
London
Victoria
St. John's
Cape Breton
Moncton
Gatineau
Laval
Levis
Longueuil
Montreal
Quebec
Sherbrooke
Terrebonne
Trois-Rivieres
Barrie
Chatham-Kent
Durham
Guelph
Sudbury
Halton
Hamilton
Kingston
Ottawa
Peel
Thunder Bay
Toronto
Waterloo
Windsor
York
Winnipeg
Saskatoon
Calgary
Edmonton
Saanich
Vancouver
Burnaby
Coquitlam
Kelowna
Surrey

Appendix 2.2.1 Methodology

In order to minimize the possibility of biased results due to problems associated with degrees of freedom (which speaks to the ratio of number of cases to number of independent variables), separate models were run for each of the above seven categories of variables. From these seven models it was determined the variables within each category/model that significantly impact the dependent variables (cost per capita and crime rate). The significant variables from these models were then included in a final model allowing the determination how these categories of variables perform once placed together in an overall model. Table 5 summarizes the impact of the variables examined.

Table 14: Predicting Cost Per Capita and Crime Rate ^{a, b}

PREDICTOR	COST PER CAPITA	CRIME RATE
Model #1: Population Age		
Proportion of the population age 15 – 44 years	-.940	-1.402*
% of the population age 15 and over (male)	1.534*	1.981**
Median age – male population	-.345	-.467
Median age – female population	-1.553	-2.038*
Adjusted R²	18.5%	26.6%
Model # 2: Ethnicity		
Proportion of the population foreign-born	.106	.061
Adjusted R²	1.1%	0.4%
Model # 3: Marital Status		
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) single	1.129	1.077
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) married	.647	.921
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) separated	.433*	.253
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) divorced	.564	1.177*
Proportion of the pop. (Age 15+) common-law	-.793*	-1.278**
Adjusted R²	25.4%	36.3%
Model # 4: Education		
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with less than a high school grad. certificate	-.087	-.372
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a high school grad. certif. and/or some postsecond.	-.659	-.105
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a trades certificate or diploma	-.818*	.089
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a college certificate or diploma	-.502	-.647*
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a university certificate; diploma or degree	-.461	-.115
Adjusted R²	9.7%	21.5%
Model # 5: Earnings and Employment		
Median family income; 2000 (\$) all census families	-.237	-.684*
Participation rate	.276	-.252
Unemployment rate	-.597	-.382
R²	3.4%	18.2%
Model # 6: Population Density and Geography		
1996 to 2001 population change (%)	-.112	-.112
Average value of dwelling (\$)	-.153	-.009
Population density persons/km ²	.746**	.393*
Land area (km ²)	.251	.028
Adjusted R²	35.0%	5.9%
Model # 7: Policing		
2005 crime rate	.435*	
Costs per capita		.512*
Police officers per 100 000 population	.136	-.070
Total operating expenditures 2005 \$.528**	-.314*
Change in crime rates 2004-2005 %	.116	-.126
Clearance rate %	.372*	-.542**
Adjusted R²	40.2%	29.7%
*p<0.05 **p<0.01		

^a Standardized coefficients are presented in the table, which allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the relatively contributions of each variable to particular models. A plus sign (+) indicates that the variable's effect on the dependent variable (either cost per capita or crime rate) is positive: as the independent variable increases, so too does the dependent variable. On the other hand, a minus sign (-) means that as the predictor increases the dependent variable decreases.

^b In most cases, "Adjusted R²" is a measure of variance explained to take into account the relatively low number of cases included in this analysis.

Table 15: Predicting Cost Per Capita and Crime Rate: Final (Combined) Models^{a, b}

PREDICTOR	COST PER CAPITA	CRIME RATE
Model #1: Population Age		
Proportion of the population age 15 – 44 years		-.770
% of the population age 15 and over (male)	.179	.966
Median age – female population		-1.623
Model # 3: Marital Status		
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) separated	.180	
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) divorced		.917*
Proportion of the population (Age 15+) common-law	-.006	-.838*
Model # 4: Education		
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a trades certificate or diploma	-.202	
% of the population (20-34 yrs) with a trades certificate or diploma		.046
Model # 5: Earnings and employment		
Median family income; 2000 (\$) - All census families		-.202
Model # 6: Population Density and Geography		
Population density persons/km ²	.250	.165
Model # 7: Policing		
2005 crime rate	.222	
Costs per capita		-.005
Total operating expenditures 2005 \$.291	-.256
Clearance rate %	.388*	-.250
Adjusted R ²	46.6%	51.1%

^a The variables marked with an asterisk were significant at the p=.05 level.

^b "Adjusted R²" is reported as a measure of variance explained to take into account the relatively low number of cases (N=45) included in this analysis

In terms of the overall variance explained (R^2), the model predicting cost per capita did fairly well, predicting nearly 47% of the variation in cost per capita. Notably, however, the majority of the variables are not significant (at the .05 level) suggesting that once other variables are controlled for, the explanatory impact of any particular variable is reduced. For the model predicting crime rate, 51% of the variation in crime rate is explained by the factors included in this model.

Appendix 2.2.3 Costs of Policing and Crime Rate

The previously described analyses provide an examination of selected characteristics that describe Richmond and particular comparator locations. Descriptive data, however, do not facilitate predictions as there is no clear sense of how these characteristics fit together. For example, while it is known what the costs per capita of policing may be, it is useful to identify factors that might help us to predict what the costs per capita are *predicted* to be given the information that is known about other relevant factors. The next step of the analysis focuses on generating models with some of the variables considered above in order to predict per capita cost of policing and crime rate. Taken together, cost per capita and crime rate may provide a better sense of how Richmond performs on these dimensions while using data from other municipalities to provide meaningful contextual data.

The policing data for this analysis is from the Statistics Canada publication, *Police Resources in Canada, 2006*²⁸⁵, and for the demographic variables, data was retrieved from the Statistics Canada website.²⁸⁶ The census data is from the 2001 census, with the bulk of the more recent census data from 2006 having yet to be released.²⁸⁷ The dataset includes 45 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) with representation from each of the provinces that have cities (or conglomerates) with populations of over 100 000, including Richmond (see earlier in this Appendix for a list of locations). Cities with populations over 100 000 were selected based on the assumption that centres with smaller populations have much different policing issues than do centres with larger populations. Similarly, while some of the very large CMAs, such as Vancouver and Montreal, may have issues that differ from some of the smaller centres included in this analysis, Richmond's proximity to Vancouver suggests that the inclusion of very large cities in the sample is justifiable based upon Richmond's geographic proximity to Vancouver. Hence, "big city issues" are not out of the realm of possibility for Richmond. The initial examination of data included 450 (demographic and policing) variables.

Given the relatively low number of cases and the high potential number of variables for inclusion in our models, the analysis is conducted in stages. The variables under examination are divided into seven categories, including: population age, ethnicity, *marital status*, *education*, *earnings and employment*, *population density and geography*, and *Policing*

Table 14 details the variables included in each of the seven initial models and provides information about the categories of factors that impact on cost per capita and crime rate. With one

²⁸⁵ Police Resources in Canada (2006), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

²⁸⁶ <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/Profil01/CP01/Index.cfm?Lang=E>

²⁸⁷ There are 2006 general population figures available on-line for some of the locations that were considered, but given the issue of time ordering that is implicit in the analysis, the earlier figures from the 2001 census are appropriate.

exception, the 'earnings and employment' category, each of the seven models in this tables contained at least one significant predictor of cost per capita.

From the age characteristics (Model #1), it is noted that the proportion of males aged 15 years and older in the population significantly contributes to cost per capita: as the proportion of males aged 15 years and older increases, so too does the cost per capita.

Model #2, 'ethnicity' indicates that the proportion foreign-born has no significant impact on either cost per capita or crime rate.

In terms of marital status (Model 3), the proportion of the population aged 15 and older who are separated or divorced are significant predictors of cost per capita: as the proportions of those who are separated and divorced increases, so too does the cost per capita.

The only education variable (Model 4) that was significant was the proportion of the population aged 20-34 who had trades certificates or diplomas: as the proportion of this group increases, the cost per capita decreases.

None of the 'earnings and employment' variables (Model 5) predicted costs per capita.

The only variable from Model 6 that was significant was population density: as population density increases, costs per capita increase.

Finally, the policing model (#7) determined that the crime rate significantly predicted costs per capita, as did the total operating expenditures: as crime rates and operating expenditures increase, per capita costs increase.

Turning to predicting crime rates, it is noted that more of the 'population age' variables (Model 1) were significant than for predicting costs per capita: the proportion of the population aged 15 to 44; the proportion of the population aged 15 and older; and the median age of the female population each significantly predict crime rate. For proportion of the population aged 15 to 44, as the proportion of this age group increases, the crime rate decreases. On the other hand, as the percent of the population aged 15 and over who are male increases, the crime rate also increases. Finally, as the median age of the female population increases, the crime rate decreases.

As noted, 'ethnicity' (Model 2), proportion foreign born, did not significantly predict crime rate. For marital status, the proportions of the population aged 15 and older who are divorced and common-law significantly predict crime rate, however in opposite directions. As the proportion of

divorced individuals increases, the crime rate increases; yet as the proportion of common-law individuals increases, crime rates decrease.

One education variable is significant: as the percent of the population that has a college certificate or diploma increases, the crime rate decreases. Median income for all families is significant in the 'earnings and employment' model (#5): as median family income increases, crime rates decrease. As with cost per capita, population density is significant: as population density increases, crime rate increases. In Model 7 (policing), as costs per capita increase, so too does the crime rate; as total operating expenditures increase, crime rates decrease; and as clearance rates increase, crime rates decrease.

Predicting the Crime Rate and Costs of Policing

The next step of the analysis builds models that can be used to predict both the costs per capita of policing in Richmond, but also Richmond's crime rate. Using only the variables that were significant in the above models found in Table 14, Table 15 summarizes the findings of the combined models that predict both cost per capita and crime rate.

From the final models generated, cost per capita and crime rate can now be predicted for Richmond. Table 16 summarizes these results. Richmond has an observed cost per capita of \$151. However, the equation derived from the above model (found in Table 16) indicates what cost per capita is predicted to be, taking into account all the variables in the above model. The predicted cost per capita for Richmond is \$162.90, a 7% difference between what is observed (\$151) and what is predicted (\$162.90) by the model. Similarly, the observed crime rate for Richmond is 9,411 per 100,000 population. The formula generated from the model above, however, indicates that the crime rate is predicted to be 10,153.9. The difference between the observed crime rate and the predicted crime rate is 8% when using the equation generated from Table 16.

Table 16: Predicted Per Capita Costs and Crime Rates

Per capita costs \$ (Observed)	Per Capita Cost (Predicted)	Difference (%)
\$151 ²⁸⁸	\$162.90	7%
Crime Rate per 100 000 (Observed)	Crime Rate per 100 000 (Predicted)	Difference (%)
9411	10153.9	8%

Note: the net per capita cost with the 10% cost sharing is \$133.

²⁸⁸ Source: Police Services Division

Before concluding that Richmond is spending less per capita and has a crime rate less than could be expected, it is important to specify the limitations of this form of analysis in advance of drawing any firm conclusions. First, while the variance explained (adjusted R^2) in each of the above two models is relatively high, the models do not completely explain the variation in cost per capita or in crime rate: there is still a portion of variance left unexplained by this analysis. The portions of variance left unexplained means that the models are not including all the relevant explanatory variables – other factors are influential in determining per capita costs and crime rates. Second, the model generated for cost per capita has few significant variables, yet the variance explained remains relatively high. The few significant variables in the final model (as compared to the models from the earlier stages) suggest that the included variables may be working together in ways that are not revealed by this particular analysis. Finally, the number of cases/municipalities relative to the number of independent variables may be impacting the variables in ways that are not readily identifiable.

Despite these limitations, both the initial stages of the model and the more inclusive final model provide evidence that particular variables are relatively more important than others in the determination of cost per capita and crime rate. The above analysis may encourage thinking 'outside the box', as it is clearly evident that cost per capita and crime rates are impacted by factors that are outside the control of the police.²⁸⁹ However, these factors can be taken into account in municipal and police planning. This supports the concept and practice of a continuum of policing that incorporates a broader range of agencies to assist in preventing and controlling disorder and crime.²⁹⁰ This is outlined in Chapter 4.

²⁸⁹ Given the nature of the data, which consists of large units of analysis (cities), the model fit is not (cannot be) perfect. Should a multi-level analysis be applied, which would mean using other units of analysis in addition to those used here, it may be possible to improve the model. However, doing so would require that comparable data would be available for all cities, which would mean generating measures for each city – the time and expense of this form of original data collection would be prohibitive within the mandate of this project. The goal was to use publicly available data. Clearly other factors are at play – it is difficult to measure those factors when the unit of analysis is the city. This model clearly indicates that there are particular elements that are not contributing significantly to crime rates or per capita costs. Some of the elements that may have been assumed to be making a difference are not making a difference. There needs to be more work on the predictors of crime - while it is clear that there may be other factors at work – the determination of these factors are beyond the scope of the *Review*. What is important to recognize is that correlation does not equate with causation. Many factors correlate with many others, but these may be irrelevant in terms of establishing causation.

²⁹⁰ See also, *Safer Streets and Communities*, Nova Scotia Justice, 2007.

Key Points

- Seven individual models were created to predict cost per capita and crime rate. These seven models featured: population age; ethnicity; marital status; education; earnings and employment; population density and geography; and policing variables.
- For Model 1, the “percent of the male population aged 15 and over” significantly impacts both cost per capita and crime rate: As the proportion of males in this age group increases, the costs per capita and crime rates increase.
- Ethnicity (Model 2) does not significantly impact either costs per capita or crime rates.
- The proportion of the population aged 15 years and older who are in common-law relationships significantly impact costs per capita and crime rate: as the proportion of common-law increases, costs per capita and crime rates decrease. As the proportions of separated and divorced individuals increase, so too does the cost per capita and crime rate.
- Certain categories of education (Model 4) work to lower costs per capita and crime rates.
- ‘Earnings and Employment’ (Model 5) have no effect on cost per capita, but median family income does influence crime rate: as median family income increases, crime rate decreases.
- Population density (Model 6) positively impacts both costs per capita and crime rates: as population density increases, costs per capita and crime rates also increase.
- Operating expenditures and clearance rates significantly impact costs per capita and crimes rates, yet in opposite directions. As operating expenditures increase, costs per capita increase, but as operating expenditures increase, crime rates decrease. Similarly, as clearance rates increase, costs per capita increase, but crime rates decrease.
- The final combined models suggest that different factors predict both costs per capita and crime rates.
- The models suggest that Richmond is currently spending less per capita than could be expected (7% difference between the observed and predicted estimate of cost per capita), and has a lower crime rate than could be expected (8% difference between observed and expected values).

Geographic Analysis

These detailed analyses examine the crime and call-load in each zone. It should be noted that the term “incident” and the specific types of calls are used interchangeably – all the events are incidents, and the incidents may be described as specific types of crime, for example ‘crimes against persons’ or ‘crimes against property’.

2.2.6 Incidents and Response Patterns: Variation by Zone

The City of Richmond is currently divided into 5 policing zones. Zone 1 is located in the northwest quadrant of Richmond (and includes the Vancouver International Airport); Zone 2, the southwest quadrant; Zone 3 is in the north-central region of Richmond; Zone 5 is south-central; and Zone 4 is in the eastern part of the City. Map 1 below indicates where these zones are located.

Map 1: Richmond, Zones 1 through 5



The analysis that follows mirrors the analysis above, highlighting data for each respective zone, as well as information regarding the more specific geographical dimensions of incidents occurring within each zone.

2.2.6.1. Types of Incidents

It was earlier determined that the vast bulk of incidents came to the attention of police via telephone, nearly 77%. Table 16 highlights the differences in the way that incidents come to the attention among the respective zones.

In terms of calls stemming from 911, about 15% of Zone 1 incidents come to the attention of police via 911, compared to Zone 5, where nearly double that figure, 28%, come to the attention of police through 911. With respect to incidents being received through the 'desk', Zones 1, 2, 4 and 5, have from about 15-18% of incidents received this way, while 29% of the incidents in Zone 3 are received via the desk.

The majority of the incidents in Zone 1 come to the attention of police via telephone, 65%, compared with a low of 47% received in this way in Zone 3. Given the nature of the ways in which incidents are made known to police (received), it would suggest that the nature of the incidents themselves would also likely vary, as will the response to them, as well as have some impact on policing priorities and resource management.

These different forms of reporting reflect the different level of access to "police" personnel which, in turn, determines the type and level of reporting. For example, at the International Airport, YVR, Zone 1, is labour intensive as far as available law enforcement personnel (Customs, Agriculture inspectors, security personnel, alarmed doors, required police posts). This will influence the types of calls addressed, and the occasions on which the RCMP are called to intervene.

Table 17: How complaint was received by zone

	Chapter 1 How Complaint Received	Zone					Chapter 2 Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
911 System	Count	763	1972	2832	1870	3146	10583
	% within how complaint received	7.2%	18.6%	26.8%	17.7%	29.7%	100.0%
	% within zone number	14.9%	25.3%	21.4%	26.2%	28.1%	23.8%
Desk	Count	751	1372	3846	1169	2044	9182
	% within how complaint received	8.2%	14.9%	41.9%	12.7%	22.3%	100.0%
	% within zone number	14.6%	17.6%	29.0%	16.4%	18.2%	20.6%
Telephone	Count	3347	4314	6280	3999	5848	23788
	% within how complaint received	14.1%	18.1%	26.4%	16.8%	24.6%	100.0%
	% within zone number	65.2%	55.4%	47.4%	56.0%	52.2%	53.4%
On View	Count	274	124	294	109	175	976
	% within how complaint received	28.1%	12.7%	30.1%	11.2%	17.9%	100.0%
	% within zone number	5.3%	1.6%	2.2%	1.5%	1.6%	2.2%
Total	Count	5135	7782	13252	7147	11213	44529
	% within how complaint received	11.5%	17.5%	29.8%	16.1%	25.2%	100.0%
	% within zone number	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As could be expected, given the differences in the ways that incidents come to police attention, there are also differences in the classification of incidents among the five zones. Table 18 provides two kinds of information. First, it is noted that the proportions of various types of calls vary by zone. For example, if disturbances are reviewed, it can be seen that the percent of disturbances within each zone varies. Of all incidents in Zone 1, for example, only 0.2% are disturbances. This contrasts with Zone 2, with nearly 4% of incidents classified as disturbances.

Similarly, there are relatively small proportions across the zones for 'crimes against persons', but compared to their counterparts, Zones 2 and 5 have proportionately more of these crimes (1.5% and 1.6%, respectively). Another difference is found in the property crimes category, with Zone 4 having the least of these crimes (88%), while Zone 1 has the greatest proportion (nearly 96%).

The proportion of traffic-related incidents also varies by zone, with Zone 4 having 10% of its incidents traffic-related, compared to a low of 3.8% for Zone 1. Second, it can be determined in which zone most of a certain type of case occurs. Of all disturbances, for example, 42% occur in Zone 2, while only 1.1% of disturbances occur in Zone 1. Forty percent of all 'crimes against persons' occur in Zone 5, compared to only 4.1% of these incidents occur in Zone 1.

Table 18: Case classification by zone

Incident Classification		Zone					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Disturbance (D)	Count	8	302	132	63	216	721
	% within Classification	1.1%	41.9%	18.3%	8.7%	30.0%	100.0%
	Percent within Zone	.2%	3.9%	1.0%	.9%	1.9%	1.6%
Crime vs. Person (P)	Count	18	117	82	49	177	443
	% within Classification	4.1%	26.4%	18.5%	11.1%	40.0%	100.0%
	Percent within Zone	.4%	1.5%	.6%	.7%	1.6%	1.0%
Crime vs. Property (R)	Count	4912	6877	12047	6297	10005	40138
	% within Classification	12.2%	17.1%	30.0%	15.7%	24.9%	100.0%
	Percent within Zone	95.7%	88.4%	90.9%	88.1%	89.2%	90.1%
Traffic Accident/ Problem (T)	Count	197	486	990	738	815	3226
	% within Classification	6.1%	15.1%	30.7%	22.9%	25.3%	100.0%
	Percent within Zone	3.8%	6.2%	7.5%	10.3%	7.3%	7.2%
	Total	5135	7782	13251	7147	11213	44528
	% within Classification	11.5%	17.5%	29.8%	16.1%	25.2%	100.0%
	Percent within Zone	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As was pointed out above, these broad case classifications are very preliminary and may change over the course of the investigation or as other information is gathered. Table 19 indicates the “top ten” most frequent types of occurrences in each of the zones, calculated on the basis of ‘final case classifications’.

The table demonstrates that *assisting the general public* and *assisting other agencies* (such as fire and ambulance services) make up a large proportion of the incidents in every zone, as do abandoned 911 calls. There is considerable debate regarding the appropriate deployment of first responders to incidents.²⁹¹

²⁹¹ First Responders, Fire Services and Pre-hospital Care in British Columbia – A Report to the Emergency Health Services Commission, Cameron, P., March 2007.

Agreements between police, fire and ambulance regarding an appropriate division of labour and attendance protocols will reduce the need for resources²⁹².

Theft and theft from vehicle also tend to figure prominently in the top ten types of incidents. Drugs only enter the top 10 in Zone 1, constituting 6.2% of the incidents in Zone 1. While variations of types of alarms are prominent in Zone 1, 2, 4 and 5 – alarms do not figure into the top 10 types of incidents in Zone 3. It is of interest to note that the top 10 types of incidents in Zone 1 account for just over 64% of the incidents police deal with in this zone. In contrast, the top 10 incidents account for approximately 40% of the incidents in Zones 2 and 5. This suggests that the officers in these zones are spending a lot of their time attending to a wider variety of incidents – more so than officers in Zone 1 where airport-related issues will likely dominate.

²⁹² Such a discussion can also address protocols which balance the need for an emergency triage versus the protection of a crime scene. This issue was raised in the course of the *Review*.

Table 19: Final-Case Classifications

	<i>Zone 1 Incident Type Freq (% of all incidents in zone)</i>	<i>Zone 2 Incident Type Freq (% of all incidents in zone)</i>	<i>Zone 3 Incident Type Freq (% of all incidents in zone)</i>	<i>Zone 4 Incident Type Freq (% of all incidents in zone)</i>	<i>Zone 5 Incident Type Freq (% of all incidents in zone)</i>
1.	Assist Other Agency 808 (15.2%)	Assist General Public 740 (9.5%)	Assist General Public 1649 (12.5%)	Assist General Public 523 (7.4%)	Assist General Public 1015 (9.1%)
2.	Assist General Public 569 (11.1%)	Theft 438 (5.6%)	Assist Other Agency 1046 (7.8%)	Abandoned 911 515 (7.2%)	Theft 745 (6.6%)
3.	Theft 467 (9.1%)	Abandoned 911 406 (5.2%)	Theft 999 (7.5%)	Theft 427 (6.0%)	Abandoned 911 691 (6.2%)
4.	Abandoned 911 337 (6.6%)	Mischief 279 (3.6%)	Abandoned 911 740 (5.6%)	Motor Vehicle Incident 322 (4.5%)	Theft from vehicle 500 (4.5%)
5.	Drugs 319 (6.2%)	Disturbance – Noise 278 (3.6%)	Theft from Vehicle 411 (3.1%)	Alarm Commercial - False 258 (3.6%)	Mischief 343 (3.1%)
6.	Property Lost 238 (4.6%)	Theft from Vehicle 264 (3.4%)	Motor Vehicle Incident 356 (2.7%)	Theft from Vehicle 220 (3.1%)	Motor Vehicle Incident 310 (2.8%)
7.	Property 198 (3.9%)	Suspicious Person 218 (2.8%)	Mischief 317 (2.4%)	Alarm Cancelled 212 (3.0%)	Suspicious Person 279 (2.5%)
8.	Alarm Commercial - False 167 (3.3%)	Motor Vehicle Incident 185 (2.4%)	Break and enter 295 (2.2%)	Break and enter 197 (2.8%)	Break and Enter 231 (2.1%)
9.	Alarm Airport Checkpoint 126. (2.5%)	Alarm Cancelled 161 (2.1%)	Property 286 (2.2%)	Mischief 197 (2.8%)	Traffic Complaint 228 (2.0%)
10.	Suspicious Person 97 (1.9%)	Parking 155 (2.0%)	Suspicious Person 285 (2.2%)	Traffic Driving Complaint 183 (2.6%)	Alarm Cancelled 210 (1.9%)
Total	3326 (64.4%)	3121 (40.1%)	6384 (48.2%)	3054 (42.8%)	4552 (40.8)
Other	1809 (35.6%)	4661 (60%)	6868 (51.8%)	4093 (57.2)	6661 (59.2%)
Total	5135	7782	13252	7147	11231

The incident priority levels observed earlier indicate that approximately 7% of incidents are classified as level 1 priority; 21% level 2 priority; 42% level 3 priority; and 31% level 4 priority. The distribution of calls changes when the zones to which incidents are attributed are considered. The distribution of calls over the 5 zones is illustrated in Figure 5. This figure indicates that Zone 1 has proportionately more Priority 1 incidents than any of the other four zones. This is the most striking difference, but it can also be seen that Zone 2 has comparatively more Priority 3 calls than the other zones, and Zone 3 has proportionately more priority 4 incidents than the other zones. Figure 6, in comparison, indicates that the largest proportion of Priority 1 incidents are found in Zone 1, while the largest proportion of level 4 incidents are found in Zone 3.

Figure 5: Zones Across Priority Levels





Figure 6: Priority Levels Across Zones



As noted earlier, the types of cases are correlated with the various priority levels. The next question to explore is the priority level of types of cases within each particular zone. In other words, how is a ‘*crime versus person*’ incident or a ‘*disturbance*’ incident prioritized in Zones 1 versus 2. For example, Table 20 (Part 1) first considers incidents classified (broadly) as disturbances. As demonstrated none of these incidents are classified as Priority 1. It is noted, however, that of the disturbances occurring in Zone 1, 12.5% are considered Priority 2, which is markedly higher than in the other zones, where only 1-2% is considered Priority 2 (the vast majority are priorities 3 and 4). Further, of the ‘disturbance’ incidents considered priority 3, nearly 42% are in Zone 2, with nearly 30% in Zone 5.

Table 20 (Part 1): Disturbances by priority and zone

Disturbance		Zone					
Priority		1	2	3	4	5	Total
2	Count	1	7	1	1	6	16
	% within priority of call	6.3%	43.8%	6.3%	6.3%	37.5%	100.0%
	% within zone	12.5%	2.3%	.8%	1.6%	2.8%	2.2%
3	Count	7	292	129	61	208	697
	% within priority of call	1.0%	41.9%	18.5%	8.8%	29.8%	100.0%
	% within zone	87.5%	96.7%	97.7%	96.8%	96.7%	96.8%
4	Count	0	3	2	1	1	7
	% within priority of call	.0%	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	100.0%
	% within zone	.0%	1.0%	1.5%	1.6%	.5%	1.0%
Total	Count	8	302	132	63	215	720
	% within priority of call	1.1%	41.9%	18.3%	8.8%	29.9%	100.0%
	% within zone	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The vast majority of '*person-related*' incidents are considered Priority 1. Part 2 of Table 19 indicates that of the person-related incidents ranked Priority 1, 41% occur in Zone 5, compared to only 4% in Zone 1. At every priority level, the bulk of person-related incidents occur in Zone 5. The bulk of person-related incidents occurring across the zones are designated priority 1 (between 76-85%).

Table 20 (Part 2): Person-related incidents by priority and zone

Person-Related		Zone					
Priority		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1	Count	14	99	62	38	148	361
	% within priority of call	3.9%	27.4%	17.2%	10.5%	41.0%	100.0%
	% within zone	77.8%	84.6%	75.6%	77.6%	83.6%	81.5%
2	Count	2	10	8	7	13	40
	% within priority of call	5.0%	25.0%	20.0%	17.5%	32.5%	100.0%
	% within zone	11.1%	8.5%	9.8%	14.3%	7.3%	9.0%
3	Count	2	8	12	4	15	41
	% within priority of call	4.9%	19.5%	29.3%	9.8%	36.6%	100.0%
	% within zone	11.1%	6.8%	14.6%	8.2%	8.5%	9.3%
4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
	% within priority of call	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within zone	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.6%	.2%
Total	Count	18	117	82	49	177	443
	% within priority of call	4.1%	26.4%	18.5%	11.1%	40.0%	100.0%
	% within zone	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Turning next to property-related incidents, Table 20 (Part 3) indicates that for property-related incidents ranked priority 1, nearly 37% occur in Zone 1, compared to only 10% in Zone 4. In contrast, for property-related incident ranked priority 2, 11% occur in Zone 1, compared with nearly 27% in Zone 3. Similarly, for property-related incidents in Zone 1, 15% are ranked as priority 1, compared with only about 3-4% in Zones 2 thru 5. This means that property-related incidents in Zone 1 have a higher chance of being priority 1 than is the case in the other zones.

Table 20 (Part 3): Property-related incidents by priority and zone

Property-Related		Zone					
Priority		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1	Count	742	268	376	197	445	2028
	% within priority of call	36.6%	13.2%	18.5%	9.7%	21.9%	100.0%
	% within zone	15.1%	3.9%	3.1%	3.1%	4.4%	5.1%
2	Count	929	1550	2320	1469	2451	8719
	% within priority of call	10.7%	17.8%	26.6%	16.8%	28.1%	100.0%
	% within zone	18.9%	22.6%	19.3%	23.3%	24.5%	21.7%
3	Count	1786	3166	4786	2860	4284	16882
	% within priority of call	10.6%	18.8%	28.3%	16.9%	25.4%	100.0%
	% within zone	36.4%	46.1%	39.8%	45.4%	42.8%	42.1%
4	Count	1452	1889	4552	1769	2822	12484
	% within priority of call	11.6%	15.1%	36.5%	14.2%	22.6%	100.0%
	% within zone	29.6%	27.5%	37.8%	28.1%	28.2%	31.1%
Total	Count	4909	6873	12034	6295	10002	40113
	% within priority of call	6.1%	12.2%	17.1%	30.0%	15.7%	24.9%
	% within zone	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Turning to traffic-related incidents (Table 20, Part 4), nearly 30% of priority 1 traffic-related incidents are found in Zone 3, compared to only 6% in Zone 1. The same pattern holds for property-related incidents ranked priority 2: 32% of these incidents are found in Zone 3 compared with only 5.5% in Zone 1.

Table 20 (Part 4): Traffic-related incidents by priority and zone

Traffic-Related		Zone					
Priority		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1	Count	44	115	219	189	180	747
	% within priority of call	5.9%	15.4%	29.3%	25.3%	24.1%	100.0%
	% within zone	22.3%	23.7%	22.1%	25.6%	22.1%	23.2%
2	Count	22	56	127	82	111	398
	% within priority of call	5.5%	14.1%	31.9%	20.6%	27.9%	100.0%
	% within zone	11.2%	11.5%	12.8%	11.1%	13.6%	12.3%
3	Count	51	117	290	202	235	895
	% within priority of call	5.7%	13.1%	32.4%	22.6%	26.3%	100.0%
	% within zone	25.9%	24.1%	29.3%	27.4%	28.9%	27.8%
4	Count	80	198	354	265	288	1185
	% within priority of call	6.8%	16.7%	29.9%	22.4%	24.3%	100.0%
	% within zone	40.6%	40.7%	35.8%	35.9%	35.4%	36.7%
Total	Count	197	486	990	738	814	3225
	% within priority of call	6.1%	15.1%	30.7%	22.9%	25.2%	100.0%
	% within zone	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Key Points

Incidents come to the attention of officers in various zones through different means: for example, about 15% of Zone 1 incidents come to the attention of police via 911, compared to Zone 5, where nearly double that figure, 28%, come to the attention of police through 911. The majority of the incidents in Zone 1 come to the attention of police via telephone, 65%, compared with a low of 47% received in this way in Zone 3.

The proportions of various types of calls vary by zone, with Zone 1 having proportionately fewer disturbances, for example, and the greatest proportion of property crimes. At the same time, Zone 4 has proportionately more traffic-related incidents than the other zones.

Of all “crimes against persons”, 40% occur in Zone 5, while only 4.1% occur in Zone 1.

The top ten most frequent types of specific incidents vary by zone, suggesting that officers in each zone spend their time differently. Further, while the top ten types of incidents in Zone 1 account for over 64% of incidents, the top ten types of incidents in Zones 2 and 5 account for only 40% of incidents, which suggests that officers in Zones 2 and 5 attend a much greater variety of incidents.

Zone 1 has proportionately more priority 1 incidents than any of the other four zones. Zone 2 has comparatively more priority 3 calls than the other zones, while Zone 3 has proportionately more priority 4 incidents than the other zones.

The largest proportion of Priority 1 incidents are found in Zone 1, while the largest proportion of level 4 incidents are found in Zone 3.


Of the person-related incidents ranked priority 1, 41% occur in Zone 5, compared to only 4% in Zone 1. For property-related incidents ranked priority 1, nearly 37% occur in Zone 1, compared to only 10% in Zone 4. Nearly 30% of priority 1 traffic-related incidents are found in Zone 3, compared to only 6% in Zone 1.

2.2.6.2. Time and Place

To this point, it has been established that there are regional variations within Richmond in terms of the occurrence of various types of incidents. Another way in which variation can be observed is through differences over time. As noted above, priority 1 calls occur most frequently June through September. This pattern also holds when considering the five zones (see Appendix 2.3), with most zones spiking in priority 1 incidents in July and August – these priority 1 levels are about 30% higher than in the early (and later) parts of the year.

Figure 7 provides information with respect to the activity levels at different times of the day on different days of the week by zone. This figure highlights what was learned above, that particularly busy call times are Saturday and Sunday during the early morning hours, and Friday and Saturday nights. Figure 7 also confirms that there are specific zones that are much busier, more often, than other zones. For example, it is noted the relatively flat-line evident for Zone 1, suggesting comparatively less variation over the course of respective time of day and day of week. This distribution contrasts markedly with the distribution observed for Zone 3, which shows much greater variation, both by day of week and time of day. Zone 5 shows similar variation over time, but less variation by day of week, with patterns remaining relatively comparable over each day.

Figure 7: Distribution of Incidents by Time, Day of Week and Zone



2.2.6.3. Responding to Incidents

It was reported above that response times are indeed correlated with priority levels. As could be expected, there are differences among the zones with regard to average response times for different priority incidents. Table 20 (Parts A and B) highlights the average time differences among the zones. Beginning with Priority 1 incidents, there are relatively large differences among the 5 zones: Zone 1 is clearly the fastest in terms of both received-to-dispatch times and dispatch-to-scene times. For received-to-dispatch times, Zone 1 is the fastest averaging 2:14, followed by Zone 4 which averages 2:41. This differs markedly from the received-to-dispatch time for Zone 2 which, averaging 3:50, is over one and half minutes longer to get the call dispatched. This finding largely reflects the geography of each zone with Zone 1 (primarily the airport) being a confined area with ready access to police officers and zone 4 being spread out and requiring longer distances (and times) for police to respond.

The next time examined is the dispatch-to-scene time, with Zone 1 again responding most effectively at an average time of 5:32. The next fastest dispatch-to-scene time is Zone 3 (averaging 5:47), followed by Zone 5 (5:59). The slowest dispatch-to-scene time is Zone 4: at an average of 8:41, the dispatch-to-scene time for this zone averages 3 minutes slower than Zone 1. A quick survey of the geography of Zone 4 suggests, however, that the potential distance to be covered in this zone is greater than for the other zones. (Actual geographic distance was not part of the data set.) For priority 1 calls, clearly Zone 1 is averaging the best response times. Consider, also, that the average “total response” time would consist of adding both the received-to-dispatch time with the dispatch-to-scene time. Zone 1 would therefore have an average total response time of 7:46. (Note: These response times only consider cases that have come to the attention of police via telephone or 911).

Table 21 (Part A): Response Times by Zone and Priority

	Zone #1		Zone #2		Zone #3	
Priority	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time
1						
Mean	0:02:14	0:05:32	0:03:50	0:06:32	0:03:02	0:05:47
N	788	687	458	455	630	616
Std. dev	0:06:50	0:10:19	0:16:28	0:04:32	0:08:23	0:07:14
2						
Mean	0:06:39	0:13:58	0:10:45	0:09:21	0:09:17	0:08:40
N	809	673	1343	1206	1911	1719
Std. dev	0:18:59	0:57:33	0:33:49	0:15:17	0:19:45	0:35:18
3						
Mean	0:13:08	0:19:00	0:34:53	0:15:54	0:28:17	0:12:50
N	1625	1266	2948	2563	4024	3535
Std. dev	1:01:06	1:06:46	1:42:59	0:47:47	1:26:31	0:40:42
4						
Mean	0:24:44	0:17:30	0:40:26	0:22:29	0:43:26	0:16:44
N	597	387	826	592	1271	983
Std. dev	1:52:05	1:18:55	1:30:40	1:22:35	1:52:30	1:02:09
Total						
Mean	0:11:20	0:14:36	0:27:21	0:14:11	0:24:05	0:11:43
N	3819	3013	5575	4816	7836	6853
Std. dev	1:00:43	0:58:50	1:25:23	0:46:12	1:18:27	0:41:39

Table 21 (Part B): Response Times by Zone and Priority

	Zone #4		Zone #5		Total	
Priority	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time	Received-to-Dispatch Time	Dispatch-to-Scene Time
1						
Mean	0:02:41	0:08:31	0:03:11	0:05:59	0:02:56	0:06:15
N	380	371	745	732	3001	2861
Std. Dev.	0:03:05	0:10:03	0:09:09	0:05:14	0:09:31	0:07:48
2						
Mean	0:10:39	0:11:01	0:08:48	0:08:10	0:09:20	0:09:33
N	1127	993	2135	1932	7325	6523
Std. Dev.	0:25:28	0:12:58	0:37:22	0:10:13	0:29:19	0:27:47
3						
Mean	0:32:52	0:17:13	0:30:31	0:14:32	0:29:18	0:15:14
N	2536	2182	3945	3446	15078	12992
Std. Dev.	1:42:12	0:52:46	1:34:51	0:59:01	1:32:51	0:52:15
4						
Mean	0:49:26	0:17:50	0:47:47	0:21:43	0:42:37	0:19:15
N	820	627	1134	867	4648	3456
Std. Dev.	2:06:29	0:25:42	1:54:10	1:33:16	1:52:11	1:12:34
Total						
Mean	0:28:09	0:15:04	0:24:35	0:12:46	0:23:52	0:13:20
N	4863	4173	7959	6977	30052	25832
Std. Dev.	1:32:12	0:40:11	1:23:04	0:53:25	1:21:34	0:47:54

Turning to the number of units dispatched as a measure of response time, it is noted that patterns reflect the findings for Richmond as a whole. Table 22 indicates that the greatest number of units dispatched (3 or more) are priority 1 incidents. For Zone 1, 20.9% of priority 1 incidents have 3 or more units dispatched, compared with only 3% of priority 4 incidents with 3 or more units dispatched in this zone. The proportion of 3+ units dispatched in priority 1 situations is much larger in each of the other zones. In Zone 2, priority 1 calls associated with 3 or more units dispatched is 57%; in Zone 3, 56%, Zone 4, 52%; and Zone 5, 54%. Zone 1 somewhat contradicts the pattern noted for each of the other units with respect to units dispatched for priority 1 incidents. In Zone 2, for example, it is noted that 57% of priority 1 incidents have 3+ units dispatched, 29% of priority 1 incidents have 2 units, and 10% of priority 1 incidents have 1 unit dispatched and 4.2% of these incidents have no units dispatched. This is the reverse of the situation for incidents determined to be priority 4. Again for Zone 2, it is noted that 53% of priority 4 calls have no units dispatched, 36% of priority 4 incidents have 1 unit dispatched, about 8% of priority 4 incidents have 2 units dispatched, while only 3% of priority 4 incidents have 3 or more units dispatched. This suggests an inverse relationship between priority level and units dispatched: as priority level increases, or becomes less serious, the fewer the number of units dispatched. This relationship is somewhat obscured in priority levels 2 and 3, as there is no distinct pattern emerging within these categories

It is of interest to note that in some comparator sites²⁹³, deployment of two-officer cars is a standard during some shifting periods and locations. Consequently, in some instances of priority 1 calls a two-person response is accomplished by the dispatch of one car. On the other hand, the RCMP staff or generally staff with one-person cars. Consequently, there is a necessity to send two cars to a priority 1 call in order to have a two person response to the incident. The number of units sent to a priority 1 call is as much a function of how many officers are in the unit - 1 or 2, as the priority of the call requiring for safety, 2 or more officers.

²⁹³ Halifax Regional Police and Vancouver Police for example


Table 22: Units dispatched by priority and zone

Zone	% within Priority Level		Priority				Total
			1	2	3	4	
1	Units Dispatched	.00	.9%	14.2%	5.8%	43.9%	18.0%
		1.00	45.7%	36.6%	48.8%	44.4%	44.7%
		2.00	32.5%	32.2%	31.8%	8.7%	25.1%
		3.00	20.9%	17.0%	13.7%	3.0%	12.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
2	Units Dispatched	.00	4.2%	16.7%	10.7%	53.2%	23.0%
		1.00	10.0%	28.7%	50.7%	36.0%	39.6%
		2.00	28.9%	28.8%	25.4%	7.8%	21.6%
		3.00	57.0%	25.7%	13.2%	3.0%	15.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
3	Units Dispatched	.00	3.5%	21.4%	13.2%	66.9%	34.2%
		1.00	15.4%	30.5%	50.3%	25.4%	35.6%
		2.00	25.2%	26.0%	24.4%	5.8%	17.8%
		3.00	55.9%	22.1%	12.1%	2.0%	12.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
4	Units Dispatched	.00	9.7%	27.4%	12.2%	48.5%	25.7%
		1.00	16.3%	26.0%	50.7%	37.7%	39.6%
		2.00	22.4%	25.0%	26.1%	10.5%	21.2%
		3.00	51.7%	21.6%	11.1%	3.3%	13.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
5	Units Dispatched	.00	2.6%	17.0%	9.2%	54.6%	23.2%
		1.00	11.3%	28.1%	50.3%	34.1%	38.0%
		2.00	32.4%	29.6%	26.9%	8.6%	22.8%
		3.00	53.7%	25.3%	13.6%	2.7%	16.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Along with the other measures of police response, another means by which to assess how police respond to various incidents is to examine how cases are determined to be cleared. It was noted earlier that 71.5% of the incidents to which police responded were eventually classified as having

a “report submitted”, but this determination by no means indicates that actual charges were laid. As was observed, the bulk of what police do, regardless of the zone in which incidents occur, is to provide assistance either to the general public or to other agencies. ‘Assistance’ does not suggest (but does not rule out) the laying of criminal or other forms of charges. Figure 8 below indicates rather wide variation with respect to how cases are ‘cleared’ (as measured in the CAD system). The largest proportion of incidents cleared, for example, are those occurring in Zone 1, with over 78% resulting in a submitted report. On the other hand, 66% of incidents in Zone 3 result in reports submitted, with nearly 25% of the incidents in Zone 3 resulting in ‘no report’. This figure is nearly double that of Zone 1, which submits ‘no report’ in 13% of its incidents. The other zones remain comparable, with about 71-73% resulting in a submitted report in Zones 2, 4, and 5, with approximately 13-15% of incidents resulting in ‘no report’ in these respective zones.

Figure 8: Cases 'cleared' by zone



Key Points

In terms of time of day, certain zones are much busier, more often, than other zones. Zone 1 has less variation over the course of time of day and day of week than does the distribution observed for Zone 3, which shows far greater variation, both by day of week and time of day. Zone 5 shows similar variation over time, but less variation by day of week.

For Priority 1 incidents, there are relatively large differences among the 5 zones: Zone 1 is clearly the fastest in terms of both received-to-dispatch times and dispatch-to-scene times. For received-to-dispatch times, Zone 1 is the fastest averaging 2:14, followed by Zone 4 at 2:41. Zone 2, at 3:50, is over one and half minutes longer simply to get the call dispatched.

For dispatch-to-scene time, Zone 1 responding most effectively at an average time of 5:32. Geography appears to play a role in response times, with Zone 4 appearing to face specific geographic barriers that may aggravate response times.

For Zone 1, 20.9% of priority 1 incidents have 3 or more units dispatched; in Zone 2, priority 1 calls associated with 3 or more units dispatched is 57%; in Zone 3, 56%, Zone 4, 52%; and Zone 5, 54%.


In Zone 1, over 78% of incidents result in a submitted report. On the other hand, 66% of incidents in Zone 3 result in reports submitted.

2.2.7 Geographic Context

In order to provide some further context with regard to the types and police response to various incidents, it is important to consider geographical features of the respective zones and how these features may play a role in the police response. The following provides maps of the various zones, comparing these zones to the geographic distribution of incidents determined by X and Y grid coordinates available in the CAD data.


As noted in the above discussion, a significant feature of Richmond’s Zone 1 is the Vancouver International Airport (YVR). As Map 2 indicates, the location of incidents fits the contours of the circular road at the airport particularly well. From the information in Table 18 (above) it can be seen that the nature of the incidents with which Zone 1 police must deal with likely involve a large amount of airport security, as the most frequent type of incident occurring in Zone 1 is ‘assist other agency’. It is also noted that the 9th most frequent occurrence in Zone 1 is ‘alarm airport checkpoints’.

Map2: Zone 1 Distribution of Incidents




Zone 2 differs substantially from Zone 1: incidents in Zone 2 are more spread out and present a different policing challenge than is the case in Zone 1. Unlike Zone 1, which is characterized by incidents that reflect a distribution that essentially mirrors the airport footprint, Zone 2 is characterized by a much wider, less concentrated distribution of events (Map 3). Clearly this greater variation in location of incidents will impact upon the response times that characterize Zone 2.

Map 3: Zone 2 Incident Distribution




Map 4: Zone 3 Incident Distribution




The area in square kilometres represented by Zone 3 (Map 4) is substantially less than the other zones and is characterized by a distribution that clearly follows the street grid. Zone 3 houses RCMP Richmond Detachment.

Map 5: Zone 4 Incident Distribution



In Zone 4, it is apparent that the pattern of incidents clearly follows the population density (Map 5). While a large portion of Zone 4 consists of relatively few cases, the concentration of incidents in both the far west and far east of this zone is marked. Finally, as with Zone 4, the map for Zone 5 (Map 6) clearly depicts a distribution of incidents that mirrors the population density, with the bulk of incidents occurring in the north western portion of this zone.

Figure 20: Zone 5 Incident Distribution



Key Points

The location and distribution of incidents reflects the geographic specificities of each respective Zone.

Appendix 3

The following arrangement is the back drop for the exercise of governance in Surrey.

POLICE COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. *Committee Composition*

The Police Committee is a standing committee appointed by the Mayor and is a Committee of the whole of Council.

2. *Administration*

The following Administration staff are to attend:

- *City Manager or his/her designate*
- *Officer-in-Charge, Surrey RCMP and/or his/her designates*
- *Manager, By-law & Licensing Services*

3. *Meeting Dates*

The Police Committee shall meet at the call of the Chair, with no less than one meeting every two months.

4. *Police Committee Procedure*

- *The proceedings of the Police Committee meetings are to be conducted in public, unless otherwise specifically warranted.*
- *Procedures of the Police Committee will be governed by Roberts Rules of Order unless declared informal by the Chair.*
- *The Agenda (for both open and closed meetings) will be prepared by staff in consultation with the Chair and the City Manager, if required.*
- *The minutes of each Police Committee meeting will be taken by the City Clerk or his/her designate and submitted for consideration to Regular Council, if held in open session, or to Closed Council, if held in a closed or "in camera" session, in accordance with the Local Government Act/Community Charter.*

5. *Duties of the Police Committee*

The duties of the Police Committee are to:

- *Consider items referred by Council;*
- *Consider items referred by Surrey RCMP, Fire Department and City Manager;*
- *Liaise in conjunction with the RCMP with community groups on matters pertaining to police;*
- *Discuss municipal policing priorities and review community policing initiatives with the RCMP;*
- *Assist Surrey RCMP with Public Relations and Special Programs by providing public appearance and media support;*
- *Develop policies and/or programs designed to enhance public safety for review and approval by Council; and*
- *Review, at the request of Council, decisions of other committees established by Council and/or City administration, with a view to providing Council with advice and recommendations on safety aspects.²⁹⁴*

²⁹⁴ City of Surrey website

Appendix 4

Kansas City Patrol Experiment 1972²⁹⁵

The experiment began in October 1972 and continued through 1973; it was administered by the Kansas City Police Department and evaluated by the Police Foundation.

Patrols were varied within 15 police beats. Routine preventive patrol was eliminated in five beats, labeled "reactive" beats (meaning officers entered these areas only in response to calls from residents). Normal, routine patrol was maintained in five "control" beats. In five "proactive" beats, patrol was intensified by two to three times the norm.

The experiment asked the following questions:

- Would citizens notice changes in the level of police patrol?
- Would different levels of visible police patrol affect recorded crime or the outcome of victim surveys?
- Would citizen fear of crime and attendant behavior change as a result of differing patrol levels?
- Would their degree of satisfaction with police change?

Information was gathered from victimization surveys, reported crime rates, arrest data, a survey of local businesses, attitudinal surveys, and trained observers who monitored police-citizen interaction.

Findings

Interestingly, citizens did not notice the difference when the level of patrol was changed. What is more, increasing or decreasing the level of police patrol had no significant effect on resident and commercial burglaries, auto thefts, larcenies involving auto accessories, robberies, or vandalism—crimes traditionally considered to be prevented by random, highly visible police patrol.

The rate at which crimes were reported to the police did not differ in any important or consistent way across the experimental beats. Citizen fear of crime was not affected by different levels of patrol. Nor was citizen satisfaction with police.

"Ride-alongs" by observers during the experiment also revealed that 60 percent of the time spent by a Kansas City patrol officer typically was non-committed. In other words, officers spent a considerable amount of time waiting to respond to calls for service. And they spent about as much time on non-police related activities as they did on police-related mobile patrol.

Implications

The findings do not prove per se that a highly visible police presence has no impact on crime in selected circumstances. What they do suggest, however, is that routine preventive patrol in marked police cars has little value in preventing crime or making citizens feel safe.

The overall implication is that resources ordinarily allocated to preventive patrol could safely be devoted to other, perhaps more productive, crime control strategies. More specifically, the results indicate that police deployment strategies could be based on targeted crime prevention and service goals rather than on routine preventive patrol.

²⁹⁵ www.policefoundation.org/docs/kansas.html

Appendix 10

Processes of change

1 *Defining the Vision*

Vision, mission and values statements provide impetus for change and provide a tone for the changes that are about to transpire. Although lacking in specifics, the vision statement guides the course of change by shaping what the business of policing in the City of Richmond.

The vision is the landmark that orients the change process. Whatever 'model option' is selected by Council, there will still be change process. The magnitude of change is determined by the specific selection of the model.

The Council should, therefore, establish a vision statement as the first objective in the change process. The vision statement should describe what elements of policing should be encompassed by 'the ideal' policing model that is envisaged to meet the needs of the City.

2 *Mobilizing the change agents and the staff*

Mobilization of change occurs as the participants recognize and internalize, upon review of their current situation, how the vision they are striving to achieve differs from their current reality. If change is necessary, then the difference between the ideal and the current becomes clearer.

Although the staff, generally, has an intuitive feel for what needs to be done, the perspective of each individual is a different perspective given their personal experience of policing and, more particularly, their experience of policing as a member of the City administration or on the streets of the city. The various perspectives although all accurate are merely perceptions and, further, perceptions of a certain element of policing. The whole is described as a result of the review. It is an amalgam of the individual views supplemented by best practices and review experience. Because few individuals are privy to the holistic view of policing and because the 'ideal' and a course of change have not been articulated in detail, the exact form of that change is not well understood.

It was apparent during the course of the *Review* that all participants, administrative staff, the public and even the police, expected some change. All participants lobbied for some form of change on one or a range of issues. This was part of what appears to be the culture of the City administration that one must strive for improvement with the public good as a touchstone. These views are articulated in the report. Consequently, the need is to decide and then describe the form and harness the enunciated desire for change.

There was some scepticism voiced by participants. Some assumed that change would be too difficult. The assumption was that the RCMP was well ensconced as the agency of choice and would not willingly give way to another agency if it was determined by Council to introduce another 'model option'. Politics and prevarication would prevail and prevent change. On this matter, others were fully accepting of the need for, and the ability to, change agencies.

Mobilizing is not merely a separate and distinct stage of the change process. The personnel affected by change must be mobilized throughout the change process. The dynamic of change must be continually reinforced. This creates an expectation of staff and an expectation in staff. Members of the organization are to be expected to continuously search for better ways of performing their part of the policing task. Managers are expected to keep abreast of these opinions, consider the possibilities and implement the changes where practicable. Establishing the dynamic of joint, integrated change can be onerous for a police organization.

3 Catalyzing

Catalyzing involves harnessing the momentum for change and providing structures to solicit and consolidate the views of staff and other sources of change information. The review has partly served this purpose and the Community Safety Division is in the position to establish momentum.

The Community Safety Division team, as the catalyst, for the most part, can assume the responsibility for the following actions: (a) synthesizing and translating the report of the review into a document with recommendations for Council, (b) acting on the instruction of Council to develop a change plan, (c) reviewing the detail of the intended course of change to any of the Model Options and developing a costing model by reshaping the broad explanations in the review so that the end result reflects the vision of the change process in the City, (e) providing a clear path to achieve the changes and articulating the change ideas to the staff, (f) monitoring the progress of change and making adjustments, as required, and (g) actively communicating progress to all employees and stakeholders.

4 **Steering**

The process of change must be engineered to ensure the following outcomes:

- the process remains focused and on target,
- is completed in a reasonable time, and
- is completed within the budget.

Steering, therefore, is comprised of the following five actions:

Defining and establishing the process for change

The report of the Review established many general and specific proposals for change. Some proposed changes apply to, for example, a renegotiated provincial police contract, others to a municipal model. Some of the proposals will feed into the contract negotiation process of UBCM. The role of the Community Safety Division team is to lay out a process of change for each adopted recommendation. Each individual change process must be an orchestrated as part of the higher-level change process. Both the specific and higher levels of process must be practical, accommodate consultation with relevant practitioners and detail a change course that outlines performance indicators, objectives and reporting and monitoring processes.

Planning the change process

The process of change must take into account the risks of implementation due to issues such as philosophical differences in the agencies, operational or policy conflicts or, simply, the difference in perceptions of how the task of policing should be conducted.

A perception that emerged in the review was that new initiatives, though valuable and headed in the right direction, often didn't succeed. The lack of success was attributed to factors such as a lack of common goals, a failure to develop a strategic plan, a failure to identify and resolve the detail issues, insufficient resources and personnel, and lack of an evaluation process for each change step.

Ensuring that change occurs as planned

A principal task/activity of the Community Safety Division team is to monitor each step of the change process to ensure that change is occurring as intended. This necessitates the plotting and movement forward of the change plan along with the provision of a touchstone for those involved.

The team is a sounding board for queries, the arbiter in disputes, and the sage decision maker in adjusting the plan to meet governance, administrative, and operational realities.

Providing impartial advice

Another role of the Public Safety Division team is a source of informed opinion on the process of change as it relates to the individual recommendations. This team must be able to speak with authority, regardless of rank and from a platform of knowledge gleaned through research, a broad knowledge of the principles and practices of policing, and from information from other police services' change processes.

Monitoring the process of change

The change team must be able to continuously 'feel the pulse of change' and be prepared to adjust the implementation process (within the confines of the master plan) to ensure that the changes underway are viable in an operational and management context. The voice of those impacted by the change must be heard and conveyed to the change managers.

Caution should be used to ensure that the voices of discontent reflect the operational reality rather than a simple resistance to change *per se* or the promotion of a personal or organizational agenda.

5 Delivering

Delivering is the act of making change happen. Once the overall plan is in place, then resources must be devoted to making the appropriate moves. Sceptics will await the first failure while the first successes provide a strong platform for moving forward.

Delivering is comprised of five sub-categories.

- Providing a comprehensive understanding of the existing situation and conveying this to the staff who are affected.
- Detailing a plan for improvement by articulating what must be achieved, by whom and by when.
- Carrying out pilot programs, evaluating and monitoring outcomes. This includes listening to the opinions of those affected.
- Applying the results of the pilot programs to the overall change initiative, adjusting, evaluating and refining.
- Establishing systems, policies, and processes to ensure that the change can be applied and is viable and is subject to periodic review.

6 *Ensuring Participation*

Full participation will not be achieved, as some employees, for various reasons, will merely acquiesce in the changes. Others will resist change. It is likely that a small number will be hostile as, in the course of change, vested interests are threatened, lifestyles will have to be adjusted, and established positions are eroded. Participation is optimized as the momentum of change encompasses staff that begins to see the work environment change. Although not guaranteed, participation can be facilitated by continuous communication, open discussion of issues as they arise, and a focus on bringing to fruition goals such as *'the policing of the City of Richmond to ensure the common and uniform well being of all residents of the City', 'the maximization of individual and collective skills within the City in terms of crime prevention, crime detection, and traffic safety', or 'the provision of training, education and developmental capability within Richmond policing that maximizes the potential of all members'*.

7 *Dealing with power issues*

Police agencies are conservative organisations. Fortunately, in the course of the review the RCMP managers and all staff as with other police managers in adjacent services contacted have demonstrated a great willingness embrace change. This became apparent in the course of interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the review, and in the programs and approaches that have been adopted to improve policing in the jurisdictions to which they provide service. However, it is likely that there will be resistance to change. Issue-based goal setting (and the associated issue-based negotiation) focuses perspectives on the task of dealing with community safety and security - rather than being encumbered by addressing the value-based mechanics of how it is to be done and becoming embroiled in power issues.

At the same time, power is vested in those who espouse a certain way of doing the business of policing just as much as it is in established hierarchies. The vision established by the agency executives, the process used to implement the direction of Council, the prevailing culture and the considerable skills vested in the City administration, and the credibility of the Community Safety Division team and the civic administration all impact the resilience of the power relationships.

8 *Training*

Change, particularly in a police organisation, requires the acquisition of new skills by personnel. At times it also requires changes in mind-sets. Training, in a broader context, requires the establishment of goals and objectives and the use of effective performance review processes to shape supportive behaviours. In addition, change requires a promotional system that selects appropriate personnel who concur with the change direction, are capable of aligning and integrating the changes in a practical manner, and ensures the effective maintenance of the new corporate systems. It was apparent from the interviews conducted in the course of the review that all the agencies who might be involved in a change process have skilled and competent staff that are very capable of managing the task of policing. Their skill base should be built on by providing opportunities to acquire new expertise in the Richmond context. Managing the change process also requires the ability to recognise when existing skills sets are inadequate and determining the need to acquire new assets, including human resources, to ensure the success of the initiatives.

No matter which policing model option is selected, nor the magnitude of the change required, training, where necessary, is an important element in ensuring the effective implementation of each change component. Training is buttressed by the shaping of performance-based behaviours through processes such as setting goals and objectives, and developing and implementing effective individual performance review. These processes help employees through the change as they acquire new responsibilities and adopt the new performance requirements that emerge.

9 *Communication*

All stakeholder expectations need to be kept realistic. Staff must understand the magnitude of change and their role in ensuring its achievement. Personnel must be informed regarding progress and they must feel that they are fully informed. Ongoing and enthusiastic communication underscores the need for change, emphasises the successes, and conveys to the staff the movement of the change plan along the prescribed continuum to the vision.

Persons consulted in the course of the Review

<i>Contact</i>	<i>Position/Organization</i>
1. Christine Silverberg	Chief of Police (retired), Calgary Police Service
2. Bob Mosher	Ministry of AG, Ontario, Program Specialist, Crown Law Office-Criminal
3. Robert Lindsay	Sergeant Policy Development Officer, Team Leader - Policy Unit, Research & Policy Section, OPP
4. Rod Case	Staff Sergeant, Proposal Development & Contract Maintenance Case Manager, OPP
5. Frank Kreiszi	Staff Sergeant, Strategic Services Coordinator, OPP
6. Kern Scott	Sergeant, Specialized Services Agreements Manager, OPP
7. Sue O'Sullivan	Deputy Chief, Ottawa PS
8. Randy Mar	Ottawa Police Planning and Research
9. Barb Burroughs	Strategic Operations Analyst, Bureau of Community Policing Services, Calgary Police Service
10. Kim Rossmo	Research Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Texas State University, and a management consultant with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
11. Lorie Velarde	Crime Analyst, Irvine Police Department, California
12. Dave Jones	Director of Crime Prevention, Vancouver Downtown Business Improvement Association
13. Bill Kaye	Insp. Lethbridge Police Department
14. Gail Edinger	Previously Co-chair, Vancouver VAWIR Co-ordination Committee
15. Dave Weber	Director, City Clerk's Office, City of Richmond
16. Terry Crowe	Manager, Policy Planning, City of Richmond
17. Anne Stevens	Manager, Community Recreation Services, City of Richmond
18. Eric Stepura	Manager, Sports & Community Events, City of Richmond
19. Dave Semple	Director, Parks & Public Works Operations, City of Richmond
20. Kate Sparrow	Director, Recreation & Cultural Services, City of Richmond
21. Victor Wei	Director, Transportation, City of Richmond
22. Wayne Yee	Coordinator, Youth Services, City of Richmond
23. Murray Chitra	Chair, OCCPS
24. Ron Paysen	Client Services NCO, Richmond City Detachment, RCMP
25. Bob Rolls	Deputy Chief Constable, Vancouver PD
26. Ted Schinbein	Inspector, HR Section, Vancouver PD
27. Dan Painter	S/Sgt., Human Resources Advisor, Career Development & Resourcing Services, "E" Division
28. Rendall Nessel	Operations Officer, Richmond City Detachment, RCMP
29. Tony Mahon	Ops. Support, Richmond City Detachment, RCMP
30. Ward Clapham	Officer I/C, Richmond City Detachment, RCMP
31. Paul Levy	V-P, Airport Ops. YVR
32. Barb Maloney	Manager, Aviation Security, YVR
33. Jorda Miller	Crime Intelligence Analyst, Richmond City Detachment, RCMP
34. Elaine Pederson	Manager, Records Management, Richmond Detachment, RCMP
35. Ronald Mostry	Officer I/C, Planning and Strategy Management RCMP, Ottawa
36. Troy Lightfoot	OIC, Ops. Policy, RCMP, Ottawa
37. Mike Woods	Ch. Supt., National Crime Ops. Ottawa, RCMP

38. Gord Gummer	Inspector, Victoria PD
39. John Ducker	Inspector, Victoria PD
40. Sandra Pearson	Manager, Operational Support, Richmond Fire Rescue
41. Scott Seivewright	Controller, Victoria PD
42. Jim Sumi	Architect, Process Four, Public Safety Bldg, Richmond
43. Cathy Boxer-Smith	Senior Advisor, OCCOPS
44. Malcolm Brodie	Mayor, City of Richmond
45. Mike Kirk	GM, City of Richmond
46. Cathy Volkering Carlile	GM, City of Richmond
47. Andrew Nazareth	GM, City of Richmond
48. Phyllis Carlyle	GM, City of Richmond
49. Jeff Day	GM, City of Richmond
50. George Duncan	CAO, City of Richmond
51. Joe Erceg	GM, City of Richmond
52. Brenda Bartley-Smith	Manager, Fire Administration, City of Richmond
53. Shawn Issel	Manager, Law and Community Safety, City of Richmond
54. Ted Townsend	Manager, Communications, City of Richmond
55. Jim Cessford	Chief, Delta PD
56. Lorne Zaptichny	Chief, New Westminster PD
57. Mike Judd	Deputy Chief, New Westminster PD
58. Kevin Begg	Assistant Deputy Minister and Director of Policing Services
59. Lisa Godenzie	Senior Program Manager, RCMP Contract, Public Safety and Sol. Gen.
60. Curtis Albertson	Deputy Director, Public Safety and Sol. Gen.
61. Peter German	Assistant Commissioner, LMD, RCMP.
62. Craig Duffin	Insp. Urban Policing Section, RCMP, Ottawa
63. Scott Merithew	Contract Mgmt., PPSA Renegotiation Team, RCMP, Ottawa
64. Ian MacKenzie	Chief, Abbotsford PD.
65. Doug Le Pard	Deputy Chief, Vancouver PD
66. Jim Chu	Deputy (now Chief), Vancouver PD
67. Kevin McQuiggin	Inspector, VPD
68. Bill Mercer	Dept. of Applied Research, UBC
69. Jerry Chong	Director, Finance, City of Richmond
70. Sam MacLeod	Executive Director, Security Programs and Police Technology, Public Safety and Sol. Gen.
71. Tim Trytten	Program Manager, Security Programs and Police Technology, Public Safety and Sol. Gen.
72. Geoff Lake	Deputy Chief, Richmond Fire and Rescue
73. Sherry Brown	Manager, BC Government, Publications and Web Hosting Services.
74. Glen Miller	Crime Analyst/Strategic Planning, Richmond Detachment
75. Dan Dureau	Chief, BC Transit Police
76. Ken Allen	Deputy, BC Transit Police
77. Ken Shymanski	Exec. Director, EComm
78. Deborah Cherry	Ops. Director, EComm
79. Bea Nicallato	Finance Director, EComm
80. Fred Biro	Executive Director, Peel Regional Police Services Board, Member, Ontario Municipal Employers Retirement Board (OMERS)
81. Wendy Fedec	Executive Director, Ottawa Police Services Board
82. David Griffin,	Executive Director, Canadian Professional Police Association
83. Dirk Ryneveld, QC	Police Complaints Commissioner, BC

84. Gordon, Robert	Professor of Criminology and the Director of the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University and Co-Director of the Centre for Restorative Justice
85. Darryl Plecas	Chair, Department of Criminology, University College of the Fraser Valley.
86. Fraser W MacRae	Chief Superintendent, Surrey RCMP Detachment
87. Lakhpinder Takhar	Senior Crime Analyst, Surrey RCMP Detachment
88. Doug Wright	S/Sgt. YVR RCMP Detachment
89. Tim Laidler	Insp. VPD, E-Comm
90. Jim Scott	Sgt. VPD, E-Comm
91. Lance Talbot	Crime Prevention Strategy Manager, City of Surrey
92. Trudy Dana	Victim Services, Lynnwood Police Department, WA
93. Adam Palmer	Insp. Planning & Research, VPD
94. Doug Fisher	St/Sgt, VPD
95. Axel Hovbrender	Director, Police Academy, JIBC
97. Mark Tonner	Sgt, Crime Analysis, VPD
98. Tom Stamatakis	President, Vancouver Police Union
99. Kash Heed	Chief Constable, WVPD
100. Dave Thompson	Sgt, CAD Coordinator, VPD, E-Comm
101. Dan Wendland	Sgt i/c Operations, University RCMP Detachment
102. Langley RCMP Detachment	three members, focus group
103. Vancouver Police	three members, focus group
104. New Westminster Police	three members, focus group
105. Richmond RCMP Detachment	three members, focus group
106. Richmond RCMP Detachment	shift briefings and "ride-a-longs"
107. Surrey RCMP Detachment	three members, focus group
108. Mike King	Research Professor in Criminal Justice, Centre for Criminal Justice Policy & Research, School of Social Sciences, University of Central England, Birmingham, UK

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